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THE FIELD OF SOCIAL JUSTICE

In a world beset by serious and manifold social evil many articulate pens and voices, zealous for the needed reform in the conduct of life and living, have advocated social justice. There can be no doubt of the value of social justice as a remedy for the world's illness. That illness is spiritual as well as corporal so the remedy must minister to the soul as well as to the body. Thus the curative value of social justice cannot be attributed entirely to social justice itself but must be attributed also to the supernatural virtue of charity, a fact often overlooked by many of those who interest themselves in social reform.

This error, if it may be called such, is easily understandable. Justice is, after all, the social virtue. It concerns itself intimately with the almost infinite number of human interchanges that are the stuff of which the social fabric is woven. It not only concerns itself with them but, since it is a virtue, makes them good.¹ The necessity of justice in everyday social life cannot, therefore, be overestimated, for the very conservation of that life depends upon it.² Justice might be called the life-blood of nations, the great guarantor of human rights, the law factor, and still its excellencies would only be hinted. Yet it should not be forgotten that justice has its limits, especially as a sole instrument of reform.

Rather than anticipate however, it will be sufficient here to mention some basic concepts of justice which will serve to illustrate our meaning. One of these, springing from the essence of the virtue,³ can be called or described as the emphasis justice places upon the giving to others of what *belongs* to them.⁴ Where St. Thomas treats of justice in a general way, he insists that the one broad notion common to all parts of the virtue is the notion of debt.⁵ The work of justice is to equalize a debt⁶

¹ *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 58, a. 3, c.

² *De Regimine Principum*, IV, 3.

³ *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 58, a. 5, c.

⁴ *Ibid.*, q. 59, a. 11, c.

⁵ *Ibid.*, I-II, q. 60, a. 3, c.

⁶ *Ibid.*, II-II, q. 61, a. 2, ad 2um.

and in this equalization we must note that justice is completely satisfied when the debt is paid,⁷ further it does not go. The *ad alterum* concept of justice⁸ is not based upon brotherliness but upon creditorship or indebtedness. We might mention also a quality of justice which amounts to a kind of brusqueness; that quality namely, which disposes it to attend to its own business—the payment of a debt—rather exclusively and to disregard the manner of its payment or the interior dispositions of the parties concerned.⁹ Not without reason does art personify justice as a goddess blindfolded.

Some advocates of social justice appear to extend its scope too much.¹⁰ Viewed as a species of justice it must conform to the notions fundamental in all justice and for this reason even impassioned advocacy should recognize the essential limitations of social justice, *as justice*. The lack of this recognition is perhaps more apparent than real. Behind most of the modern agitation for reform via social justice there is the realization that social justice of itself is not enough. "Neither moral reformation nor economic reorganization is alone sufficient. Both are necessary and each supplements the other."¹¹ But though the

⁷ *Ibid.*, q. 58, a. 10, c.

⁸ *Ibid.*, a. 2, ad 4um; a. 8, c.

⁹ *Ibid.*, q. 57, a. 1, c.

¹⁰ This is most clearly evidenced by sharp differences of opinion, even among Catholics, as to the precise role of social justice. Monsignor John A. Ryan, a recognized authority, begins one of his recent magazine articles with "The concept of social justice is not clearly fixed in the minds of most Catholics." In the analysis which follows Monsignor Ryan stresses the definition put forward by the Reverend Andre Rocaries, S. J.: *Social justice is the virtue which governs the relations of the members with society, as such, and the relations of society with its members; and which directs social and individual activities to the general good of the whole collective body and to the good of all and each of its members*; he is of the opinion that this "is the most precise and comprehensive definition of social justice that has yet been formulated." According to Monsignor Ryan's article Fr. Rocaries believes that the notion of social justice implies a doctrinal progress. "Social Justice and the State" in *The Commonweal*, XXX, no. 8 (June 16, 1939), p. 205.

¹¹ *Organized Social Justice*. Pamphlet prepared by the Social Action Department, National Catholic Welfare Conference (Washington, D. C.: 1936), p. 18. Cf. also *The Framework of a Christian State* by E. Cahill, S. J. (Dublin: 1932), pp. 539 ff. and *Reorganization of Social Economy* by O. von Nell-Bruening, S. J. (New York: 1936), pp. 333 ff.

realization of this insufficiency is present, the tendency is often to cancel it by enlarging the domain of social justice beyond the limits set for it by its particular nature.¹² This tendency is doubtlessly prompted by an admirable zeal which impels men, appalled by existing conditions, to bend every effort towards their betterment. But if social justice is not powerful enough to effect this betterment in the manner and with the speed which zealotry envisions, it does not do to tamper with social justice, to inject some sort of a virus into it. For this destroys it, topples it from the high position which it rightfully occupies in the hierarchy of the moral virtues,¹³ because the tampering always seems to hit in and around the end or purpose of social justice and the least harmful consequence of that is a decided weakening of its value as a means to any end.

The answer to the difficulty is that there must be, to repeat, an alliance between social justice and charity. It is true that there is no intrinsic quality in either virtue absolutely necessitating such an alliance. Charity is, under one aspect, worlds removed from social justice for its orbit is a supernatural one. Our concern, however, is not with the aspects which separate them. Man is a unit composed of spiritual and corporal elements. Therefore the needs of man will best be served by a keen realization of his duality. And there is no question here of comparison nor of superiority. Spirit excels matter; yet in man spirit and matter coalesce according to the design of God. A mind which looks upon this condition and conceives it solely as a chaining, an enslavement of the spirit is an heretical mind; a conception of man as a purely material being is equally mistaken. In the words of Christopher Dawson, "the issue is not simply one between two rival economic or political systems; it involves a spiritual issue that is deeper and more complex."¹⁴

We find in charity and social justice proportionate similarities. They reside in the will;¹⁵ are most excellent in their own

¹² This happens, for instance, when social justice is considered as a new virtue.

¹³ *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 59, a. 12, c.

¹⁴ *Religion and the Modern State* (New York: 1935), p. 140.

¹⁵ *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 24, a. 1; q. 58, a. 4.

order;¹⁶ influence other virtues: charity, by ordaining all virtues to the ultimate end¹⁷ and justice, by the ordination of natural or acquired virtues to the penultimate end.¹⁸ There is in charity an *ad alterum* concept,¹⁹ far nobler, since it is rooted in the supernatural, more extensive and much less circumscribed than the corresponding idea in social justice; prompted by love²⁰ rather than indebtedness, but nevertheless constituting a likeness and making the cooperative action of charity and social justice all the more possible. Thus in the modern Papal encyclicals which have been more responsible for arousing among men an awareness of social justice than any secular or civil influence, there is a constant and vigorous plea to join charity with social justice.²¹ The Papal analysis of the ills of mankind is no less acute for being fatherly. Because that analysis was worked out primarily through an understanding of man's spiritual make-up and further developed in accordance with his physical one, the result had to be the proposal of a dual remedy. To ignore one of its elements is to apply the remedy in vain.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the nature of social justice and to find out thereby some of the reasons why, in the task of social reform, it must be buttressed by charity. A review of fundamentals is essentially necessary for this; indeed our concern will be principally with fundamental and basic notions. Most of what follows will have to do, proximately or remotely, with social justice because a precise understanding of that virtue is necessary in an appraisal of its fitness as a means of reform. The correct conception of the purpose of social justice moreover will engender a knowledge of the extrinsic factors

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, q. 23, a. 6; q. 58, a. 12.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, q. 58, a. 6, c., ad 4um.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, q. 23, a. 6, c., ad 1um, ad 3um.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, q. 25.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, q. 23, a. 1, c., ad 2um, ad 3um et q. 27, a. 1, c.

²¹ Pope Leo XIII: "Inscrutabili" in *The Great Encyclical Letters of Leo XIII*, New York: 1903, p. 11; "Immortale Dei," p. 117; "Libertas Praestantissimum," p. 141; "Rerum Novarum," pp. 220-227, 233, 244, 247-248; "Graves de Communi," pp. 483, 485, 486.

Pope Pius XI: Pamphlets published by N. C. W. C., Washington, D. C. "Divini Redemptoris," pp. 35, 37-39; "Caritate Christi"; "Acerba Animi," p. 12; "Quadragesimo Anno," pp. 15, 34, 41-48.

which today hinder the attainment of that purpose and which make the cooperation of charity so much more necessary.²² In short we hope to indicate the necessity of the alliance between social justice and charity by an exposition of the limitations of social justice. That is our ultimate purpose.

We must mention here that we shall retain the name *social* justice throughout, although St. Thomas, in the tract on Justice²³ and on Law,²⁴ does not employ that term, using instead *legal* justice, which seems a more logical and fitting denomination. "St. Thomas, in giving this justice the name 'legal,' put the emphasis on its *formal aspect*; actually it pertains formally to law to provide for the common good and to regulate the acts of citizens which concern it. If we propose today to displace this emphasis, to put it on its *final aspect*, it is because the expression 'legal' has, by reason of usage, which remains the *de facto* master of language, lost much of its moral import."²⁵ Rightly or wrongly, *social* justice is the more widely-used name at the present time and it is evident that the *legal* justice of St. Thomas is contemporary *social* justice: the justice which points to the common good.

The order of procedure in a paper of this kind is to a certain extent arbitrary. Our first consideration will deal with general

²² The Rev. J. D. Callahan in his *The Catholic Attitude toward a Familial Minimum Wage* has listed varying concepts of social justice culled from contemporary writings: "'This term (social justice) it seems to us, *salvo meliori judicio*, ought to be rejected.' . . . 'Social justice carries the most humane and fruitful implications of all the terms and concepts that have found place in the discussion of social problems.' . . . 'Social justice is just another word for general (legal) justice.' . . . '(Social justice) is, to be sure, clearly enough differentiated from legal justice.' . . . 'Social justice is regarded as that (virtue) which obliges the employer to pay a family wage'" (Washington: 1936), p. 99.

²³ *Summa Theol.*, II-II, qq. 57-122.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, I-II, qq. 90-108.

²⁵ "En donnant à cette justice le nom de 'legale,' saint Thomas a mis l'accent sur son ASPECT FORMEL; il appartient formellement à la loi en effet de pourvoir au Bien commun et de régler les actes des citoyens qui le concernent. . . . Si nous proposons aujourd'hui de déplacer cet accent, de le mettre sur son ASPECT FINAL, c'est parce qu'à l'usage, qui reste maître en fait de langage, l'expression de 'legale' a perdu beaucoup de sa valeur morale." M. S. Gillet, O.P., *Conscience Chrétienne et Justice Sociale* (Paris: 1922), p. 141.

principles concerning the nature and rights of man; with his nature because it is the bedrock in and upon which all his activity and governance are anchored; with rights because they are the objects of justice.²⁶ They deserve primary treatment here for yet another reason, namely, that a large part of mankind's illness is directly traceable to a non-recognizance of individual and collective rights motivated by a mistaken idea of human nature.

Man is, by nature, a combination of the immaterial and the material. He is a creature and therefore dependent, but his dependency is not manifested through an unchanging physical necessity impelling him to act according to rigid laws, because his immateriality—the soul and its faculties of reason and will—transcends physical control. Man's dependency is manifested through moral control or guidance; through a law, in other words, regulating or measuring his acts of reason and will. This law is the natural moral law and constitutes for man a participation, proper and intrinsic to him, of the eternal law.²⁷ Since the dependency of a creature is evidenced by guidance or control—physical in the lower creatures, moral in man—we conclude that all creatures are destined, in the plan of God, to reach an end or a goal compatible with their status as creatures. The purpose of the natural moral law, then, is to effect God's plan for man, to guide him to his end.

Because of man's spirituality and corporality his end will be spiritual and corporal also and since the two elements are not antithetical in man neither can his double end be inwardly antithetical; but there must be a subordination of the lower to the higher. Consequently the progression of man to his end is exercised through the operation of the natural moral law impinging first upon his higher or spiritual faculties, and through them upon his lower or corporal faculties.

Man's end is determined by his nature. So there is a relative determination in his progress to his end. In other words, the reason and will of man, to measure up to or to fulfill the natural

²⁶ *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 57, a. 1, c.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, I-II, q. 91, a. 2, c.

moral law whose basic precept is "good should be done and followed, evil should be avoided,"²⁸ must choose and use means in a manner which insures progress to the end. Since his end is determined in accordance with his nature, since by his natural inclinations he is ordained to an end co-natural with him,²⁹ man also inclines naturally to the things that lead to the end.³⁰ Bad choice or use of means is not a perquisite of man's will, therefore, but unnatural and in conflict with his reason, which knows the end and by the same token judges whatever leads away from it as evil and contrary to the natural moral law.

Man as the creature of an intelligent Creator was made for a purpose, which purpose is the source of his obligation to reach his end. By reason of his nature the sanction for this obligation is moral, and thus in accordance with his intellective and appetitive rationality. The natural moral law embodies this guidance.³¹

The natural moral law is made up of three elements, two of them passive—the natural inclinations of man and the light of reason, while the third is active and is the command of reason—do good and avoid evil.³² All law is derived from the eternal law³³—the wisdom of God directing all act and movement³⁴—so the basic purpose of law is subordinated direction, ordered movement to an end in compliance with the plan of God. The natural moral law concerns itself wholly with elementals, "things intrinsically good and intrinsically evil, i. e. which lead to the end or away from it."³⁵ Because it deals with elementals the natural moral law underlies all human or positive law which is nothing more than its detailed application. The dependence of positive law on the natural moral law is properly the same rigid dependence as obtains between conclusions and the prin-

²⁸ *Ibid.*, q. 94, a. 2.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, q. 10, a. 1, c. et q. 91, a. 2, ad 2um.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, q. 62, a. 3, c.

³¹ *Ibid.*, I-II, q. 94, a. 2, c.

³² Farrell, W., O. P., "Natural Foundations of the Political Philosophy of Saint Thomas" in *Proceedings, Seventh Annual Meeting of the American Catholic Philosophical Society* (St. Louis: 1931), p. 77.

³³ *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 93, a. 3, c. et ad 2um.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, a. 1, c.

³⁵ Farrell, O. P., *op. cit.*, p. 78.

ciples from which they are drawn;³⁶ but there is also that dependence between them as between general principles and particular applications or specifications of those principles.³⁷ This latter type of dependence allows for a certain divergence in positive law, necessary because of "the great variety of human affairs."³⁸

This divergence is held to definite limits, for the natural moral law profoundly influences the use of means and, of course, the choice of means. Inasmuch as these lead man to his end they are good; inasmuch as they are more closely placed to the actual attaining of this end so much the more directly are they under the immediate judgment of the natural moral law.

Man's intellectual or spiritual end is his primary (i. e. ultimate) one: the operation³⁹ of his highest faculty⁴⁰ seeing God.⁴¹ Yet his secondary end and the operations conducive to it, by reason of their subordination, play a real part in the progress of man to his primary end.⁴² Man's higher faculties must travel in company with his lower ones; if they go hand in hand (pre-supposing that the former choose the route) man enjoys a fleeting foretaste of his last end.⁴³ If they do not, then progress to that ultimate end is broken and laborious; the measure of happiness attainable in this life through good living, i. e. ordered operation of all faculties implying the reasoned subordination of the higher to the lower—the life of virtue, in other words,⁴⁴—will be nil. But all this may be summed up by saying that the secondary end of man combines: (1) his physical end strictly understood which is the perpetuation of his species;⁴⁵ (2) the means necessary for the good attainment of this end: sustainment of individual, family and community life; (3) his natural rational end which is the life of virtue:⁴⁶ facile intellectual and wilful operation in conformance with the natural

³⁶ *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 95, a. 2, c.

³⁷ *Ibid.*

³⁸ *Ibid.*, ad 4um.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, q. 2, a. 1.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, a. 3.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, a. 8.

⁴² *Ibid.*, a. 3.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, I-II, q. 5, a. 3.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, aa. 3, 4, 5.

⁴⁵ Farrell, O. P., *loc. cit.*, p. 75.

⁴⁶ *In VII Polit.*, lect. 1.

moral law; (4) the means necessary for the good attainment of the natural rational end: broadly, the felicity fostered by tranquil and peaceful community, i. e. political life ⁴⁷ through which he is enabled to spend time in speculation and contemplation.⁴⁸ This secondary end of man in view of his primary or ultimate end, is itself a means. Only in the sense or with the understanding that all the constitutive parts of this secondary end—the multitude of interrelated ends and means which lead to it—are themselves man's means of reaching his ultimate end, is it possible to grasp their full significance and importance.

Man as an individual, as an intellectual person, tending to his end, enjoys a dignity by reason of his entity, and an inviolability in consequence of his obligation to reach his end; which obligation extends beyond him in the form of a corresponding duty in his fellowmen to recognize and respect this obligation and to allow him the free fulfilling of it. This is the proximate foundation of *rights* considered in the abstract.

A person is essentially an intellectual entity existing incommunicably in himself: under one aspect he is lord of his actions because of liberty, from another aspect . . . he is entirely individual in being and action; whence he does not merely nor principally exist for the good of others but for his own good and proper end. He cannot therefore be considered by others as a means subordinate to them, but they should revere him as a being existing just like themselves and of the same dignity, who cannot be deprived of his order to a proper good. Each person consequently is inviolable inasmuch as he tends to his end.⁴⁹

Since this tending to the end is largely dependent on the good use of secondary means and ends, the inviolability which man enjoys must extend likewise to his use of means and secondary ends. Rooted in this inviolability are all the so-called rights of man, those moral preferences by which one man exclusive of all

⁴⁷ *In I Ethic.*, lect. 1; IX, lect. 6; X, lect. 14. *In I Politic.*, lect. 1; VII, lect. 1, lect. 10. *De Regimine Prin.*, I, 2, 14.

⁴⁸ *In VII Polit.*, lect. 2.

⁴⁹ Merkelbach, O. P., *Summa Theologiae Moralis* (Paris: 1932), II, p. 157. Cf. also, III *Summa contra Gentiles*, 111 et 112.

others takes precedence in the use of whatever is necessary either proximately or remotely for the attainment of his end.

The rights of man determine the nature and extent of this use as well as the nature of the things to be used. We might add, at the risk of causing confusion, that rights themselves, in the broad conception of man as being always in progress to his end, are means. Rights must be substantiated by the natural moral law either immediately or mediately, i. e., the exercise of some rights have the same elemental bearing upon man's end as the natural moral law itself, while others, more concerned with less basic material, may indeed be directly sanctioned by positive or human law.

For St. Thomas, correlating rights with justice, the prime fact about a right objectively considered is that it signifies a debt.⁵⁰ The proper recognizance of a right consists in the performance of whatever is exacted for banishing this debt, for establishing some mode of equality,⁵¹ or righteousness.⁵² His meaning may be more clear if we say that he interpolated all rights in terms of what is right, i. e. of what is adequate to solve the debt involved.⁵³ The determination of what is adequate depends either on the very nature of the debt itself or upon an agreement, a pact or a common understanding of what constitutes adequateness in a particular case.⁵⁴ The debts of the former kind are, to revert to common usage, natural rights; those of the latter are positive rights.

Natural rights are not subject to change or curtailment by the force of human opinion or legislation; they are as immutable as the natural moral law itself having "everywhere the same potency and ability to lead to good and to refrain from evil (because) the nature which is the cause of this right is the same everywhere and among all."⁵⁵ Positive rights may be private

⁵⁰ *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 57, a. 2, c.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*

⁵² *Ibid.*, q. 58, a. 1, ad 2um.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, II-II, q. 57, a. 2, c. et ad 2um.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, c.; q. 60, a. 5; *In V Ethic.*, lect. 12.

⁵⁵ *In V Ethic.*, lect. 12. cf. also *Summa Theol.*, I-II, aa. 5, 6.

and therefore short-lived, the result of an agreement, for instance, between a buyer and a seller as to what shall constitute a right, a just price. Or they may be public and relatively lasting, the result of popular agreement or executive decree⁵⁶ which is incorporated into written law to gain authority and which must be interpreted according to that written law.⁵⁷ The scope of positive rights is limited in the same way as the scope of positive law is limited—to those things which of themselves entail no repugnance to natural rights.⁵⁸

Because of the connection between positive rights and positive law St. Thomas sometimes refers to them as legal rights.⁵⁹ They differ according to the nature of the political community which legislates them while natural rights on the other hand, remain the same in every kind of a political community.⁶⁰ It may be noted that the written law of a political community almost always contains enactments guaranteeing the recognition and preservation of natural rights; written law, however, adds nothing in the way of sanction to natural rights.⁶¹ Legal, i. e. positive rights are not only contained in written law, they are established or instituted by written law and depend upon it for their authority,⁶² in other words for their validity as obligating factors.

The quality of all rights and in consequence the kind of obligation they impose must be gauged from the law in which they originate. The strictest obligation is caused by a right which is founded directly in the natural moral law or which is derived from it as a conclusion is derived from a principle.⁶³ Positive rights, based on positive law, carry with them a less rigid obligation. The right of man to attain his end imposes the strict obligation upon others of allowing the free operation of this right. His right to the possession and use of the means necessary for such operation, in turn, establishes other obligations more or less strict in accordance with the degree of in-

⁵⁶ *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 57, a. 2, c.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, q. 60, a. 5, c.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, q. 57, a. 2, ad 2um.

⁵⁹ *In V Ethic.*, loc. cit.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*

⁶¹ *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 60, a. 5, c.

⁶² *Ibid.*

⁶³ *Ibid.*, q. 94, a. 4.

trinsic necessity existing between the possession and use of these means and the attainment of the end.

Rather than examine the whole gradation of rights it will suffice for us to note here the ways in which a natural right may be said to differ from a positive right: (1) a natural right is founded immediately in the natural moral law—a positive right is founded immediately in positive law; (2) a natural right imposes a universal obligation—a positive right obligates those under the jurisdiction of the law in which it is founded; (3) a natural right is formally immutable—a positive right is interpreted according to the wording of positive law and is subject to a further determination through judicial decision.⁶⁴

For our purpose now it would be well, keeping in mind the general objective principles we have just reviewed, to give some consideration to the subjective aspect of rights. First we must note that there is a causal relation between law and rights. In order to understand fully this relation we must separate subjective rights from objective rights and then conceive of the causality, or picture it, as flowing from law to subjective rights and then through these to objective rights. Law is the determinant or measure of right as it exists in man (subjective); right as it exists in man becomes an objective right to all other men, i. e., it causes in other men what can best be described as a responsive awareness of itself. A subjective right, then, is the middle ground and for that reason perhaps the most fertile in the general examination of the whole field.

It is defined ⁶⁵ as the moral legitimate and inviolable faculty of the subject to have, make or exact anything as exclusively his, for his own use. As a *moral* faculty or power a subjective right must be reasonable, that is, in conformity with reason; as a *legitimate* moral faculty its origin in law and the sanction of law which it enjoys is doubly emphasized. Its *inviolability* implies that it cannot be licitly prohibited nor unduly interfered with because it carries with it the moral power to impose

⁶⁴ *In V Ethic.*, loc. cit.; cf. also *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 91, a. 5, ad 1um.

⁶⁵ Merkelbach, O.P., *op. cit.*, p. 155.

upon others the obligation of recognition and respect. The words, *to have, make or exact*, point out some of the ways in which subjective rights are exercised. *Anything* is, of course, a very broad term but the customary acceptance of it in this matter is a triple one and includes (1) the possession of external goods, (2) the exercise of faculties, (3) whatever action is incumbent upon others to insure the recognition of a subjective right. *As exclusively his for his own use*—this phrase indicates the nature of the connection established by the exercise of subjective rights between the subject of the right and the *anything* to which it refers.⁶⁶ Since the purpose of a subjective right is to establish this connection such a right *before* the connection is made is called a *jus ad rem*, the right to a thing not yet attained; *after* the connection is established it is known as a *jus in re*, the right to a thing already obtained.

From all that has gone before it is quite obvious that the proper subject of a right is man, an entity of an intellectual nature capable of knowing his end and of freely disposing or ordering the use of means to that end. To bring all that has gone before more directly in line with our main purpose we must now pause in our consideration of individual man and give some time and thought to collective man, i. e. to the moral entity—society, the state. As we shall see later, social justice governs man's behavior towards his political community; therefore some survey of the nature and end of the state is called for here before we examine social justice itself. We have just completed an examination of rights, stressing at the conclusion the idea of subjective rights. Men depend for the preservation of their rights upon the offices of their political community and must exercise them under its aegis. So the state is intimately bound up with the operation of human rights and for that reason, too, deserves our next consideration.

Heretofore we have been interested in the nature of man as an individual; we considered him in the abstract and we concentrated on his nature and end as a separate entity in the

⁶⁶ Cf., *ibid.*, p. 156.

hierarchy of being. Retaining the abstract viewpoint our work now is to look upon man as a naturally social being and thence to proceed to a consideration of the life in common which is the result of man's social nature.

Communicativeness is the fundamental basis of man's natural socialness. The physical instrument of communicativeness is voice which is not limited to man alone.⁶⁷ What is proper to man, distinct from all other animals in the notion of voice is locution: the use of voice to indicate knowledge, "which is ordained to this, that men may communicate among themselves as to what is useful or harmful, just or unjust, and the like. From the fact that nature makes nothing in vain it follows that in these things the communication of man is natural."⁶⁸

There is in man, besides the ability to communicate intelligently with his fellows, a need for fellowship. And this need is natural too, and may be divided into a physical and an intellectual or moral need. "For other animals nature has prepared food, toughness of skin, means of defense such as tusks, horns, claws or at least a fleetness in flight. But man is made with none of these things prepared for him by nature; in their place reason has been given him—reason, through which he is enabled to make these things with his own hands. One man (however) does not suffice for making all. For one man by himself cannot carry on life sufficiently. It is therefore natural to man to live in the society of many men."⁶⁹

Not alone for purposes of maintaining life amidst the dangers which threaten it is the company and help of other men necessary. Even as regards the necessities of living such as food, clothing and shelter man depends largely on his fellows. Today this dependence is very pronounced since a very great proportion of men live in urban centers. Yet it is not something peculiar to our age; it is reasonable to consider it as characteristic of man's entire stay on earth.⁷⁰ Some men must farm, others must build and others must weave, all thereby contributing a share

⁶⁷ *In Polit.*, lect. 1.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*

⁶⁹ *De Regimine Prin.*, I, 1.

⁷⁰ *In I Polit.*, lect. 1.

of life's necessities to their fellowmen. It is not to be denied that in the old tribal and patriarchal communities individual families were more or less self sufficient. But in them also there had to be a division of labor according to aptitude and ability and there was a consequent mutual interdependence among the tribal or family members.

Men must not alone live but live well.⁷¹ Granted his physical need for community life of some kind, is there in man a moral or intellectual need for such living? There is, for in community life man receives help not only as regards corporal things but also as regards moral things.⁷² "For this do men live together, that they may live well which one living alone cannot do; a good life is one lived according to virtue and a virtuous life therefore is the end of human congregation."⁷³

We have already touched upon man's communicativeness. By means of this he formulates ideas in words and transmits them to others. He profits intellectually and morally from the example of others, for he is able to recognize goodness in them and to pattern his own life on their example. Indeed numberless arguments could be adduced to show proof of this need man has, but the best summation is: "It is clear that man is led to observe the order of reason in all things that may be of use to him. Now of all things that may be useful to man, other men hold the first place."⁷⁴

Man's socialness, the necessity he finds within himself for life in common as well as his aptitude for it, indicate that society is the natural mode of human life. He who cannot abide society is less than a man; he who does not need society is more than a man.⁷⁵ So it is reasonable to look upon society as a dictate of man's nature in full conformity with the natural moral law moving man to his end.

The fulfillment of the social impulse in man has resulted in the formation of the civil society or the state. Therefore not

⁷¹ *Ibid.*

⁷² *In I Ethic.*, lect. 1.

⁷³ *De Regimine Prin.*, I, 1.

⁷⁴ *III Contra Gentiles*, 128.

⁷⁵ *In I Polit.*, lect. 1.

only is society the natural mode of life but this society must be a close-knit moral entity with its own end and the right to use means for the attainment of this end. Here it is not a question of comparing various state forms or governments. Our concern is with the fact that some form of statehood is the natural mode of society.⁷⁶ The state or civil society is the perfect generation of the social impulse in man which moves him to bind all his lesser communities, family, town, city, etc., under a single large community.⁷⁷

The formation of the state is the result not of an accident nor of purely physical necessity; it is principally a morally necessary union altogether natural to man, and therefore human. Man recognizes in such a union a means of progressing towards his ultimate end and under this aspect his identification with the state is a secondary matter;⁷⁸ but his citizenship in civil society is of primary importance as far as his earthly life is concerned.⁷⁹ This moves man to join with other men who are likewise aware of their need for civil society as a help to them in living; and that form of society we call the state has its beginnings.

Since the state is a moral union it must be a union governed and conserved by reason. It has a purpose in being else it would never have been formed and the fulfilling of this purpose calls for a willingness on the part of its members to give to the state the right to ordain whatever is necessary for its purpose. This, in other words, is to say again that the state is a moral entity, resulting from the full development of the socialness of man which, as we have seen, is natural to him. The state, then, cannot be conceived of as an accidental moral entity; its origin is directly traceable to the natural moral law and thence to the divine wisdom. It has an end as have all entities. This end is a temporal one, of course. It may never supercede the ultimate end of each individual man.⁸⁰ Yet the due exercise of the state's

⁷⁶ *De Regimine Prin.*, I, 1.

⁷⁷ *In I Polit.*, 1.

⁷⁸ *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 21, a. 4, ad 3um.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, q. 90, a. 3, ad 3um.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, II-II, q. 104, a. 5, ad 2um.

right to attain its end cannot interfere of itself with the ultimate end of man; it is a means for his better progress thereto. The state must use proportionate means to attain its goal; for this reason (ultimately redounding to man's own good) those whose union form the state must be prepared to allow the state the free choice of these proportionate means in a manner consonant with their form of government.⁸¹

For the continued well-being of the state some form of unified proper action towards its end is necessary. This is only reasonable and it implies that the state must have authority as a moral entity to dispose the political life of its members; there must be order in political life, subjection of the lower to the higher,⁸² for even in a state composed of men entirely equal in everything there would still have to be a subordination of the ones ruled to their rulers. If this order is lacking then the efficacy of the social impulse which groups men into civil groups is destroyed and a purely *per accidens* community is the result, shot through with discord and without value as means to man.

Because it is evident that the state is called into being in the first place by the moral need of man for it, it does not follow that its existence thenceforth is automatic. There must be in man a continuous operative recognition of that need and a determination of the state's being according to that need. This recognition and this determination is fostered by the delegation of authority to the rulers of the state;⁸³ by means of this authority the state remains actually a purposeful entity and exercises its right to progress to its end in a reasonable manner.⁸⁴

Political authority is actuated principally through the legislation of positive law,⁸⁵ for law is a reasonable ordination whereby the end of the state is furthered. Positive law is necessary for this furtherance⁸⁶ but at the same time positive law, like the authority of which it is an actuation, is definitely limited in

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, I-II, q. 90, a. 3, c.

⁸² *De Regimine Prin.*, I, 1.

⁸³ *Ibid.*, II-II, 104, a. 1, c.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*

⁸⁵ Cf. *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 98, a. 6, ad 2um; q. 101, a. 3, c. II-II, q. 50, a. 1, ad 3um. Also, Farrell, O. P., *op. cit.*, p. 82.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, I-II, q. 95, a. 1, c.

scope and in power.⁸⁷ The acquisition of citizenship does not deprive man of the intrinsic guidance of the natural moral law. Indeed man must judge whatever his citizenship entails of him in the light of its conformity or non-conformity with the natural moral law, upon which rests the authority of the state to legislate, and consequently positive law itself.⁸⁸ The necessity of this accord does not prohibit a variegation in human legislation nor its mutation when circumstances or conditions warrant changes.⁸⁹ Yet civil authority and civil law are not limitless. Over and above the restriction placed upon them by the fact that citizens, as men, are guided intrinsically by a superior law there is a limitation by reason of the fact that citizens remain free to judge the efficacy of their particular form of civil society; which means that the end of the state is a determining factor in the existence and operation of any civil society. Briefly, we may say that the end of the state is the root determinant in this matter of the extent of civil authority and law, an end which is itself formulated in harmony with the nature of man and, in the larger concept, serves him as a means in his progress to his ultimate end.

So far we have been content to refer to the end of the state in a very general way. We must now examine it more thoroughly and attempt, as far as possible, to determine just what it is.

"The end of the state is to supply for the natural insufficiency of man."⁹⁰ The most widely used phrase to indicate the end of the state is "the common good." The purpose or end of the state is to procure the common good which is made up, quite obviously, of many things.⁹¹ To arrive at some definite notion of what constitutes the common good, attention should first be given to the term itself.

Common is to be understood literally, i. e., the commonness of the end of the state is to be determined strictly, it is the end of all the members of the state, not of a majority

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, q. 96.

⁹⁰ Farrell, O. P., *op. cit.*, p. 79.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, q. 95, a. 2, c.

⁹¹ *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 96, a. 1, c.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, q. 97, a. 1, c. et ad 1um.

nor of a particular group. St. Thomas compares the state and its members to a whole and its parts and thereby seems to insist on the necessary inclusion in the concept of the state of all of its parts or members, for a true whole must have all of its parts.⁹² *Good* means both a physical and a moral good⁹³ and it can be understood here in a general sense as applying to whatever is necessary and fitting, within the scope of the state's authority to procure, to enable the members of the state to attain their ultimate end. Since this good is specified by the word *common* it follows that its usefulness as a means to the ultimate end must somehow apply to all the members of the state.

The common good because it is an end, and in consequence a principle of operation, is not realized in any one operation. We cannot encompass it therefore in such definite terminology as we can a particular good, for instance. The common good is particularly the good of all the members of the state. The particular good of each of the members must contribute to the common good of the whole which they form by union. But there is a formal difference between the particular good of an individual and the common good.⁹⁴ So we cannot think of the common good as the sum or total, so to speak, of all the particular or individual goods—it is a specific good in itself.

In order to understand it more clearly it must be considered under a twofold aspect, or rather its constitutive elements must be considered under a twofold aspect: 1) those which constitute the immediate end of the state; 2) those which constitute its ultimate end. There is no sharp dividing line between them because the immediate end of the state is ordained to its ultimate end,⁹⁵ and both seem to be essentially bound up in the true concept of the common good.

Since the inductive method of procedure seems more in keeping with our present purpose—to find out what constitutes the

⁹² I-II, q. 92, a. 1, ad 3um; II-II, q. 58, a. 9, ad 3um; *De Regimine Prin.*, I, 3 and IV, 23; *In I Polit.*, lect. 1 and VII, lect. 6.

⁹³ *In I Ethic.*, lect. 1.

⁹⁴ *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 58, a. 7, ad 2um.

⁹⁵ Cf. Farrell, O. P., *op. cit.*, p. 79.

common good—we shall endeavor to list the benefits which should accrue to a citizen by reason of his civil status; the goods which come to him because he is a citizen; which he has a right to expect; which the state should be able to provide and which retain an essential similarity in all state forms, i.e. under different types of government.

Under the first heading (immediate elements) there should be placed primarily the basic goods for which men depend on social life, those we considered previously in terms of man's natural needs and estimated as proofs of his social nature. We divided them into corporal and spiritual needs or better, physical and moral needs, and consequently we may conclude: 1) that the state must provide for the physical needs of its members—a sufficiency of food, clothing and shelter.⁹⁶ This does not mean that the state must give these things to its citizens—saving in extreme cases. The ordinary provision of the state in this regard would extend to a supervisory control of agriculture, commerce and industry and the guaranteeing of a fair and just system of trade under which its citizens may equitably obtain their requirements.⁹⁷ Under the supplying of intellectual or moral goods should be placed all matters concerning education which the state should likewise guarantee, and provide where necessary. The attitude of Saint Thomas as regards the state's influence upon education is characteristically logical and reasonable. "No one having the right use of reason can doubt that for the common good of a nation it is of utmost importance to foster a disciplined and well-disposed youth."⁹⁸ Education means training in virtue and he insists that this extend to all the virtues. "A youth nourished solely on fortitude becomes a bellicose manhood fit for war but not for peace and felicity. . . . If instruction in virtue be limited at all, fortitude and temperance can best be minimized but not justice nor prudence."⁹⁹ Although there is no virtuous act which is not

⁹⁶ *In I Polit.*, lect. 1.

⁹⁷ *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 77, a. 2, ad 2um.

⁹⁸ *In VIII Polit.*, lect. 1.

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*

susceptible of being ordered to the common good¹⁰⁰ it is nevertheless true that the direct influence of the state in providing for the intellectual and moral needs of its citizens is restricted to the cultivation of civic virtues.¹⁰¹ This is succinctly expressed in the Aristotelian dictum: the virtue which makes a man good is not the same as that which makes him a good citizen.¹⁰²

The immediate end of the state is furthered by a just distribution of civic honors and rewards,¹⁰³ by the punishment of crime which by way of example and deterrent is a good for all citizens,¹⁰⁴ by adequate defense against invasion and protection in time of war.¹⁰⁵

All these elements, then, seem to constitute the immediate end of the state. St. Thomas sums them up by employing the phrases, "unity of the multitude," "peace," "the good life of the people" for which, he says, "three things are required. First, that the people be constituted in the unity of peace. Secondly that, united by the bond of peace, they be directed in good operation. . . . Thirdly, it is required that through the industry of the government (of the ruler) there be at hand a sufficient supply of life's necessities."¹⁰⁶

The common good which is the ultimate end of the state may be defined as that good which all members of the state desire¹⁰⁷ and whose desirability is such that it acts as the uniting bond in civil society. The proximate step to the attainment of this end is the immediate end of the state which we examined above and which we may call here, for brevity's sake, the unity engendered by peace or, more broadly, political concord.¹⁰⁸ The concrete ultimate end of the state, as far as it can be concretized,

¹⁰⁰ *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 96, a. 1, ad 3um.

¹⁰¹ *Q. D. De Virt.*, q. 1, a. 5, ad 5um.

¹⁰² *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 92, a. 1, ad 3um; *In III Polit.*, lect. 3.

¹⁰³ *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 61, a. 1, c.

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, q. 59, a. 4.

¹⁰⁵ *De Regimine Prin.*, I, 15.

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.* Cf. also, Farrell, *op. cit.*, p. 79.

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, III, lect. 11. Cf. also, Cox, S. J., *Liberty, Its Use and Abuse* (New York: 1937), II, p. 133.

¹⁰⁸ *In IX Ethic.*, lect. 6.

is the life of virtue¹⁰⁹ made possible by this political concord.¹¹⁰ It is called "felicity," the happiness fostered by a sufficient supply of exterior, bodily and spiritual goods exemplified in virtuous living.¹¹¹ In this felicitous operation the principal element is spiritual (i.e. intellectual) for in all determination of political ends and means the nature of man is the supreme guide. The ultimate end of the state must conform, in its sphere, to the ultimate end of man—the operation of his highest faculty seeing God; it must provide him with the opportunity for speculation and contemplation.¹¹² St. Thomas further specifies this by saying that "the felicity . . . of the whole state is the perfection which comes with virtue, not as something habitual . . . but as something flowing into operation. . . ."¹¹³

This common good which is the ultimate end of the state remains always a human good subordinate to the divine good constituting man's ultimate end.¹¹⁴ As it is realized in the lives of members of the state it can only come to them after a long time and this evident fact is an indication that *man's* ultimate end is not an earthly one.¹¹⁵ Consequently this common good is something finite; a civic good, in the sense that it is the desired goal to which all civil society must point.

But life on this earth is the necessary prelude to the next life and the manner of its conduct is the factor which shall condition the life to come. We have seen how here man must tend to his end; we have touched upon the means he uses in this tending and have examined the necessity as well as the usefulness of civil life as one of these means. The common good, immediate and ultimate, is the reason for the very being of community existence, especially of that ordered and unified community existence which is the state. All this serves to give evidence of the importance of the common good. Whether it is

¹⁰⁹ *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 92, a. 1, ad 1um.

¹¹¹ *Ibid.*, lect. 10.

¹¹⁰ *In VII Polit.*, lect. 1.

¹¹² *Ibid.*, lect. 1.

¹¹³ "felicitas . . . totius civitatis est perfectio quae est cum virtute, non secundum quod habitus quidam est . . . sed secundum quod reundat in opus . . ." *ibid.*

¹¹⁴ *De Regimine Prin.*, I, 14.

¹¹⁵ *Ibid.*; *III Contra Gent.*, 48.

ever actually realized and to what extent, are other and, it seems, irrelevant questions; what matters is that there is a common good; that this common good should be striven for in every state which is worthy of the name.

This striving is the work of the members of the state since the state is not an autonomous entity but a moral one. It is the people: rulers and ruled, united, cooperative and ordained to the common good. The union, cooperation and ordination must be rational and voluntary if it is to be human, virtuous if it is to be efficacious and good. The state as a particular form of society is the result of human industry;¹¹⁶ its continued existence depends likewise on human industry, i.e. on the vitality and the rectitude of the joint and cooperative ordination of all the members of the state to the common good. The rectification of all operations demanded for this continuance is the work of social justice.

The external operations of man inasmuch as they constitute his relations with those who are other than himself fall naturally into two categories: those which relate him to other individuals and those which relate him to his community or state.¹¹⁷ Social justice is the virtue which governs man's relations with or to the state. It is a good habit which inclines him to give to his community whatever is due to it, to respect the right of the state in its procuration of the common good by ordaining his acts to the common good insofar as the obligation of so doing is incumbent upon him.

The first distinction arises from the commonness of the common good which makes of social justice both a general and a special virtue. To paraphrase the words of St. Thomas:¹¹⁸ each man may be compared to his state as a part to its whole and consequently every good act of that man redounds to the good of the state, the common good. For this reason not only acts of social justice but acts of particular justice, the acts of

¹¹⁶ *In I Polit.*, lect. 1; cf. Farrell, O. P., *op. cit.*, p. 79.

¹¹⁷ *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 58, a. 5, c.

¹¹⁸ *Ibid.*

all the virtues in fact,—of temperance and fortitude which rule the interior dispositions or passions, of the intellectual virtues and of the theological virtues (in their exterior or public manifestation)—are ordainable to the common good, the same common good which is the object of social justice. So social justice may order any one of these to the common good and because of this it is called a general virtue, being compared in the natural order to what charity is in the supernatural order.¹¹⁹

It must be made clear that the distinction of social justice as a general and as a special virtue does not imply that there are two kinds of social justice. Essentially it is a special virtue by reason of its special object—the common good. The nature of this object is such that any virtuous act may be ordained to it through the imperium or command of social justice, just as any virtuous act in the supernatural order may be ordained to the *bonum divinum* by charity. Social justice is a special virtue in essence, a general virtue in extent.¹²⁰ It may move a man to place an act of temperance for the common good, thereby instilling into the temperate act a relation to the common good. This brings about a relative identification of social justice with temperance—or with any of the other virtues as the case may be—and thus we find social justice sometimes referred to as being all virtue.¹²¹ Over and above the commonness of its object there is yet another aspect of social justice which accounts for the broad extent of its influence. It is a virtue of the will, the rational appetite, and consequently not limited in its material as are fortitude and temperance, for instance.¹²²

Social justice is a special virtue because the common good of itself exacts the performance of special operations. In other words, the state has the right to progress to its end and it has the right to employ proportionate means thereto by using its authority to order the political lives of its citizens in accordance

¹¹⁹ *Ibid.*, a. 6, c.

¹²⁰ *Ibid.*, II-II, q. 58, a. 6, c.

¹²¹ *Ibid.*, I-II, q. 60, a. 3, ad 3um; II-II, q. 58, a. 6, c. *In V Ethic.*, lect. 2. Cf. also Cajetan, *Commentarium in II-II*, q. 58, aa. 5, 6, 7.

¹²² *Ibid.*, II-II, q. 58, a. 5, ad 2um.

with the common good. Citizens have the obligation of respecting these rights as a corollary of their citizenship.

The state, as was indicated previously, exercises its authority by means of law, the reasonable ordination of human operations to the common good,¹²³ and the consequence is that there exists a rigid connection between social justice, the wellspring of these operations, and the law which marks out the course of their flowing.¹²⁴

Social justice, of course, is subjected in the rational appetite as we know from its definition: the virtue through which a man *is inclined to, or firmly resolved, or always and constantly willing*—these various phrases give ample evidence of its psychological subjection.¹²⁵ What is of interest to us, however, is not in what faculty but in what person does it reside. There is no question but that social justice should be part of the moral equipment of all the members of a state. But it must be remembered that the object of social justice and the end of the state are one and the same. As the state's progress to its end depends for impetus upon the ruler, so too does social justice depend upon the ruler as upon a source. His acts are, so to speak, the roots of social justice; they determine the quality and extent of its growth. And in this sense the ruler is spoken of as the principal subject of social justice.

Social justice is a special virtue because the common good exacts special operations. These operations or acts are proportionate to the common good, i. e. they have of their very nature a positive influence on its procuration or preservation. Quite evidently the radical elements of these acts can only be placed by those who rule the state and by these only when acting in their official capacity.¹²⁶

When a man becomes the ruler of a state the destiny of the state is spoken of as being placed in his hands. This is literally

¹²³ *Ibid.*, I-II, q. 90, a. 2, ad 1um.

¹²⁴ *Ibid.*, II-II, q. 58, a. 5.

¹²⁵ *Ibid.*, II-II, q. 58, a. 1, c.; a. 4, c.; et a. 5, ad 2um. Cf. I-II, q. 56, a. 3, c.; q. 57, a. 1, c.; q. 59, a. 5, c.

¹²⁶ Cf. *ibid.*, I-II, q. 90, a. 3, ad 2um.

true if we understand a state's destiny to be its attainment of the common good. The advancement of the state towards its destiny depends principally on the virtue of him who guides it, subordinately on the virtue of those who follow his guidance. The virtue in both cases is the same—social justice, residing radically in the ruler or rulers of the state whose duty it is to govern, to move the state to its end, and formally in those who are ruled, who act for the common good by operating in accordance with the law. The equality which social justice seeks to establish is effected by the whole state entitatively; it is effected by the state ruler inasmuch as he plans state operation through legislation; it is effected by each citizen insofar as each one fulfills his socially just obligation to obey the law.¹²⁷

Since an unwillingness of a citizen to obey the laws of his state offers a real hindrance to the attainment of the end of the state, an individual may exercise a privative or negative influence on the common good. His positive influence upon it must remain only partial by reason of his status as a part of the whole, yet through the commission of crime he may injure the common good completely.¹²⁸ Because of this the state must resort to a coercive power in safeguarding its progress to its end. In other words, law enforcement is a necessary adjunct of state operation and efficient law enforcement renders the lack of social justice in ordinary citizens a less serious detriment to the common good. It is hardly necessary to add that a lack of social justice in a ruler weakens the social justice of the citizens who, without the legislative guidance which the ruler should provide, are haphazard and ineffective in their disjointed efforts to further the common good.¹²⁹

The connection between social justice and law must be stressed. Confining ourselves for the moment to the virtue as it resides in the ordinary citizen, we recall again that his individual operations of themselves cannot positively procure the

¹²⁷ Cf. *ibid.*, II-II, q. 58, a. 6, c.; q. 60, a. 1, ad 4um; I-II, q. 92, a. 1, ad 3um. In *III Polit.*, lect. 3; VII, 10. *De Regimine Prin.*, I, 1.

¹²⁸ *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 59, a. 1, c.

¹²⁹ Cf. *ibid.*, I-II, q. 92, a. 1, ad 3um.

common good. His part in its procuration and also in its conservation consists in his fulfillment of his lawful obligations. His socially just acts are not intended to establish a *quid aequum* immediately, but a *quid legitimum*.¹³⁰ These acts *plus* the socially just acts of the ruler which are, to repeat, the radical elements of social justice, are positively proportioned to the common good for by means of this correlation the movement of that moral entity which alone can adequate the common good is initiated and controlled. Without law, without legislation, however, the two can never join forces.

Law is, therefore, the great instrument of social justice and it is logical to conclude that the laws of a state are an indication of the manner in which social justice is practised within its borders; or, to put it another way, the quality of legislation gives evidence of the condition of social justice. If legislation is lacking or faulty, then the law must be improved and extended.¹³¹ "According to the teaching of Pope Pius XI, the principle means of promoting social justice (aside from a reform of morals) is action by the state."¹³²

There can be no gainsaying the fact that Thomistic doctrine stresses the necessity of the connection between law and social justice. Law is at one and the same time an embodiment of the ruler's planning for the common good and the determinant of each individual's acting for the common good. This, in the mind of Saint Thomas, does not in any way constrict social justice because for him social justice should be linked "to the law ordaining the acts of all the virtues to the common good."¹³³ This

¹³⁰ Cf. Merkelbach, O. P., *op. cit.*, p. 259.

¹³¹ Cf. *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 97, a. 1, c. et ad 2um.

¹³² Monsignor J. A. Ryan in *Social Justice in the 1935 Congress* (Washington, D. C.: 1932), p. 12.

Msgr. Ryan re-emphasizes this: "... in present-day conditions the state should be regarded as by far the most important agent and instrument of social justice," in "Social Justice and the State," *The Commonweal*, XXX (June 6, 1939), no. 8, p. 206. Cf. also *Towards Social Justice* by Rev. R. A. McGowan (Washington, D. C.: 1932), pp. 46 ff. and *What Laws Must We Have* by E. Morrissey (Washington, D. C.: 1937).

¹³³ *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 58, a. 5, c.

"law" is in reality a collection of law which must perforce be large since the common good "is made up of many things" and, especially in its immediate elements, is dependent upon a "multitude of persons, actions and temporalities."¹³⁴

What has been said so far concerning social justice may for clarity's sake be crystallized here into six propositions:

- 1) Since the *alterum* of social justice is the common good, social justice is interwoven with the well-being of the state.
- 2) What is owed the common good is ordained to it immediately by an act of social justice, mediately by an act of any other virtue imperated by social justice.
- 3) Social justice resides (and operates) radically in the ruler of the state.
- 4) Social justice resides formally in the subjects of the state.
- 5) Law is the embodiment of the ruler's social justice.
- 6) Law is the determinant of the subject's social justice.¹³⁵

¹³⁴ *Ibid.* Cf. also Callahan, *op. cit.*, p. 101.

¹³⁵ To hold that contemporary *social* justice is altogether identical with traditional *legal* justice is to leave oneself open to formidable objections. In the notion of *social* justice there is an element of distribution (i.e. *distributive* justice) which cannot be overlooked. The following analysis will perhaps serve as a guide.

- 1) Justice is triply divided according as it regulates the only three possible classes of relationships or interchanges in civil society: (a) part to part—*commutative* justice; (b) whole to part—*distributive* justice; (c) part to whole—*legal* justice. The justice which we call *social*, then, is one of these three types, a combination of all three, or a correlation of some two of these three.
- 2) All justice is social yet *social* justice as it is used today implies a further determination.
- 3) It is not *commutative* justice because then the use of *social* justice would be mere tautology. Therefore it is either *distributive* or *legal* justice or a combination of both.
- 4) In the practical working of *social* justice we can distinguish these acts:
 - a) act of obedience to or compliance with civil law on the part of citizens—an act of *legal* justice constituting the formal element of *social* justice;
 - b) act of legislating on the part of rulers to procure a more equitable

Our next step is to examine more closely the operation of social justice in the light of these propositions. The examination would be most profitable if we limited our consideration to the operation of social justice under a particular form of state government, preferably the democratic form.

In a democracy the ruler of the state is not one man but many men; indeed the actual government is to some extent vested in the people themselves inasmuch as they exercise their power of election at frequent intervals. The point of interest to us, though, is that in a democracy there are numbers of men, sometimes great numbers of them, who are the principal subjects of social justice. We have established the fact that social justice depends upon the ruler of the state as upon its source. When the number of rulers is multiplied so too are the number of those from whom must come the initial impulse of social justice's positive operation for the common good. We may limit "rulers" to those who are directly concerned with legislation, but the legislative branch is usually the most profusely peopled of all the branches of government.

Theoretically it is fairly evident that a numerous legislature is not a hindrance but a help in the working of social justice. Law-makers drawn from all sections of the state, from various classes of people, should be well able to determine the immediate and mediate measures necessary for the preservation and furtherance of the common good. Whether this actually is the normal course of legislative procedure is not for us to investigate. We may conclude that the men who make the laws must

condition among citizens, which act, constituting the radical element or root of *social* justice, is twofold:

- 1) formally as legislation—an act of architectonic prudence and of *distributive* justice;
 - 2) as a fulfillment of a duty of office on the part of an individual legislator—an act of *legal* justice, common to all acts of his office.
- 5) In a wider sense all acts of the state are of *legal* justice in relation to a higher law—the Law of Nature.

Social justice, then, is a correlation of *distributive* and *legal* justice on the part of rulers and citizens relative to the social, physical and economic conditions of the citizens.

be socially just men or else the common good will somehow suffer, and we can further affirm that since social justice is primarily beholden to the legislators for actuation and operation, appeals for its employment in the affairs of state must be directed mainly at them. Otherwise the appeals are useless.

In democracy the citizen's part in the operation of social justice remains secondary. This is something which can be emphasized for the good of social justice. It remains true in democracy that an individual cannot in any positive way attain the common good or establish it. That is the work of the state and of law. The common good is beyond the reach of an individual acting as an individual. His duty in social justice to the common good is a *quid legitimum* and cannot be a *quid aequum*. His goodness contributes to the good of the whole but the good of the whole is specifically distinct from his goodness or the good of any individual. That he be socially just, in other words, is necessary for the common good; but the operation of his social justice is to be determined by law.

As we shall see later, the restrictiveness of this determination is really the fault of law and not of social justice itself. We can repeat here the Thomistic concept of what that law should be: legislation ordaining the acts of all the virtues to the common good. In the absence of such legislation a citizen's social justice *is* restricted. But not beyond his power to lose, for in democracy he has a voice in the making of law since he freely chooses his representative legislator. Through his voting franchise the democratic citizen wields what approximates a real though remote positive influence on the procurement of the common good because his vote decides who shall legislate for it. It must not be forgotten either that any citizen in a democracy may be elected to a legislative position and thus become a principal instead of a secondary agent of social justice.

In view of his franchise and possible appointment as a legislator the virtue of social justice in the moral equipment of the ordinary democratic citizen is very important to the well-being of the state. Yet as long as he acts as an individual his social

justice must conform in its operation to the law, and the part it plays in the furtherance of the common good is secondary.

To gauge the status of social justice in a democracy, or in any other form of government for that matter, recourse must be had to the quality of existing legislation. There must be an examination, too, of the efficacy of law enforcement as it touches upon payment of taxes, respect of public property, the conduct of business, the exercise of basic human rights etc., though if law observance in a given state is mainly achieved through the use of force then we may rightly assume that the law is seriously defective. At all events the law is the definite measure of the actual condition of social justice.

Legislation must be judged on the basis of its furtherance or non-furtherance of the common good both proximately and ultimately. Granting that the concept of what constitutes the ultimate common good may differ in the minds of various members of the state there should be no essential differences of opinion as to its proximate elements, and this insures a common test for legislation. Does it effectively safeguard basic human rights in the midst of changing conditions? Does it afford each one the opportunity of equitably procuring a sufficiency of physical and moral necessities: food, clothing, shelter; freedom of worship, education, leisure? Does it suppress and punish crime? Does it insure, under the democratic idea of universal equality, that the liberty of one man or group will not predominate to the consequent detriment of the liberty of other men and groups? Does it exact a proportionate levy on private goods for the sake of the public good? Does it coordinate the due exercise of various rights, e. g. property and human?

Inasmuch as legislation, subjected to this or a similar test, is found wanting, a resurgence of social justice is vitally necessary to the well-being of the state and all its members. The consensus today is that legislation has been found very wanting and that social justice is much needed as the remedy.

We may here refer briefly to two factors which have contributed to what might be called the failure of legislation. One

is that during the greater part of the last century and for the initial portion of this century governmental and legislative activity was debilitated by the infamous *laissez faire* attitude, exemplified in a hesitancy to govern and legislate for fear of interfering with individual liberty. The other is a corollary to the first: the unrestrained growth of industrialism which has made the majority of men dependent entirely on wages for sustenance.

Lest there be a misunderstanding of the connection between social justice and wage payments it is well to recall that *commutative* justice regulates the wage contract between employer and employee. A just wage (sometimes referred to as a *living*, or a *minimum* wage) is one which perfectly adequates the value of a man's work and the obligation of an employer to pay this wage is strictly binding irrespective of the lack of labor legislation. To some Catholic sociologists a just wage means a family wage and the adequateness of payment must be measured in relation to the worker's family and social requirements. Though their arguments have been ably presented ¹³⁶ it seems evident that the more common opinion interprets a just wage as a perfect adequation of the value of the work performed, a payment determined by commutative justice, while a family wage is a payment which equalizes not only the value of the work performed but also enables the worker comfortably to raise and educate his children, to better his social status, to enjoy a reasonable amount of leisure and to insure a calm and peaceful old age—the wage, in short, which social justice aims to make possible and in so doing immeasurably further the common good. “Every effort must therefore be made that fathers of families receive a wage sufficient to meet adequately ordinary domestic needs. If in the present state of society this is not always feasible, social justice demands that reforms be

¹³⁶ Cf. Callahan, *op. cit.*, pp. 96 ff. Holding the opinion that social justice has no proper act but operates solely by imperating other virtues, Fr. Callahan concludes, “the virtue ordinarily connoted by social or legal justice relative to the (family) wage, is commutative justice” (p. 108).

introduced without delay which will guarantee every adult workingman just such a wage."¹³⁷

Laissez faire and unrestrained industrialism have contributed the most to the evils which now beset the world and the sum of their contribution may be succinctly stated as a woeful discrepancy between legislation and the exigencies of the common good as it exists in the well-being of the laboring classes. Thus the commonness of the common good, the value of civil society as a means for *all* men in the progress to the ultimate end, the felicity and peace which should be the state's contribution to man's earthly life—all these and kindred things have patently not been among the principles which have prevailed in recent political processes. Civil and social life, in consequence, is threatened with the spread of class consciousness and the enmity which it nurtures between groups promises, unless rooted out, to poison the whole social body. Law itself has suffered inasmuch as the failure of legislation to procure the real common good has been mistakenly attributed to a weakness inherent in all law, rather than to the fact that legislators have failed to make the proper use of law.

¹³⁷ Pius X in *Quadragesimo Anno*. The following summation of the problem of wages and justice is offered by O. von Nell-Breuning, S. J., in his *Reorganization of Social Economy*. After stating (p. 168) that "Commutative justice and charity are the *only* determinants in the relation between capital and labor" he goes on to say (p. 178): "According to *Quadragesimo Anno* the demand for a family wage is justified. In an economic system in which vast numbers of the population are forced to live on income from wages, this demand is absolute, as a demand of *social justice*. The public order in such a community contradicts social justice until conditions have been changed so that a family wage can be paid, not only to those workers who have a family, and must support these families solely from their wage income, but to every adult worker. As a demand of *commutative justice*, however, it is *conditional*; as soon as the demands of commutative justice have been fulfilled, and work has actually attained the value to which it is entitled according to economic conditions, it automatically becomes the employer's duty to pay family wages." The use of the expression "automatically" can be called into question.

Cf. also *Catholicism, Protestantism and Capitalism* by A. Fanfani, O. P. (New York: 1935), p. 134; *Rights and Wrongs in Industry* by Rev. T. J. Haas (New York: 1933), pp. 5, 6, 24 ff. For a brief survey of the U. S. Supreme Court decisions and their varied interpretations of a just wage cf. *The Constitution and Catholic Industrial Teaching* by Msgr. J. F. Ryan (Washington, D. C.: 1937), pp. 15 ff.

In the remedying of this state of affairs social justice has its work cut out for it indeed. Keeping in mind what we have already determined as its nature, subject and mode of operation we may now outline some of the actual conditions which, in view of the seriousness and extent of the evils to be eradicated, make a reform based on social justice alone an unfitting remedy. These conditions, of course, have to do with legislation for we have determined that social justice and law must work together. They are:

- 1) The multiplication of legislative bodies which are not always properly coordinated, e. g., city, county, state, and federal legislatures.
- 2) The influence of purely political factors in law-making, e. g., adherence to "party" programmes.
- 3) The influence of other factors not purely political, in law-making, e. g., group lobbying.
- 4) The period of time which must elapse in the ordinary legislative process.
- 5) The period of time which must elapse before a law is authoritatively interpreted, e. g. by judicial decision.

Many conclusions can be drawn from the above listing; the one we draw is that at best it will take time before necessary laws can be drawn up, passed and interpreted. Apart from the fact that the conditions listed may very easily result in the promulgation of conflicting, ineffective or faulty laws, they certainly do extend the process of legislation to undue limits and thereby prevent the immediate and practical application of the principles of social justice. Its remedial power is without a doubt hampered by the temporal element.

So the immediate task of social justice as things stand now is, it seems clear, to concentrate on the promulgation of needed legislation. The burden falls therefore on the legislators which is where it belongs according to our interpretation of the nature of social justice. The social justice of the private citizen must

likewise concentrate on the promulgation of needed legislation, through the instrumentality of his legally constituted voting franchise. There is no doubt, then, of the *ultimate* remedial power of social justice thus rightfully employed. But in the meantime—what?

In the meantime charity must fill the breach. Looked at in terms of actual suffering and hardship the evil conditions resulting from the disuse of social justice in a major portion of formal civil society heretofore seem to foster a distrust and dissatisfaction which charity alone can wipe out. We have already made allusion to the fact that the chief sufferers are those of the lower or working classes. It would be needless to recount the ills which plague them, but such things as poor wages, unemployment, etc., have brought upon them physical as well as moral ill-being. The latter can await an adjustment which, in the nature of things human, will be slow in coming; but the former must be adjusted now.

Not alone, then, because of man's dual nature is the need for charity imperative. Until such time as social justice accomplishes the legalization of an adequate family wage, for instance, until economic forces hitherto allowed free rein are harnessed for the common good of all, until liberty is harmonized with duty—charity, besides its ministration to the spirit, must also devote itself to the alleviation of physical suffering. There is no other remedy.

We have seen that social justice is hampered by external but real factors and that the disruption of the common good is an actual existing evil, which we must interpret in a twofold way: first as want and secondly as superfluity. For the common good is disrupted precisely because some men have taken too much while others have been unable to procure enough. Social justice will in the long run restore a balance in the manner which is properly that of justice: by fixing the amount of the debt owed the common good and by determining what each one must contribute to its payment. But only in the long run, after it has surmounted many high-reaching, difficult barriers such as those

we listed previously. Law, human law, says St. Thomas, leads man to virtue gradually not suddenly.¹⁸⁸ Social justice is paced by law.

Yet charity is not bound by any law save that of love of God and neighbor; it is not hampered by external factors such as time or jurisdiction. It does not await the fixing of a debt and the apportionment of payments before it operates. Charity looks at the common good warmly, personally, not abstractly; it sees in all men—the poor, the laboring, the unprivileged—a link which binds each and every one to the supreme common good which is God. Charity gives to a man not only what belongs to him but what is its own; its payment is measured by need and not by right.

There are no classes in the eyes of charity. The fact that a man is a laborer does not blind it to the other more fundamental and, in a sense, truer fact—that he is an inviolable entity destined by his Maker to an ultimate end beyond the power of earthly community or state to provide or prohibit. Charity recognizes the importance of organized civil life in the conduct of an ordered human existence. Charity knows too, that when the state fails in its mission to felicitate earthly life it is the men of the state who suffer, that the suffering of men is of more moment than the continued existence of any state. Charity, in short, sustains man individually and socially when the state cannot, and when social justice, hard-won and human, must necessarily plod to his rescue.

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¹⁸⁸ I-II, q. 96, a. 2, ad 2um.

THE IDEA OF THE CHURCH IN ST. THOMAS AQUINAS

It was customary to say, at least until recent years, that there was no treatise on the Church in St. Thomas and to place the origin of this treatise in the fifteenth century with the *Summa de Ecclesia* of the Dominican Cardinal, John Turrecremata.¹ Historians have recently claimed for the treatise a more ancient origin, and with justice. Arquillière, in his edition of the *De Regimine Christiano* of James of Viterbo, describes it as "the most ancient treatise on the Church." He is indisputably right in reclaiming priority for this work—older than the *Summa* of Turrecremata by nearly one hundred and fifty years; but he adds in his turn: "This phrase (elaboration of the treatise *De Ecclesia*) means that, for the first time, theological speculation strives, not to define the Church (for that had been done in the first centuries), but to discuss with a greater span its distinctive marks, its organization in the form of a kingdom, and the authority which rules it."² Arquillière here makes an important discrimination: if the *De Regimine Christiano* of James of Viterbo appears as the first treatise on the Church, then before it there was no treatise of its *kind*. This assertion obviously rests on a criterion; it involves a certain notion of what constitutes a treatise on the Church and further of what the Church herself is. The assertion is one that is typical of a certain concept of the Church which developed in the age of James of Viterbo, in the disputes with Phillippe le Bel; in the age of Turrecremata, in the midst of the arguments about the Council and the Pope raised by the Great Schism; and then in the age of the Reformation and the Counter-Reformation, as a reaction against the denial of every kind of

¹ Thus P. Torreilles (*Le Mouvement théologique en France depuis ses origines jusqu'à nos jours*. Paris: p. 172) makes it begin with the protestant controversy; M. d'Herbigny (*Theologia de Ecclesia*, vol. I, p. 9) with Turrecremata.

² H.-X. Arquillière, *Le plus ancien traité de l'Église: Jacques de Viterbe, De Regimine Christiano (1301-1302). Étude des sources et édition critique*. Paris: 1926, p. 10; compare p. 20.

institutional and visible Church by protestantism. And yet it is just this idea of the Church which is now called into question and made subject to revision by that present movement of thought and life which represents, as a whole, a return to something earlier than the polemic anti-gallican and anti-protestant positions, a return to the infinitely wider and deeper viewpoints of the great theological traditions of the Fathers and the great scholastics, and in particular to that of St. Thomas.

It is true that on the Church St. Thomas wrote no separate treatise, characterized by a study of the distinctive marks of the Church, of its organization in the form of a kingdom, or of the authority which rules it. But it seems quite clear that St. Thomas has in his works answers to these questions, answers which are compact even though scattered. It has even been said, and perhaps truly, that he was the first to introduce into theology a doctrine of papal infallibility;³ above all, it appears quite certain that his works contain scattered but most explicit principles of a theology of the Church *having a different drift* from that which developed subsequently, and it is even conceivable—the writer, indeed, is strongly inclined to the opinion—that St. Thomas acted deliberately when he wrote no *separate* treatise on the Church but conceived one on the lines which shall be set forth in the following.

But just one introductory note: all I say here about St. Thomas is equally true of St. Bonaventure, Alexander of Hales, Albert the Great and the other scholastics of that epoch. Excluding certain delicate discriminations which do not affect the general structural outlines, all these Scholastics offer the same ecclesiology as St. Thomas. In short, before the “first tractates on the Church,” no other method was known.⁴

* * *

³ F. X. Leitner. *Der hl. Thomas von Aquin über das unfehlbare Lehramt des Papstes*. Freiburg in Br.: 1872, p. 101. Harnack, *Dogmengesch.*, III², p. 422, makes St. Thomas responsible for introducing into theology the hierarchic or papal conception of the Church which was definitely established during the crisis inaugurated by the Reformation.

⁴ For the ecclesiology of St. Thomas, consult: J. Bainvel, S. J., “L’idée de l’Église au moyen âge: S. Thomas,” in *La Science catholique*, Oct. 1899, pp. 975-988; M.

Examined closely, the ecclesiological texts of St. Thomas are numerous, but to begin with it is enough to choose them haphazardly. Still, there is one which I prefer to take as a starting point, not only because it is one of the most thorough, but also because it occurs in a work where St. Thomas, speaking expressly about the Church herself, was more free to develop his thought as he wished without being bound or determined by considerations of systematic construction: the subject being the explanation of the words: *Sanctam Ecclesiam Catholicam*, in the *Expositio in Symbolum* (where St. Thomas follows the text, not of the Symbol of Nicea-Constantinople—the *Symbolum Patrum*, but of the so-called Symbol of the Apostles). I translate this text almost in its entirety:

As in a man there is one soul and one body, yet a diversity of members, so the Catholic Church is one body and has different members. The soul which quickens this body is the Holy Ghost; and that is why, after faith in the Holy Ghost, we are required to have faith in the Catholic Church, as the Creed itself makes clear. He who says Church says Congregation; and he who says Holy Church says Congregation of the Faithful, and he who says Christian Man says Member of that Church. . . . The Church is one, and this unity of the Church is grounded in three elements. It is grounded first in the oneness of faith; for all Christians belonging to the body of the Church believe in the same reality, as Scripture says: *That ye all speak the same thing, and that there be no divisions among you* (I Cor., i, 10); *One Lord, one faith, one baptism* (Eph. iv, 5). Further, this unity comes from the oneness of hope, for all are rooted

Grabmann, *Die Lehre des hl. Thomas von Aquin von der Kirche als Gotteswerk* . . . Regensburg: 1903; J. Geiselman, "Christus und die Kirche nach Thomas von Aquin," in *Theologische Quartalschrift*, CVII (1926), pp. 198-222 and CVIII (1927), pp. 233-255; Th. Käppeli, O. P., *Zur Lehre des hl. Thomas von Aquin vom Corpus Christi mysticum*. Fribourg (Switz.): 1931. On the ecclesiology of Albert the Great, the monograph, unfortunately inadequate, of W. Scherer, *Des sel. Albertus Magnus Lehre von der Kirche*. Freiburg in Br.: 1928. On the ecclesiology of St. Bonaventure: D. Culhane, *De corpore mystico doctrina Seraphici*. Mundelein: 1934; R. Silič, O. F. M., *Christus und die Kirche, Ihr Verhältnis nach der Lehre des hl. Bonaventura*. Breslau: 1938 (the best monograph); H. Berresheim, *Christus als Haupt der Kirche nach dem hl. Bonaventura. Ein Beitrag zur Theologie der Kirche*. Bonn: 1939.—One may suggest analogies in Richard de Mediavilla, for whom confer F. Ott, O. F. M., "Der Kirchenbegriff bei den Scholastikern, besonders bei Richard von Mediavilla," in *Franzisk. Studien*, 1938, pp. 331-353.

in the same hope of attaining to eternal life, as St. Paul says again: *There is one body, and one Spirit, even as ye are called in one hope of your calling* (Eph. iv, 4). Thirdly, there is the oneness in love, for all are joined unto the love of God, and to one another in the love of one another, according to what St. John says: *The glory which thou gavest me I have given them: that they may be one, even as we are one* (John xvii, 22). This love reveals itself, if it be true, when the members have care and solicitude one for another and when they feel for one another. . . . The Church of Christ is holy . . . , with a holiness which is grounded in three things: . . . in this, that the faithful have been washed in the Blood of Christ . . . , in that spiritual anointing which they have received and whereby they have been sanctified . . . , which anointing is the grace of the Holy Ghost . . . , and thirdly in the fact that the Trinity dwells in her . . . , in short, that there we call upon the name of the Lord. . . . Furthermore, the Church is Catholic, that is, Universal. First in virtue of her spatial or geographic catholicity, which springs from her diffusion through the whole world . . . , then from the catholicity which she has by inclusion of all kinds and conditions of men of which none is left without; . . . lastly she is universal in time . . . , enduring from Abel till the end of the world, after which she shall continue to endure in heaven. . . . Fourthly the Church is indestructible . . . , having Christ for her chief foundation and the Apostles and their doctrine for the second . . . , and that is why she is called apostolic. . . .⁵

⁵ "Sicut videmus quod in uno homine est anima et unum corpus, et tamen sunt diversa membra ipsius, ita Ecclesia catholica est unum corpus, et habet diversa membra. Anima autem quae hoc corpus vivificat, est Spiritus Sanctus. Et ideo post fidem de Spiritu Sancto jubemur credere sanctam Ecclesiam catholicam; unde additur in Symbolo: *Sanctam Ecclesiam catholicam*. Circa quod sciendum est quod Ecclesia est idem quod congregatio. Unde Ecclesia sancta est idem quod congregatio fidelium, et quilibet christianus est sicut membrum ipsius Ecclesiae. . . . Sed Ecclesia est una (*Una est columba mea; perfecta mea, Cant., vi*). Causatur autem unitas Ecclesiae ex tribus. Primo ex unitate fidei. Omnes enim christiani qui sunt de corpore Ecclesiae idem credunt: *I Cor., i, 10, Idipsum dicatis omnes et non sint in vobis schismata*, et *Ephes., iv, 5, Unus Deus, una fides, unum baptisma*. Secundo ex unitate spei, quia omnes firmati sunt in una spe perveniendi ad vitam aeternam, et ideo dicit Apostolus, *Eph. iv, 4: Unum corpus, unus Spiritus, sicut vocati estis in una spe vocationis vestrae*. Tertio ex unitate charitatis, quia omnes connectuntur in amore Dei, et ad invicem in amore mutuo: *Joan., xvii, 22: Claritatem quam dedisti mihi dedi eis ut sint unum sicut et nos unum sumus*. Manifestatur autem hujusmodi amor, si verus est, quando membra pro se invicem sunt sollicita et quando invicem compatiuntur. . . . Ecclesia vero Christi est sancta. . . . Santi-

In this text where St. Thomas and his thought are not conditioned by any particular biblical passage, by any question of systematic articulation, but have free play, we find him defining the Church as a living body compacted out of a plurality of members, all quickened and governed by a single living principle. This living principle or soul is the Holy Ghost. In a more immediate manner, the various members of this living body which is the Church are a unity in virtue not only of the indwelling of God in them, the indwelling of the Trinity, and the possession of the Holy Ghost, not only in virtue of the presence of this divine soul which dwells in them—one of the titles of the Church's claim of holiness—but also in virtue of the fact that God, always through the possession of the Holy Ghost, places *in them* certain tendencies, which flow from Him into them as gifts or graces and which in them are the virtues of faith, hope, and love. The Church is one living body, not only because a single soul dwells therein and makes a temple of it, but also because a single soul, namely, the theological virtues, which are divine life immanent in men, quickens its members inwardly.⁶

fiantur autem fideles hujus congregationis ex tribus. Primo enim quia sicut ecclesia, cum consecratur, materialiter lavatur, ita fideles loti sunt sanguine Christi. *Apoc. i, Dilexit nos et lavit nos a peccatis nostris in sanguine suo; Hebr., xiii, Jesus, ut sanctificaret per suum sanguinem populum.* Secundo ex inunctione, quia sicut ecclesia inungitur, sic et fideles spirituali inunctione unguuntur ut sanctificentur, alias non essent christiani, Christus enim idem est quod unctus. Haec autem unctio est gratia Spiritus Sancti. . . . Tertio ex inhabitatione Trinitatis. . . . Quarto propter invocationem Dei. . . . Circa tertium est sciendum quod Ecclesia est catholica, id est universalis, primo quantum ad locum, quia est per totum mundum. . . . Secundo est universalis quantum ad conditionem hominum, quia nullus abjicitur, nec dominus, nec servus, nec masculus, nec femina. . . . Tertio est universalis quantum ad tempus . . . quia haec Ecclesia incoepit a tempore Abel et durabit usque ad finem saeculi. . . . Circa quartum sciendum est quod Ecclesia Dei est firma, primo si habet bona fundamenta. Fundamentum autem Ecclesiae principale est Christus . . . secundarium vero fundamentum sunt Apostoli et eorum doctrina. . . . Et inde est quod Ecclesia dicitur apostolica. . . ." *Expos. in Symbolum*, in art. 9.

⁶ God is our life *effectively, actively*; charity, *formally*: *In III Sent.*, d. 13, q. 1, a. 1 ad 3um; *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 110, a. 1, ad 2um; a. 2, ad 1um; q. 111, a. 2, ad 1um; II-II, q. 23, a. 2, ad 2um and 3um; *Q. D. de carit.*, a. 1, ad 1um. Thus, it is in having grace and living faith as immanent and informing the soul that we have, dwelling in us, the Holy Ghost; and each time St. Thomas asks if men can confer

To clarify these general ideas which dominate St. Thomas' notion of the Church, the following points must be noted:

1. St. Thomas primarily conceives of the Church within the plan and categories of life and not primarily within the plan and categories of the sociological. If the Church is a "body," it is not only in the sociological sense of the word that St. Thomas defines it as "a multiplicity organized into unity by the concourse of different activities and functions";⁷ rather it is conceived in a manner which must remain profoundly mysterious, in the biological sense of the word.⁸ When St. Thomas inquires into the nature of the law which operates in the economy of the New Covenant, he finds that it is before all else the grace of the Holy Spirit:⁹ that is to say, not a text, or a sociological structure, but an inward reality, a supernatural living thing.

2. Nevertheless, this life does not dissolve us in God; it is, indeed, a wonderful thing that, in living by the life of God, we are able to be and to remain personalities; it is genuinely *we ourselves* who live by this life. The unity which grafts us into God is a social unity of personalities, after the pattern of the Triune Society of the Absolute. The mode of our living by the divine life is the mode of spirits, of persons. Moreover, life is determined, like all movement, by its objects; for men to live the life of God means having the "ends" and objects of the life of God: this is achieved by the theological virtues, by faith

grace, he puts it in these terms: *Utrum possint dare Spiritum Sanctum: Summa Theol.*, III, q. 8, a. 1; ad 1um; in *Galat.*, c. 3, lect. 2, etc.

⁷ "Unum corpus similitudinarie dicitur una multitudo ordinata in unum, secundum distinctos actus, sive officia." *Summa Theol.*, III, q. 8, a. 4.

⁸ St. Thomas frequently compares the *corpus Ecclesiae*, that is the body which is the Church, and the natural body: in *III Sent.*, d. 13, q. 2, a. 2, sol. 2; *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 183, a. 2, ad 3um; *Expos. in Symb.*, a. 10 (Sanctorum communionem); in *Coloss.*, c. 1, lect. 5; c. 2, lect. 4; in *Ephes.*, c. 4, lect. 1 and 5; in *I Cor.*, c. 12, lect. 3, etc.—The mystical Body is nevertheless the Body of Christ only metaphorically (*analogia metaphorica*): *Summa Theol.*, III, q. 8, a. 1, ad 2um.

⁹ "Id quod est potissimum in lege Novi Testamenti et in quo tota virtus ejus consistit, est gratia Spiritus Sancti quae datur per fidem Christi. Et ideo principaliter lex nova est ipsa gratia Spiritus Sancti quae datur Christi fidelibus." *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 106, a. 1; q. 107, a. 1, ad 3um; q. 108, a. 1, etc.

which begins to see as God sees, love which loves as God loves, and all the moral virtues which organize human life under the theological virtues. To define the Church as a body having community of life with God is to conceive of it as humanity vitalized Godwards by the theological virtues, which have God for their object, and organized in the likeness of God by the moral virtues. The ecclesiology of St. Thomas is profoundly ethical and theocentric. According to him the Church is one *ex unitate fidei quia idem credunt, ex unitate spei quia omnes sperant vitam aeternam, ex unitate charitatis quia omnes connectuntur in amore Dei*; she is one because, by faith, hope, and love, all have the same vital object and goal, and because this is itself the very object of *the life of God*. Hence it is also true to say that the entire Second Part of the *Summa Theologica* is ecclesiology.¹⁰

3. The plane or sphere of means and ends must correspond. Only God can lift us up to the life of God; only a "dynamic" principle genuinely divine can direct and move us towards the objects of the divine life. So also, St. Thomas tells us that the Holy Ghost is the quickening soul of the body of men living by the life of God. A characteristic and classic idea in the patristic and scholastic tradition,¹¹ but one which St. Thomas has vividly portrayed and which, far from being a mere pious metaphor, a beautifully literary *motif*, or rather nebulous exaggeration, manifests and represents a powerful technical factor in his theological thought.¹² I shall recall three examples and no more,

¹⁰ For St. Thomas the substance of the mystical Body is living faith. There are many texts: cf. for instance: "Fides caritate formata est nova creatura. . . . Sic ergo per novam creaturam, scilicet per fidem Christi et caritatem Dei, quae diffusa in cordibus nostris, renovamur et Christo jungimur," in *Galat.*, c. 6, lect. 4, fin.; in *Joan.*, c. 7, lec. 7, nn. 2, 3, 4 and 6; in *IV Sent.*, d. 9, q. 1, a. 2, sol. 4; *Summa Theol.*, III, q. 80, a. 2, c. and ad 2um, ad 3um; a. 4, etc.

¹¹ Cf. S. Tromp, S. J., *De Spiritu Sancto anima Corporis mystici*. I. *Testim. ex Patribus graecis*. II. *Testim. ex Patribus latinis*. Rome: 1932; E. Mura, "L'âme du Corps mystique. Est-ce le Saint-Esprit ou la grâce sanctifiante?" in *Revue thomiste*, 1936, pp. 233-252; Käppeli, *op. cit.*, pp. 100 ff.

¹² This is obvious from the texts cited *supra*, n. 9. To the text of *Expos. in Symb.* cited *supra*, n. 5, add: in *Galat.*, c. 5, lect. 4, in *III Sent.*, d. 13, q. 2, a. 2, sol. 2; *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 183, a. 2, ad 3um. It is true that St. Thomas also calls the

but these are tremendously significant ones. In chapters 20, 21 and 22 of the Fourth Book of the *Contra Gentiles*, St. Thomas explains how and why the whole supernatural life of man, the whole *motus creaturae in Deum*, is to be attributed to the Holy Ghost.¹³ This idea is most clearly developed in the question of merit, which, to be most exact, is the efficacious power in the moral action or the spiritual life of man, of attaining *God*, his final end. Realizing that only what comes effectively from God can return efficaciously to Him, attaining to Him, and appealing to the words of Christ in the Gospel of St. John, *Fiet in eo fons aquae salientis in vitam aeternam* (John iv, 14), St. Thomas sees that merit depends on two conditions: first, the meritorious act is free, really emanating from us (remember that we are discussing a society of persons); secondly, it receives its meritorious efficacy from God, *ex hoc quod procedit ex gratia Spiritus Sancti, secundum virtutem Spiritus Sancti moventis nos in vitam aeternam*.¹⁴ Lastly if we look at the Sacraments, which confer this grace efficaciously, we see that St. Thomas relates their efficacy to the power of the Holy Ghost working within them: "The water of Baptism receives its efficacy from . . . the Holy Ghost, as from its first cause; 'We have all been made to drink of the same Spirit,' says St. Paul. This can be understood . . . in a second sense of the sacramental drink, which the Holy Ghost

Holy Spirit the *heart* of the Church (cf. Grabmann, *op. cit.*, pp. 184 ff.). It is useful to indicate here the texts where St. Thomas comments on the words of the *Credo*, "In unam Sanctam . . . Ecclesiam," explaining it to mean: "Credo in Spiritum Sanctum vivificantem et santificantem, et unientem Ecclesiam." In *III Sent.*, d. 25, q. 1, a. 2, sol. and ad 5um; *Comp. Theol.*, I, c. 147; *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 1, a. 9, ad 5um, etc. The same idea is found in the Fathers and the great Scholastics: cf. S. Tromp, S. J., *Corpus Christi quod est Ecclesia*, I. Rome: 1937, pp. 89-91; Grabmann, *op. cit.*, p. 122; M.-J. Congar, *Divided Christendom*, London: 1939, p. 56, n. 2.

¹³ The texts are many: *Comp. Theol.*, I, c. 147; in *Galat.*, c. 5, lect. 4; IV *Cont. Gent.*, 20; *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 45, a. 6, ad 2um, etc.

¹⁴ *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 114, a. 3; *Comp. Theol.*, I, c. 147; in *Rom.*, c. 8, lect. 4; in *Joan.*, c. 4, lect. 2, n. 4. Compare what St. Thomas says on the Communion of saints and the communication of spiritual goods, which he attributes always to the *virtus Spiritus Sancti*: *Summa Theol.*, III, q. 68, a. 9, ad 2um; q. 82, a. 6, ad 3um. Compare II-II, q. 183, a. 2, ad 3um.

consecrates.”¹⁵ And the same applies to all the functions and ministries of the Church, whose efficacy St. Thomas traces to the Holy Ghost, who is indeed the soul of the Church, the dynamic power of this life of humanity moving Godwards. Herein St. Thomas sees the first and deepest notion that can be had of the Church.

To sum up this first glance at the mystery of the Church contemplated in not a few texts of St. Thomas, but mainly in his commentary on the Creed, we may say that it is anthropological or moral, and pneumatological or theocentric. The substance of the Church is made of the new life which men receive by the three virtues of faith, hope, and love, and which is a life driven Godwards, which has God for its end, and the objects of divine life as its determining principles. For St. Thomas, the Church is the whole economy of the return towards God, *motus rationalis creaturae in Deum*, in short, the *Secunda Pars* of his *Summa Theologica*. Of this *motus* and return the Holy Ghost is the power and the first action; He is the principle of this divine life which is determined by the “dynamism” towards the objects of the life of God; He is the soul of the Church.

To this elemental notion corresponds the definition of the Church, classic in ancient theology, as *Congregatio Fidelium*:¹⁶

¹⁵ *Summa Theol.*, III, q. 66, a. 9; in *I Cor.*, c. 12, lect. 3. Grabmann, who cites these texts (*op. cit.*, p. 175), suggests the importance of this interesting point of view for the problem of the *epiklesis*. In general, one may note, on the points which we have just touched the difference of approach and interest between St. Thomas and the moderns. In the matter of merit, the latter attend before all else to the conditions and human value of the act; St. Thomas rather stresses the divine source. In the matter of the Church, the moderns stress almost exclusively its foundation by Christ in the form of an organized society, whilst St. Thomas concerns himself above all with its inward soul. In the matter of sacraments, the question of institution which has become all-engrossing for the moderns, little interested the Scholastics, who had on the point great liberty of spirit (see, for Alexander of Hales, *Ephemerides Theologicae Lovanienses*, 1932, pp. 234-251, and for St. Bonaventure, *Études franciscaines*, 1923, pp. 129-152, and 337-355); St. Thomas seems as if interested above all in the *auctor* of the sacraments, in the causality which acts in them and to which their effects must be traced.

¹⁶ This definition comes from Isidore, *Ethymol.*, lib. VIII, c. i. For St. Thomas, cf. *In IV Sent.* d. 20, q. 1, a. 4, sol. 1; *Q. D. de Ver.*, q. 29, a. 4, obj. 8; *IV Cont.*

the assembly of those who have received the gift of faith, and, through it, have been made sharers of the divine life.

* * *

If the Church is the economy of the return of personal beings to God, *reditus creaturae rationalis in Deum*, this return can only be accomplished actually *in Christo*, "*qui, secundum quod homo, via est nobis tendendi in Deum.*"¹⁷ I have already said that the ecclesiology of St. Thomas, like the ethic to which it is wedded, is *before all things* theocentric, and the same may be said of the ecclesiology of St. Paul; it is inevitable that to try to think of the mystery of the Church in the light of the principles of St. Thomas means focusing the attention first on the theological or theocentric phase, and after that on the "Christ" or christocentric phase, and, even more manifest, is the fact that in the two systematic expositions of theology which he has left us—both of them unfinished—St. Thomas has thrown into relief the theological or theocentric phase before the "Christ" or christocentric one.

And yet, the second aspect is in nowise minimized or blurred by the first, and, after having found in the commentary on the Creed an elemental notion which is anthropologic and ethic or pneumatologic and theocentric, we read on and find in St. Thomas a strong christological idea of the Church. It is probably true that, just as St. Thomas was more original and creative in ethic than dogma, so he can be said to be more original in his pneumatologico-moral notion of the Church than in his christological. In fact, what possesses remarkable power, depth and precision concerning Christ and His meaning and relevance for the Church is common to the great scholastics of the thirteenth century and reaches St. Thomas largely via St. Augustine, Hugh of Saint-Victor and William of Auxerre,¹⁸ to say

Gen., 78; *Comp. Theol.*, I, c. 147; *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 117, a. 2, obj. 1; III, q. 8, a. 4, ad 2um; *Expos. in Symb.*, art. 9; in *I Cor.*, c. 12, lect. 3; in *Hebr.*, c. 3, lect. 1, etc. For other Scholastics, cf. R. Seeberg, *Dogmengeschichte*, vol. III⁴, p. 567; F. Ott, *art. cit.*, p. 332; Arquillière, *op. cit.*, p. 89.

¹⁷ *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 2, prol.; compare III, prol.

¹⁸ For St. Augustine, cf., among others, M. Vetter, *Der hl. Augustinus und das Geheimnis des Leibes Christi*. Mainz: 1929, pp. 35 ff.; for Hugh of St.-Victor, cf.

nothing of the Fathers, the Greek Fathers in particular, the scattered threads of whose doctrine this view gathers up and presents.¹⁹ I refer to the very foundations of the matter to be here discussed, namely the matter of the capital grace of Christ.

Like the Fathers, St. Thomas himself had a most powerful sense of the engulfing of the Church in Christ and of the immanence of Christ in the Church, a sense of the ecclesiological relevance of Christ and of the christological relevance of the Church.

A) ECCLESIOLOGICAL RELEVANCE OF CHRIST. When very God became flesh, the divine-human being that He constituted, the humanity which, in Him, was joined to God *in persona*, became the head of all creation. St. Thomas has looked deep and clear into the consequences that follow on this unique dignity.²⁰ First, in the soul of Christ there was the fulness of all grace, a fulness "intensive" as well as "extensive," qualitative as well as quantitative, embracing all we can attribute to a man flowing from the created grace of God, whether sanctifying grace with the virtues and gifts flowing from it, or graces *gratis datae*. Thus, in the world of grace, a kind of Platonism is valid, for Christ contains in Himself the fulness of the species grace, in a way similar to that in which the archetype of Man, in Plato, contains the fulness of human species. So that, if other individuals are to receive grace too, they may only do so in dependence on

De sacramentis, lib. II, pars 2, P.L., CLXXVI, 415 ff., and Grabmann, *op. cit.*, p. 17; for William of Auxerre, cf. *Summa aurea*, lib. III, c. 4 and Grabmann, p. 201. Other references will be found in F. Ott, *art. cit.*, and useful readings can be found in the texts of Albert the Great and Ulrich of Strasburg edited with those of St. Thomas by Backes in *Florilegium patristicum*, XL (Bonn: 1935).

¹⁹ Cf. I. Backes. *Die Christologie des hl. Thomas von Aquin und die griechischen Kirchenväter*. Paderborn: 1931. The admirable book of Father H. de Lubac, S. J., *Catholicisme. Les aspects sociaux du dogme* (*Unam Sanctam*, III, Paris: Ed. du Cerf) may be consulted with considerable profit: many patristic texts are cited therein.

²⁰ *Summa Theol.*, III, qq. 7 and 8; *Comp. Theol.*, I, c. 213 ff. *Q. D. de Ver.*, q. 29. This q. 29 is very important because it is between q. 27 and q. 29 of the *De veritate* that St. Thomas changed his first theory of the causality of Christ's humanity, and consequently of the sacraments, in the communication of grace. Geiselmann has conclusively shown this in the work cited *supra*, n. 4. More recently, Backes has noted the influence of St. Thomas' reading of the Greek Fathers in that evolution.

Christ and, if these be men, whose unique Savior is the God-given Christ, they may only receive it from Christ and in virtue of sharing, participating, in His own grace.

St. Thomas has developed this thesis in questions 7 and 8 of the *Tertia Pars*, which are on the grace of Christ precisely as it is proper to Him and comes to Him as *Caput Ecclesiae*—basic questions in his ecclesiology. The following ideas are dominant: Christ is head of a new humanity, to be exact, just that humanity which we have considered in the process of receiving from God this new Godward life, which has as its goal the objects of the divine life, and which returns to the heart of the Father. Christ is the principle and head of this new economy of things, somewhat as Adam was of the first. He contains in Himself all the effects of grace which are to be later spread abroad in the Church, as the white flame enfolds all the brilliancies of color analysable into the spectrum. Hence St. Thomas goes so far as to say that Christ plus the Church do not make more than Christ alone, in the same way as God plus the world, which emanates from God and realises in plurality what is one and simple in Him, do not make more than God alone.²¹ For, as the world is what it is only by participation of God, thus receiving from Him but adding nothing, so the Church, new life of humanity moving Godwards, is what she is only by participation of Christ, receiving from Him, yet adding nothing. St. Thomas further says²² that the return of humanity to God from whence we came out and whose image we bear—this return of created realities and goods, *naturales bonitates quas*

²¹ Cf. *In IV Sent.*, d. 40, q. 4, a. 3, ad 4um: "In Christo bonum spirituale non est particulatum, sed est totaliter et integrum; unde ipse est totum Ecclesiae bonum, nec est aliquod majus ipse et alii quam ipse solus"; *Q. D. de Ver.*, q. 29, a. 5: "Et quia Christus in omnes creaturas rationales quodammodo effectus gratiarum influit, inde est quod ipse est principium quodammodo omnis gratiae secundum humanitatem, sicut Deus est principium omnis esse: unde, sicut in Deo omnis essendi perfectio adunatur, ita in Christo omnis gratiae plenitudo et virtutis invenitur"; compare *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 183, a. 2, c.; *Expos. in Symbol.*, art. 10.

²² *In III Sent.*, prol.; compare *Comp. Theol.*, I, c. 201: "Perficitur etiam per hoc quodammodo totius operis divini universitas; dum homo, qui est ultimo creatus, circulo quodam in suum redit principium, ipsi rerum principio per opus incarnationis unitus."

Deus creaturis influit—operates twice: once in Christ, for, says St. Thomas, when the human nature, in which is concentrated and recapitulated all creation, was united to God in Him, *omnia flumina naturalium ad suum principium reflexa redierunt*; a second time, not in the mystery of the Incarnation itself, but in its harvest, the riches of God, humanized in Christ, scattered over all humanity so that they may return once more to their source and principle.

Thus, for St. Thomas the very structure of the Church of Christ as God-Man is radically ecclesiological, for Christ bears in Himself the whole economy of the new life, the whole of humanity reborn moving back to God, and the Church, which is the same thing, is really a kind of overflow of a fountain, or an unfolding and development of what was from the beginning Real in Christ.

B) CHRISTOLOGICAL RELEVANCE OF THE CHURCH. This is just the counterpart of what has been said. Nothing exists in the economy of return to God, that does not spring from Christ, that is not caused in us by Him and first known and willed by Him, that has not in Him its pattern and is not a likening to His perfection as image of the Father. All we do in the economy of the new creation, which is the Church, is not wrought in us except it come from Christ—"Virtue is gone out of me"—nor except it be willed and caused by Christ. And that is why it is truly the life of the Alone, *His* life, that is lived in the new humanity and quickens the Church. In truth, the whole of the *Secunda Pars*, the whole of the theological and moral life that is the new life borne Godwards, is the life of Christ in us.

The plan and the scientific process of analysis followed by St. Thomas in the *Summa* and the *Compendium Theologiae* is not exactly adapted to manifest this truth inevitably and this is undoubtedly a weakness in a plan otherwise finely conceived and vigorously applied. But there is no shadow of doubt that, for St. Thomas, the supernatural life in its entirety, theological and moral, is in us intimately as something "Christic" and

sacramental, and, when examined closely, there are several indications in the very structure of the *Summa* which force it to give up this secret. Let us examine just one, which seems to have outstanding importance. In the anthropological treatise which is part of the *Prima Pars, De Deo et de processu creaturarum a Deo*, St. Thomas contemplates man precisely as made in the image and likeness of God.²³ It is of such a man—man carrying about with him and realizing the image of God—that St. Thomas speaks as a theologian. Man bearing it and realizing it, I have said, for this image is not some sort of mere statically possessed and imposed imprint; it involves a dynamic tendency towards the Object to which we are thereby likened, and it only truly realizes itself in action and movement, and the more so in proportion as the action and movement are true and perfect. This is why, in question 93, article 4, of the *Prima Pars*, St. Thomas distinguishes three degrees according to which the image of God may be realized in us, according to the more or less actually alive relation to Him, as Object of knowledge (acquaintance with) and of love, namely: (1) in potency, through the natural powers of the *mens*; (2) habitually and imperfectly, through grace; (3) actually and perfectly, in our actions and through the heavenly glory. The whole movement of the *Secunda Pars*, the entire *reditus creaturae rationalis in Deum*, is a realization of the *transire in imaginem* of which the medieval mystics speak.²⁴ I am not reading into St. Thomas what may not be there, I am merely translating him, for listen to the words in which, in the prologue to the *Secunda Pars*, he prefaces the study of this *reditus in Deum*: “Since, according to St. John Damascene, man is said to be made in the image of God inasmuch as he is endowed with a spiritual power of knowledge and with free will, and is master of his actions, therefore, after treating of the exemplar, God, and the created beings emanating from his power and will, it remains to consider his

²³ *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 93, prol.

²⁴ Cf. E. Gilson, *L'Esprit de la philosophie médiévale*, vol. II, ch. I; *La Théologie mystique de st. Bernard*. Paris: 1934.

image, man, precisely inasmuch as man is the principle of his actions, and has over them free disposal and dominion.”²⁵

Moreover—and here is what I am trying to lead up to—the three degrees which St. Thomas, at the end of the *Prima Pars*, distinguished within the process of realization of the image of God, and of the growth in likeness to God, find their exact counterparts in the degrees of belonging to Christ and likening unto Christ which St. Thomas analysed in an article of the *Tertia Pars*. “*Utrum Christus sit caput omnium hominum.*”²⁶ I think one would hardly depart from the thought of St. Thomas in saying that the degrees of realization of the image of God, the analysis of whose richness and manifold phases is the work of the *Secunda Pars*, are correlatively degrees of incorporation into Christ, degrees also of conformity, of likening, and assimilation to Christ: for He is emphatically, in the terms of the prologue to the *Tertia Pars*, “*Viam per quam ad beatitudinem immortalis vitae resurgendo pervenire possimus,*” and He is this in virtue of all the things *quae per ipsum sunt acta et passa.*²⁷ Whence

²⁵ *Summa Theol.*, I-II, prol. Thus, in virtue of the point of view which it expresses, and of the citation from St. John Damascene which was seen before in I, q. 93, a. 9, the prologue of the I-II brings the whole of the *Ila pars* under the ratio of the image of God and joins it to the *Ia pars*, q. 93.

²⁶ *Summa Theol.*, III, q. 8, a. 3: “*Membra corporis mystici accipiuntur non solum secundum quod sunt actu, sed etiam secundum quod sunt in potentia . . . (Et qui sunt actu) secundum triplicem gradum, quorum primus est per fidem, secundus per caritatem viae, tertius per fruitionem patriae. Sic ergo dicendum est quod accipiendo generaliter secundum totum tempus mundi, Christus est caput omnium hominum, sed secundum diversos gradus. Primo enim et principaliter est caput eorum qui uniuntur ei per gloriam; secundo eorum quo actu uniuntur ei per caritatem, tertio eorum qui actu uniuntur ei per fidem; quarto eorum qui ei uniuntur solum in potentia nondum reducta ad actum. . . .*”

²⁷ *Summa Theol.*, III, prol.; q. 62, a. 5, ad 1um; compare II-II, q. 124, a. 5, ad 1um: “*Christianus dicitur qui Christi est. Dicitur autem aliquis esse Christi, non solum ex eo quod habet fidem Christi, sed etiam ex eo quod spiritu Christi ad opera virtuosa procedit, secundum illud Rom., viii, 9, Si quis spiritum Christi non habet, hic non est ejus; et etiam ex hoc quod ad imitationem Christi peccatis moritur. . . .*” The idea of the imitation of Christ is not, therefore, strange to St. Thomas, but he seems to conceive it rather in relation with the imitation of the self despoilings and sufferings of Christ. See on the subject texts gathered together by F. Florand in his admirable Introduction to the *Croix de Jesus* of Chardon, Paris: Ed. du Cerf, 1937, pp. xcvi ff.

arises St. Thomas' insistence in the *Tertia Pars* on the virtues of Christ and all He achieved and suffered in the flesh, during the time of His sojourning among us. These things are what constitute His life redemptive, meritorious, efficacious. These are the things whereby He is set up as our exemplar and pattern to be contemplated as the measure and standard of our own fashioning, becoming like unto Him in the movement of our return towards God, the return analysed in the *Secunda Pars* and filled in and completed by the *Tertia Pars* in those elements which explain the birth and growth of the Church, the new creation that is in Christ Jesus.

* * *

In this way we see how the two aspects so far delineated, the one pneumatological, ethical or theocentric, the other christological, cannot be mutually exclusive, but on the contrary work one within the other, interpenetratively and complementarily.

All graces come, as from their first and proper cause, from God, and from God the Holy Ghost by "appropriation"; our fashioning is in the likeness of God, of His Holy Trinity, the heart of which is our end and goal, and the work of the same God in us; because a work of love, it is in a special sense said to be the work of the Holy Spirit and it likens us to Him. How then can there be community of attribution between Christ and the Holy Ghost, and how is the Church the Body of Christ and not that of the Holy Spirit? Because none of these things come to us except by Christ and in Christ—by which is meant Christ—the *Man—qui est nobis via tendendi in Deum*. Further, since the Holy Ghost, according to St. Thomas at any rate, has, in the giving of grace and the work of our likening ourselves to God's image, no kind of proper and particular causality, but appears as the object only of an "appropriation";²⁸ Christ, in His humanity joined to the divinity *in persona*, has a true and particular causality, though instrumental. St. Thomas revives a teaching of the Greek Fathers, especially St. Cyril of Alex-

²⁸ Cf. the texts cited nn. 6, 12 and 13, and Congar, *Divided Christendom*, p. 55, n. 2.

andria and St. John Damascene, when he calls Christ the organ, the conjoined living instrument of the divinity for the giving of grace.²⁹ A conjoined instrument, having its causality in the giving; a living instrument, having its initiative, while entering the situation by human knowledge and human will, the knowledge and the will of Priest-King-Savior.³⁰ Moreover Christ, in His gracious humanity, humanizes the divine life communicated; He is truly able to be *Head* of the Church and the Church really His Body, because He is homogeneous with it through His human nature. In it, Christ is become a member and individual among the general concourse of humanity, and therefore He can rise to be its Head so that it becomes His Body.³¹

In this manner the newness of human life coming back to God is shared between the Holy Ghost and Christ; the newness of life called the Church: God—by “appropriation” God the Holy Ghost—is the end and active power of this divine life. Ultimately all things come from Him and we are made more and more like unto Him, living by the things and ends which make up His own divine life.

Christ, in His holy and gracious humanity, is properly the instrumental cause, besides being an intelligent and voluntary cause, of the gifts of God; and, on the plane of exemplary and final causality, He offers to us a divine life humanized and fitted to our condition of saved children of wrath. It is first to Him, and then, in Him and through Him to God, that we are fashioned

²⁹ Cf. *Summa Theol.*, III, q. 1, a. 1, ad lum; Geiselmann, cited *supra*, nn. 4 and 20; Grabmann, *op. cit.*, pp. 221, 243-244. Here lies the principal difference between St. Thomas and St. Bonaventure; the latter having remained content with the idea that whatever there was of *influxus in gratiam* derived in Christ from His divinity: cf. the Scholion of the edition of Quaracchi, vol. III, p. 402.

³⁰ Cf. *Summa Theol.*, III, q. 8, a. 5, ad lum; compare in *Ephes.*, c. 4, lect. 5: “A capite Christo in membris ut augmentantur spiritualiter influitur virtus actualiter operandi. Unde dicit: *Secundum mensuram uniuscujusque membri augmentum corporis facit*, quasi dicat; non solum a capite nostro Christo est membrorum Ecclesiae compactio per fidem, nec sola connectio vel colligatio per mutuam subordinationem caritatis, sed certe ab ipso est actualis membrorum operatio sive ad opus motio secundum mensuram et competentiam cujuslibet membri. . . .”

³¹ *Q. D.*, de Ver., q. 29, a. 4; In III Sent., d. 13, q. 2, a. 1; in *Ephes.* c. 1, lect. 8.

and moulded, living first with Him and in Him the things ineffable of His life of redeeming and saving Sonship before the Father.³²

* * *

What we have seen so far defines for us the profoundest characteristic of St. Thomas' idea of the Church, with its triple phase: pneumatological, anthropological or moral, and christological. The Church so conceived corresponds, as we saw, to the definition: *Congregatio hominum Fidelium*. Such a notion leads St. Thomas, in line with the universal Latin tradition since Augustine, to consider the Church substantially one and unbroken in its movement through time, *a iusto Abel usque ad finem saeculi*³³—an idea which assuredly does not square well with the ecclesiology of those for whom the *De Regimine Christiano* of James of Viterbo is literally "the first treatise on the Church"; yet I repeat that it is universal among the ancient writers of the West since the golden age of the patristic period.

Meanwhile it would not be accurate to conclude that the ancient writers, including St. Thomas, stopped there and remained silent concerning those things which are studied and defended in the separate treatises "De Ecclesia" today—distinctive marks, organization in the form of a kingdom, the authority that rules it. Indeed, discussions of elements of the Church which are more external find plenty of room in St. Thomas and are clearly and strongly marked. St. Thomas has a doctrine on the powers of the Church, on Priesthood,³⁴ juris-

³² Cf. *supra*, n. 27 and St. Thomas, *Summa Theol.*, III, q. 69, a. 3; I-II, q. 85, a. 5, ad 2um; *Q. D. de Malo*, q. 4, a. 6, ad 7um. It is in perfect conformity with the doctrine of Aquinas that Billuart (*Summa*, vol. III, p. 277) characterizes the grace which is given to redeemed nature in contradistinction from the grace given primordially to Adam, in terms of the final and efficient causality of Christ.

³³ Numerous texts. Cf. for the Fathers, Tromp, *Corpus Christi quod est Ecclesia*, I, p. 114. For St. Thomas, Geiselmann, *art. cit.*, pp. 218 ff.; *In III Sent.*, d. 13, q. 2, a. 2, quaest. 2, ad 4um; IV, d. 2, q. 2, a. 1, quaest. 2, ad 2um; d. 8, q. 1, a. 3, quaest. 2, ad 1um; d. 27, q. 3, a. 1, sol. 3; *Q. D. de Ver.*, q. 29, a. 4, ad 9um, etc.

³⁴ *IV Cont. Gent.*, cc. 74-76; *Summa Theol.*, III, q. 22, etc. The texts of St. Thomas on the sacrament of Orders are brought together by J. Périnelle, "La

diction,³⁵ the constitution of the Church,³⁶ the Papacy,³⁷ and the Episcopate,³⁸ on the magisterium of the Church,³⁹ the relations of Church and State, of the spiritual and the temporal;⁴⁰ he has even a sketch of the "properties" of the Church,⁴¹ out of which, after gropings and various adventures,⁴² theologians formulated the apologetical notes.

Since there is not space to discuss these elements at length, let us try rather to throw into relief the thought which binds them with the elements already discussed. The Institutional-

doctrine de S. Thomas sur le sacrement de l'Ordre," in *Revue des Sciences philos. et théolog.*, 1930, pp. 236-250.

³⁵ Cf. among others, *Summa Theol.*, III, q. 59; I-II, q. 108, aa. 1 and 2; II-II, q. 39, a. 3; *Quaes. Quod.* II, a. 8, and especially the questions relative to penance (the *clavis jurisdictionis*: In *IV Sent.*, d. 19, 20 and 24, passim) or to excommunication (IV, d. 18, especially q. 2, a. 2), etc.

³⁶ For example In *II Sent.*, d. 44, expos. textus; IV, d. 20, q. 1, a. 4, sol. 1; d. 24, q. 3, a. 2, sol. 3; d. 25, q. 1, a. 1; in *Psalm.*, 45, n. 3, etc. One may note also the texts where St. Thomas says that the "apostoli et eorum successores sunt vicarii Dei quantum ad regimen Ecclesiae constitutae per fidem et fidei sacramenta. Unde sicut non licet eis constituere aliam Ecclesiam, ita non licet eis tradere aliam fidem neque instituere alia sacramenta" (*Summa Theol.*, III, q. 64, a. 2, ad 3um; In *IV Sent.*, d. 17, q. 3, a. 1, sol. 5; d. 27, q. 3, a. 3, ad 2um).

³⁷ *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 1, a. 10; *Contra impugnantes*, c. 4; *Contra errores Graecorum*, cc. 21-27; etc.

³⁸ Principal texts: In *IV Sent.*, d. 7, q. 3, a. 1, quaest. 2, ad 3um; quaest. 3, sol.; d. 23, q. 1, a. 3, quaest. 3, ad 1um; d. 24, q. 3, a. 2, sol. 1 and 2; d. 25, q. 1, a. 1, sol.; *IV Cont. Gent.*, c. 76; in *I Tim.*, c. 3, lect. 1; c. 4, lect. 3; *Quaes. Quod.* III, a. 17, ad 5um; *De perf. vitae spir.*, cc. 23-24 (ed. Parma) or 27-28 (Ed. Paris); *Summa Theol.*, III, q. 82, a. 1, ad 4um; etc.

³⁹ Cf. among others, *Quaes. Quod.* IX, a. 16; *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 1, aa. 9 and 10; *IV Cont. Gent.*, c. 76; In *IV Sent.*, d. 24, q. 1, a. 2, sol. 3; etc. Most important in this matter is the discrimination manifestly implied by St. Thomas and formulated by Cajetan (*Com. in II-II*, q. 1, a. 1, nn. X and XII; q. 6, a. 1) that the Church is only a condition of the presentation of the object of faith; compare *supra*, n. 36.

⁴⁰ Cf. among others, *De regimine princ.*, lib. I, c. 14; In *II Sent.*, d. 44, expos. textus. The thought of St. Thomas on this matter is not fully worked out and hence his disciples have put upon it different interpretations, among which that of John of Paris, who was not an immediate disciple, is perhaps more faithful than that of Tolemeo of Lucca, who was.

⁴¹ *Expos. in Symb.*, art. 9 (partly quoted *supra*, n. 5); In *Boet. de Trin.*, q. 3, a. 3: "Utrum fides christiana convenienter nominetur catholica vel universalis," etc.

⁴² Cf. G. Thils, *Les notes de l'Église dans l'apologétique catholique depuis la Réforme*. Gembloux: 1937.

Church or Social-Church appears in St. Thomas as something most closely bound up with the Church as Mystical Body, as new life in Christ through the Holy Ghost, which we have already examined as his first and deepest idea concerning the Church. This intimate fusion of the inward unity and the elements of the outward unity⁴³ seems to be manifested in St. Thomas through two chief ideas: (1) the Church-as-Institution is the very mode of being of the Mystical Body and of the new life in Christ; (2) she is the Sacrament of the ministry, that is, the instrument of realization of the Mystical Body.

I.) THE CHURCH-AS-INSTITUTION IS THE VERY MODE OF BEING OF THE MYSTICAL BODY AND OF THE NEW LIFE IN CHRIST. It is most important to note⁴⁴ that St. Thomas does not separate the visible and invisible, interior and spiritual elements in the Church. If we recall the text of his commentary on the Creed, with which we began, it is interesting to see how "the Angelic Doctor unites and fuses into one whole all the visible and invisible elements, how he puts the Holy Ghost, grace and sanctity, virtues, communion of saints, in the complete Body, the society established by Christ, propagated by the Apostles, spread abroad in the world, united in union with Papal Rome . . . , how he traces back to Abel this same society which he holds to be founded by Christ and the Apostles";⁴⁵ if we refer to the article of the *Secunda Secundae*, q. 39, a. 1, on Schism,⁴⁶ it is seen how St. Thomas passes quite naturally from the sin of schism defined in relation to Christ and the spiritual unity of the Mystical Body, to the sin of schism defined in relation to the inward unity of the Church-as-social-organism and in relation to the Pope, its visible leader.

This is because, for St. Thomas, the Church in its outward unity—Church as society—in other words as a Body organized under a hierarchy for the differentiation of labor, is not a differ-

⁴³ Cf., for instance, in *II Cor.*, c. 13, lect. 3.

⁴⁴ J. Bainvel, quoted *supra*, p. 979.

⁴⁵ Bainvel, *ibid.*

⁴⁶ Cf. the article *Schisme*, by the present writer, in *Dictionnaire de Théologie catholique*.

ent reality from the living Body of new life in Christ, whose soul is the living Spirit, the Holy Ghost. The latter is the inward mode of that which appears outwardly beneath the organizing and ruling span of the hierarchy.

Nevertheless it is obvious that St. Thomas does not overlook certain facts and problems which force a discrimination between the mode of the Mystic Body as such, and the mode of social manifestation of the Institutional Church. He is fully aware that the hierarchy of sanctity and union with Christ does not necessarily correspond to the social hierarchy of sacred ministries;⁴⁷ he is aware that one can be within the visible unity of the Church and at the same time have killed the life of sanctifying grace and even one's very faith, and that with equal certainty a soul can be inwardly justified and have the grace of living faith without being in visible union with the Church—in the first case one is in the Church *numero tantum, et non merito*, in the second case, *voto*.⁴⁸ Yet these discriminations affect individual souls, not the Church herself.⁴⁹ A given individual can belong to the Church in a hidden manner unknown even to himself, but that in no way leads to the conclusion that the Church herself is purely spiritual or indefinable. Rather does that individual belong invisibly to the one Church, which is at once visible and spiritual; and similarly for the other cases. The Church embraces spiritual and invisible, and institutional and visible elements, but for St. Thomas there is only one Church whose inward being manifests itself in an organic society,

⁴⁷ Cf. *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 184, a. 4, where there is a clear distinction between the inward state, which is known to God alone, and the outward state, officially recognized in the society. In the *De perfectione vitae spir.*, application is made of this consideration in favor of married men and women; cc. 23 and 24 (ex. Parma), or 25 and 26 (ed. Paris).

⁴⁸ Cf. *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 1, a. 9, ad 3um; III, q. 69, a. 5, ad 1um; *Com. in Psalm.*, 14, n. 1. For other Scholastics, see F. Ott, *art. cit.*, pp. 335-340.

⁴⁹ St. Thomas says that the faith of the Church is always *formed* by charity: *In III Sent.*, d. 25, q. 1, a. 2, ad 4um; *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 1, a. 9, ad 3um. The distinction between "soul" and "body" of the Church has the disadvantage of transferring to the Church herself a distinction which affects only individual members.

whose outward veil contains for the soul the spiritual realities of grace, above all the Holy Spirit: "*Ecclesia catholica est unum corpus . . . Anima autem quae hoc corpus vivificat est Spiritus Sanctus.*"⁵⁰

Touching upon many elements of the tradition and experienced life of the Church, St. Thomas has in different places in his work a very profound and fairly developed theology of the Church as an organized Body. On the one hand, his sociological work provides us with all the elements of a theology of the Church as society, of a theology of this differentiation of labor in view of a common good in which consists that *ens sociale* applied suggestively by St. Thomas himself to the Church. He does it in one of his short clear formulae to which the greatest developments do not seem to add much: "*Est in Ecclesia invenire ordinis unitatem secundum quod membra Ecclesiae sibi invicem deserviunt et ordinantur in Deum.*"⁵¹ On the other hand at the end of the *Secunda Pars* where St. Thomas, after analysing fully the different obligations common to all men, goes on to study what differentiates them, namely the Charismata,⁵² the active and contemplative "lives," and the states of perfection, it becomes clear that we shall here glean rich elements for a theology of the Church as a society differentiated and established under a hierarchy: a theology whose general idea is suggested by the second article of question 183, *Utrum in Ecclesia debeat esse diversitas officiorum seu statuum*. The echo of this is thrown back repeatedly, for example:

The diversity of states and functions in the Church is conditioned by three things: the perfection of the Church, according to the same law which holds already in the sphere of natural creation as something modally simple and one in God, participated and multiplied

⁵⁰ Cf. *supra*, n. 5.

⁵¹ *Q. D., de Ver.*, q. 29; a. 4; compare *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 183, a. 2, ad 1um; *In IV Sent.*, d. 19, q. 2, a. 2, sol. 1 and *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 39, a. 1, where St. Thomas defines in a profound manner the social unity of the Church (cf. *supra*, n. 46).

⁵² *Summa Theol.*, II-II, qq. 171 ff. Suarez remarks that St. Thomas is the only theologian who speaks in this way of the *charismata* (*De fide*, disp. VIII, sect. 1; *Opera*, vol. XII, p. 219).

in the mode of the world; secondly, by the need of differentiation of labor; thirdly, by the nobility and beauty of the Church, which consists of a certain 'order'; . . . This diversity of functions does not vitiate the unity of the Church, for this unity finds its perfection in the unity of faith, love, and service, in this bond among members who strengthen one another, of which the Apostle speaks. . . . The diversity of functions works peace and unity insofar as many thus share in an action. As the Apostle says again: That there be no division in the Body, but that the members be solicitous one for another.⁵³

2) THE CHURCH-AS-INSTITUTION IS THE SACRAMENT, THE MINISTRY, IN SHORT, THE INSTRUMENT OF REALIZATION OF THE MYSTICAL BODY. The Church is realized as a Body living in and through men who become the recipients of the treasure of heavenly light and grace, of salvation and newness of life circulating in the whole Christ our Savior, Christ Crucified; she grows and flourishes as a mystic Body of men grafted into Christ and become His living limbs. But it is therefore also essential that men be *joined* by some means to Christ their Savior, to the life-giving Cross. This is achieved, says St. Thomas, by faith and the Sacraments of faith: ⁵⁴ by faith first, because the rebirth is of soul, a personality, and is rebirth through a spiritual force in the being by which we are to be bound in a spiritual touch.⁵⁵ The Sacraments, in various ways, bring to us beneath a sensible form called for by our nature and the Incarnation ⁵⁶ which itself follows the logic of our nature the redeeming and life-giving power of the Cross;⁵⁷ but,

⁵³ The whole of this wonderful text should be read: compare *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 112, a. 4; in *Rom.*, c. 12, lect. 2.

⁵⁴ *Q. D., de Ver.*, q. 27, a. 4, c.; q. 29, a. 7, ad 8um; compare *Expos. in Symb.*, art. 10: "Bonum Christi communicatur omnibus christianis sicut virtus capitis omnibus membris; et haec communicatio fit per sacramenta Ecclesiae in quibus deriventur." *Ibid.*, q. 62, a. 5.

⁵⁵ *Summa Theol.*, III, q. 48, a. 6, ad 2um.

⁵⁶ "Sacramenta humanitatis ejus": *Summa Theol.*, III, q. 80, a. 5, c. "Oportet quod virtus salutifera a divinitate Christi per ejus humanitatem in ipsa sacramenta deriventur" *Ibid.*, q. 62, a. 5.

⁵⁷ The sacraments receiving all their virtue from the Cross: in *IV Sent.*, d. 1, q. 1, a. 4, quaes. 3, sol.; d. 25, q. 1, a. 2, ad 4um; *IV Cont. Gent.*, cc. 56 and 57; *Summa Theol.*, III, q. 52, a. 1, ad 1um; q. 60, a. 3; q. 61, a. 1, ad 3um; q. 62, a. 5, c. and ad 2um; q. 83, a. 3, ad 1um.

among the Sacraments, there is one which contains in itself and gives purpose and significance to all the others; this is the Sacrament of the Holy Eucharist in which the redeeming Body and Blood of Christ are really present. Wherefore it substantially contains, says St. Thomas, the common spiritual good of the whole Church.⁵⁸

Thus we see why St. Thomas describes the Church as constituted, moulded, founded and blessed by faith and the Sacraments of faith.⁵⁹ We see also why he tells us that the Church was born on Calvary, appearing under the form of water and blood, *ex latere Christi formata*, formed of the dead Christ sleeping in death, like Eve formed from the side of the sleeping Adam.⁶⁰ It would be easy to illustrate this traditional teaching by means of iconographic details.

The Church surely appears here in a new light, again, as revealing the elements that complete the preceding. She is now no longer the Body of Christ simply, but also the means of realization and construction of that Body; she is the Mother and, so to say, the matrix, the ground of a new world in which the Christians subsist, live and move and have their being. She holds the means of begetting them, of nourishing them, and of making them grow and flourish in Christ, as members of His

⁵⁸ "Bonum commune spirituale totius Ecclesiae continetur substantialiter in ipso eucharistiae sacramento." *Summa Theol.*, III, q. 66, a. 3, ad 1um. Compare q. 79, a. 1, c. and ad 1um.

⁵⁹ *Ecclesia constituitur, fabricatur* (*In IV Sent.*, d. 18, q. 1, a. 1, sol. 1; *Summa Theol.*, III, q. 64, a. 2, ad 3um), *fundatur* (*In IV Sent.*, d. 17, q. 3, a. 1, sol. 5), *instituitur* (*Summa Theol.*, I, q. 92, a. 3), *consecratur* (*in Joan.*, c. 19, lect. 5, n. 4) *per fidem et fidei sacramenta*. Compare the idea which occurs very frequently that the merits of the passion of Christ are mediated to us by faith and the sacraments of Faith: *Q. D. de Ver.*, q. 27, a. 4; q. 29, a. 7, ad 8um; ad 11um; *Summa Theol.*, III, q. 49, a. 3, ad 1um, and a. 5, c.; q. 62, a. 5, ad 2um and a. 6; q. 79, a. 7, ad 2um; *in Hebr.* c. 3, lect. 3; *Expos. in Symb.*, art. 10, etc.

⁶⁰ A collection of texts on this point would be found in the article of Tromp, "De nativitate Ecclesiae ex corde Jesu in cruce," in *Gregorianum*, 1932, pp. 489-527. For St. Thomas, cf.: *in Matt.*, c. 16, n. 2; *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 92, aa. 2 and 3; III, q. 62, a. 5; q. 64, a. 9, ad 3um; q. 66, a. 3, ad 2um; *In IV Sent.*, d. 8, q. 1, a. 1, sol. 3 and a. 2, sol. 2; *in Rom.*, c. 5, lect. 4; *in I Cor.*, c. 11, lect. 2. Cf. also F. Ott, *art. cit.*, p. 350 and Grabmann, *op. cit.*, pp. 225, 232, etc.

Body, the Body that is herself in the mode of her underlying substance. And these means which are gathered under two heads, faith and the Sacraments of faith, the Church herself as economy of realization of the Body of Christ, Church-as-Institution, is in fact definable in terms of those two things: faith and the Sacraments of faith. The Church visible, the Church institutional, is the ministry of the faith and of the Sacraments of the faith, by which men are grafted into Christ and realize the Mystical Body which is the Church in its inward substance. We touch here the second definition of the Church given by St. Thomas which relates to it, not only in its spiritual substance, identical from Abel to the end of the world, but in its condition of society founded by Christ: *Ecclesia, id est fides et fidei sacramenta*.⁶¹

The Church in its institutional and visible reality, in that aspect which has become the subject of a separate treatise, appeared to St. Thomas as defined and constituted by the ministry of faith and the sacraments of faith, and in terms of its goal—for the Eucharist is the final cause of all else⁶²—by the ministry of the redeeming Blood. All things, for him, derive from it. It is because she holds the ministry of the true Body of Christ that the Church has power over the Mystical Body. This power over the Mystical Body involves principally the power to purify and enlighten souls by the preaching of the truth, and that of preparing or disposing for the reception of the Eucharist by a juridical control: in the internal forum by the exercise of the power of the keys, in the external forum by the rule of the spiritual power. St. Thomas asserts that all such powers over souls come to the Church solely from the power or ministry which she has in the celebration of the Eucharist, the Sacrament of Christ Crucified, Sacrament of our salvation.⁶³

Thus her whole ministry consists, whether in the celebration of the Eucharist or in exercising functions that spring therefrom

⁶¹ Cf. n. 59.

⁶² *Summa Theol.*, III, q. 65, a. 3 and q. 73, a. 3.

⁶³ Cf. *In III Sent.*, d. 25, q. 1, a. 2, ad 10um; in *IV Sent.*, d. 18, q. 1, a. 1, quæst. 2, ad 1um; *IV Cont. Gent.*, c. 74, etc., and Grabmann, *op. cit.*, p. 292.

and are preparatory to it, in applying to each soul, across the centuries, the universal cause of salvation and of life found and given by Christ in His Passion.⁶⁴ In short, the Church-as-Institution is the Sacrament of the Cross, the Sacrament of the unique mediatorship of Christ Crucified. Again she is the Sacrament, the effective sign and giver of the gift of new life and of union of men in Christ their Savior. This mystery St. Thomas studies in detail in the *Tertia Pars, De ipso Salvatore, de Sacramentis ejus quibus salutem consequimur* (prol.).

Perhaps then we may begin to glimpse the literalness, the realism, and depth of this doctrine, once more traced back in the common tradition of Catholic theology since Augustine.⁶⁵ The unity of the Mystical Body is the reality attained by that Sacrament which is the source, the end, the beginning and the consummation, of all the others, that by which and for which the Church—the Church the mystery of faith, of which we are speaking, as much as the Church building, the Cathedral, the Temple—that by which and for which the Church was created—the Eucharist. In numerous texts St. Thomas asserts that the *Res hujus Sacramenti*, that is, the thing attained by the effective symbolism of the Sacrament, is the *Unitas corporis mystici*.⁶⁶

I cannot here further develop this doctrine with all its incidentals and consequences; but I want only to note its general relevance to the “treatise on the Church” of St. Thomas, or rather the treatise which could be written with the guidance of his principles. The whole Church is a great Sacrament, whose soul is the Eucharist, whence flow and whither tend all the other

⁶⁴ *Q. D., de Ver.*, q. 29, a. 7, ad 8um; q. 27, a. 4, c.; *Summa Theol.*, III, q. 49, a. 3; *Expos. in Symb.*, art. 10.

⁶⁵ The texts of St. Thomas on this point are innumerable. See, e.g., *Summa Theol.*, III, qq. 73, 74, 79, 80 and 83, passim; in *I Cor.*, c. 11, lect. 5; in *Joan.*, c. 6, lect. 7; in *IV Sent.*, d. 8, q. 2, a. 2, etc. For the Fathers, cf. Gasque, *L'eucharistie et le Corps mystique*, Paris: 1925; for St. Bonaventure, S. Simonis, O.F.M., “De causalitate eucharistiae in Corpus Christi mysticum doctrina S. Bonaventurae,” in *Antonianum*, 1933, pp. 193-228; for Albert the Great, cf. the excellent article of A. Lang, “Zur Eucharistielehre des hl. Albertus Magnus. Das Corpus Christi verum im Dienste des Corpus Christi mysticum,” in *Divus Thomas* (Fr.), 1932, pp. 258-274.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, and Grabmann, *op. cit.*, pp. 269 ff.

Sacraments and Sacramentals, powers and ministries. This Sacrament considered outwardly is as it were a *Sacramentum tantum*: the Institution with its rites, organization, hierarchy, law. But the Sacrament embraces both *Sacramentum et Res*, the thing which it is really made to produce or attain as its spiritual effect: in the Eucharist the outward rite signifies and attains the real presence of Christ beneath its *species*. This *Res et Sacramentum* in turn is the sign and principle of attainment of a pure, inward reality of grace, the *Res tantum*. In the likeness of the Eucharist, and by the power of its grace, the Church-as-Institution, considered as a great Sacrament, attains this *Unitas corporis mystici*. This last consists of faith and supernatural love in the life of living faith. What the Sacraments attain effectively the action of the spiritual rule seeks ministerially in its own way. St. Thomas puts it in a singularly striking way, both in his treatise on the new law, where he insists that all the directions of this law are “*dispositiva ad gratiam Spiritus Sancti*”⁶⁷—and this holds for *everything* in the Church-as-Institution, laws, rites, even rubrics, etc.—and also in the *Contra errores Graecorum*, where he describes the role of the Pope which is to subject the Church to the inward action of Christ which, through His Holy Spirit, consecrates to Him His Church impressing upon it His seal and image—and this, again, affects the entire spiritual rule of the hierarchy.⁶⁸

⁶⁷ Cf. *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 106, a. 1 (in its entirety).

⁶⁸ “*Similis autem error est dicentium Christi vicarium, Romanae Ecclesiae Pontificem, non habere universalis Ecclesiae primatum, errori dicentium Spiritum Sanctum a Filio non procedere. Ipse enim Christus Dei Filius suam Ecclesiam consecrat, et sibi consignat Spiritui Sancto quasi caractere seu sigillo. Et similiter Christi vicarius suo primatu et providentia universam Ecclesiam tanquam fidelis minister Christo subjectam conservat*”: *Contra errores Graecorum (Opera Omnia, ed. Parma, XV, 256)*. It is a rich idea; Christ always continues under two forms and according to two modes, namely inwardly or invisibly, and outwardly or visibly, to fashion and rule His Body, His Church (*Ecclesiam meam*, Peter was told): cf. *Summa Theol.*, III, q. 8, a. 6; *Q. D., de Ver.*, q. 29, a. 4, ad 2um. These two dominions are mutually complementary, that of the hierarchy acting from without only disposing souls for the interior and profound action of the Spirit of Christ. Compare supra, n. 67, and M. B. Schwalm, O. P., “L’inspiration intérieure et le gouvernement des âmes”; “Le respect de l’Église pour l’action intérieure de Dieu dans les âmes,” in *Revue thomiste*, 1898, pp. 315-353, 707-738.

Here we find that we have returned to our starting point: whether in its pneumatologic and moral, christologic, or institutional and sacramental, phases the Church is for St. Thomas a new life of humanity, the divine life led by men when they receive for their contemplation and goal the objects of the life of God. They are received in faith and in love.

* * *

The ecclesiological thought of St. Thomas is so rich, and there are in his work so many ecclesiological elements,⁶⁹ that, to fulfil our aim of studying his idea of the Church literally, a whole treatise on the Church would have to be written.

But it can hardly be too strongly emphasized that this treatise would be rather different from the more or less derivative treatises of the *De Regimine Christiano* of James of Viterbo, and of the controversies of Bellarmine. In reality everything in the thought of St. Thomas has an ecclesiological phase, and the author of an essay on his theology of the Mystical Body has gone so far as to say that this doctrine is the heart of his theology.⁷⁰ The reason is that the Church is not a separate reality, something outside the Christian-Trinitarian mystery, outside the anthropologic, christologic, sacramental thing which is the subject of theology. So much is this true, that I am forced to ask myself if it be not a deliberate act on St. Thomas' part that he has refused to write a *separate* treatise *De Ecclesia*, seeing that the Church pervaded his theology in all its parts. I am indeed inclined, personally, to think so. In any case, is it not at least manifest that, if we are going to make up a treatise *De*

⁶⁹ There are many relevant points which we have not discussed: Certain conceptions of the concrete development of the Church; of the situation in the primitive Church (cf. *Quaest. Quod.*, XII, a. 19; *In I Sent.*, d. 16, q. 1, a. 3, ad 2um; etc.); of its relation to the Synagogue (*Summa Theol.*, I-II, qq. 98 ff.): Ideas about the hierarchies of Angels and the human hierarchy (*In II Sent.*, d. 9 and the many parallel texts); The whole of many-sided theology of worship: worship as *protestatio fidei* (*In IV Sent.*, d. 13, q. 2, a. 1, ad 4um); the official prayer of a priest (*In II Sent.*, d. 11, q. 1, a. 1, ad 3um, etc.); the cultural significance of sacramental character, conceived by St. Thomas at least in the *Summa* as a participation in the priesthood of Christ (III, p. 63, aa. 3 and 5; q. 65, a. 3, ad 3um), etc.

⁷⁰ Käppeli, *op. cit.*, p. 2.

Ecclesia, we must use for its making both *theo*-logical as well as other elements, canonical, juridical, or sociological; and not just these without the first. Without forgetting to complete the more mystical doctrine of the middle ages by the study of more clearly manifest elements,⁷¹ we must not neglect the element which we have termed ecclesiological. It must be sought and separated—from the Trinity, the Divine *Missiones*, anthropology and ethic, christology and soteriology, Sacraments and hierarchic ministry. So we shall preserve purely, as St. Thomas did, the full, large and undefiled Catholic tradition, the inspiration of the Fathers. That tradition can be characterized by three marks: the Church is contemplated as a Spirit-moved, Spirit-known and Spirit-defined reality, as the Body whose living Soul is the Spirit of Life. The Church is contemplated in Christ, as Christ is contemplated in the Church. And the inward Church is not separated from the outward Church, which is its sacramental veil and vehicle. I think no one will deny this to be the ecclesiology of the Fathers. And I hope that I may have proved it to be that of St. Thomas Aquinas.

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⁷¹ For example, what concerns the office of priesthood and in general the role of the hierarchy in the constitution of the visible Church; as also the elements of an apologetic *de vera Ecclesia*, the subject of relations between Church and State, etc.

THE INTERPRETATION OF THE CONJUGAL ACT AND THE THEOLOGY OF MARRIAGE

(APROPOS OF RECENT ESSAYS)

There is infinitely more in conjugal life than there is in the sexual relation. This proposition, which is of elementary evidence, is stated at the beginning of this article in order to have it clearly understood by the reader that the rational and all-important truth that it enunciates is not overlooked herein. Father Boigelot¹ recalls it with insistence and in very plain terms to Doctor Doms, who he believes—wrongly it seems to us—magnifies the sexual “moment” at the expense of the others. We readily subscribe to all that is said about the other aspects by Father Boigelot and the authors to whom he appeals. May this preliminary remark suffice to preclude the misunderstandings that are always to be feared in such a subject as this.

Therefore whatever may be the place and importance of other aspects in the life of married couples it is the sexual act that specifies conjugal society and life in that which is irreducibly proper and peculiar to it. The right to this act is the precise object of matrimonial consent. The Code of Canon Law states: “*Consensus matrimonialis est actus voluntatis quo utraque pars tradit et acceptat jus in corpus perpetuum et exclusivum, in ordine ad actus per se aptos ad prolis generationem*”^{1a} (Can. 1081, #2).

It is therefore not to be wondered at that theologians have always sought in an analysis of this act a foundation, if not *the* foundation of the characteristic qualities of marriage in natural law. The moral treatise *de castitate et luxuria* rests entirely on the very notion of the joint act of man and woman.²

¹ In *Nouvelle Revue theologique*, Jan., 1939.

^{1a} “The marriage consent is an act of the will by which each party gives and accepts a perpetual and exclusive right over the body for the exercise of acts suitable of themselves for the procreation of children.” Translation of Ayrinhac-Lydon, *Marriage Legislation in the New Code of Canon Law* (New York: Benziger, 1935), p. 190.

² There are some who are ignorant of or deny a distinct virtue of chastity,

It is evident that the act should be examined in its essential elements, not in its psychological elements in individual cases, which vary endlessly according to persons and circumstances. We are not therefore considering what it is in the concrete for such and such a couple, its reverberations in such and such a conscience of man or woman, physiologically or psychologically well or unwell. We are considering it in its deep reality, what it is in itself, its object, its immediate objective end (*finis operis*), from which it takes its moral specification, its primary and essential morality.

What then intrinsically and ontologically is that act which consists in a union of sexes? It seems to us that the answer to such a question should not admit of any variation. It is a fact however that the answer is not the same in the writings of ancient and modern authors—or at least in essays on marriage written by some of the modern authors.

THE OLD VIEW: FUNDAMENTALLY “GENETIC”

According to the old view the sexual act is naturally and immediately a generative act; it is accomplished by an effusion of seed of the man into the genital organs of the woman; the seed is the bearer of an instrumental active virtue by which the “generator” “draws from the matter,” that is, from the “blood” furnished by the woman (who is altogether passive), the form of a new living being; of which, a spiritual soul (created directly by God and substituted for the animal form

whether it is because they reduce chastity to justice, seeing no evil in any carnal satisfaction whatever provided that it does not violate the rights of another, or because they take it to be a matter of hygiene and consider sexual activity as something indifferent as long as there is no injury to one’s health—sometimes strangely deluding themselves in this respect. They are in error not because they depart from the notion of the sexual act, but because they have only a superficial notion of it, and see in it only a *pleasure* or the satisfaction of a *necessity*. It is for this reason that their sexual morality is so profoundly amoral or immoral.

^a It is hardly ever admitted now that there is a succession of three souls: vegetative, animal, human, or rational. It is generally admitted today that the spiritual soul is created by God at the instant of the union of the germ-cells, and that from

or soul of the embryo) ³ will make a new human person with a right to an education that normally requires on the part of the spouses an enduring collaboration. That the sexual act is not always followed by conception and generation is an accident, the frequency of which does not change the character of the act.

A man therefore does not use his sexual or generative power rightly, he does not properly discharge by a voluntary act the germ of life developed within him, unless it be done in such a way that, except in case of an accident beyond the control of his will, conception can take place. Immoral therefore is every use of the sexual faculty (as for instance in voluntary pollutions, homo-sexual practices, etc.) that is contrary to its purpose as indicated by nature in the very structure and form of the complementary organs of the sexes. Only the *concubitus naturalis* or the *commixtio carnalis* of a man and woman can be lawful. This is not to be understood of any man and woman at all, although both the one and the other may be individually disposed to assume the office of father and mother and so the obligation of educating a child that might be born to them. It is to be understood only of a man and woman who are recognized by society as being in a state of life in which, as husband and wife united by an objective and permanent bond and provided with a legal guarantee, they can assume the obligation and discharge it, i. e., in a word, a married couple. Thence it follows that fornication (*actus soluti cum soluta*), adultery, etc., are evil. They are sins of lust, not of course by reason of the delectation or delight that is found in them—for this accompanies the lawful act of spouses—but because the partners, not being united by marriage, have not the right to the generative act, which by nature, inasmuch as it is a generative act, is reserved to spouses.

For the same reasons marriage, which alone renders the consummation of a carnal union lawful, must have *oneness*, that is, to be between one man and one woman (*unius cum una*), and must be indissoluble (*indivisum*). Polyandry (a union of

the beginning it presides over the development of the embryo. But this change leaves intact the identification or reduction of the sexual to the generative.

one woman with several "husbands") is absolutely barred by natural law; because a woman of several "husbands" conceives rarely, and more rarely in proportion to their greater number, and because when conception does take place the paternity of the offspring is uncertain. Polygamy (marriage of one man with several women) is not absolutely repugnant: one man can beget children of several women and with these care for their education. But in such a system woman is the victim of a flagrant inequality with respect to man, and many men must necessarily remain unmarried. Such conditions entail a number of grave disorders, to which experiences in polygamous societies bear sad testimony.⁴ Therefore polygamy also is condemned.

Marriage that is *one* must be *indivisible*, indissoluble, because the education of the children, the care they demand and the preparing of their future, normally take the whole life of a married couple. In this conception the *first* aim of marriage and the reason for its properties is the child, to the procreation of which the generative act is directly ordained. In addition to this there are other aims, which are seen in the affection or the love of spouses, in their mutual aid, in the equality with one another, etc. But these ends are secondary.

The child is the "primary end." The other ends of marriage and of the marriage act are not simple means in relation to the primary end, but their peculiar value is of a secondary order. The absolute necessities of a first end are expressed in what are called primary precepts of the natural law and which cannot be subject matter of a dispensation. The conditions of a realization of secondary ends or of a better realization through them of a primary end are expressed in precepts that are called second or secondary. Unlike the first these are subject to derogation. Thus it is that, according to many scholastic Doctors, polygamy, notwithstanding its disadvantages, was provisionally lawful in the Old Testament by virtue of a divine dispensation.⁵

⁴ See J. Wilbois, *L'Action sociale en pays de missions*. Paris: Payot, 1938; St. Marie André du Sacré-Coeur, *La femme noire en Afrique Occidentale*.

⁵ Cf. B. Lavaud, *Le monde moderne et mariage chrétien*, Appendix: *Le droit naturel du mariage d'après Saint Thomas d'Aquin*.

Such is the old idea of the conjugal act as commonly held by the classic theologians; such in outline is the deduction from that idea of the sexual and conjugal morality of the precepts of chastity and of the properties of marriage.

THE NEW VIEW: FUNDAMENTALLY "PERSONALIST"

We turn now to the view as expressed in several modern essays, passing over their accidental differences. Reference is made especially to the essays of Dr. Herbert Doms and M. Norbert Rocholl, which, although they differ very much in their argumentation, are very much alike in their conclusions.⁶

The normal and natural sexual act of human beings (if it is really a human act and fully consented to by both parties) is essentially and always a *union* of two persons, a complete surrender, a reciprocal giving and receiving, and the most intimate participation in the life of one another that is possible. That is why a woman who has permitted a man to "know" her—to use a Biblical expression—will tell of it by saying: "I have given myself." If she has not consented to this greatest of intimacies she is convinced that she is right in saying: "I have not given myself."⁷

⁶ Several authors in French and other languages say in substance what is said by the German authors of whose thought we will give a summary. If they do not meet with criticism it is largely because they are careful not to declare themselves to be in opposition to the old authors and to attack their predecessors. They do no more than expose simply and in a constructive manner what is revealed by a conscientious analysis of the reality of marriage considered in all its richness and complexity. This is notably the case of Dr. Biot and his collaborators in the Lyonesse group devoted to philosophical and medical studies. Very recently there appeared at the A. M. C. (Association du mariage chrétien) an admirable tribute to the Christian home: *Ce Sacrement est grand*, under the pseudonym of A. Christian. The book, which is a real treatise on conjugal spirituality, goes very far in an appreciation of the personal values of conjugal life and especially of the conjugal act, but it does not show that the least need is felt of changing anything whatever in the classic nomenclature of the first and second ends of marriage.

⁷ People commonly speak of man's "possession" of woman. In the novel *Dame en Noir* by Camille Mayran, Yves writing to Paula, his fiancée, protests against this term, in which he sees a reflection upon the reciprocity of love and man's peculiar role in the joint conjugal act. It may be that the expression is something that remains from the inhuman notion of inequality between the sexes, according

This act of union redounds profoundly on the persons of the two spouses whom it engages so completely. On the other hand, it tends, when all favorable circumstances have been realized, to effect the conception of a new human being. This tendency is so natural in fertile persons, that to wish to hinder its accomplishment of this result is to introduce an *arbitrary* reservation into a gift that is *naturally* without reserve. But in itself and before all else, this act is a *union* of two persons. Because it is the most intimate and fullest of all possible unions, it gives to the sharers in it—unless some physiological or psychic obstacle intervene—a sense of achievement and fullness. It is reserved to the married couple because it is the most profound actual participation of each other's life: two human beings cannot accomplish this act, cannot give themselves in this manner, unless they are bound to each other in a stable and permanent fashion, unless they belong to each other for all of a lifetime, as husband and wife. Carnal union is *human* only inasmuch as it is the extension to the body of a union which first unites souls and hearts. Such a surrender, being without reserve, excludes a sharing with a third person both on the part of the man and on the part of the woman. Undoubtedly one man can start physiological processes of fecundation in one after another of an indefinite number of women (whereas a woman can become pregnant only a very limited number of times in her whole life), but the giving of self that is consummated in the union of bodies is not human and complete unless it is reserved exclusively to only one partner. A man cannot give himself wholly—mind, soul and body—to several women, nor can a woman give herself in like manner to several men. And for a human being whose mind embraces the present and the future, “to give oneself”

to which woman belongs to man as to a master who would take possession of her by a carnal union. In Christian doctrine, and even according to the natural law, the body of the husband belongs to the wife no less than the body of the wife belongs to the husband. The reciprocity is perfect. The equality of rights that the sexes have in marriage is strict. “Mulier sui corporis potestatem non habet, sed vir; similiter autem et vir sui corporis potestatem non habet, sed mulier” (I Cor. vii, 4).

is to give oneself irrevocably until death separates one partner from the other. Therein, independently of the actual existence, or the reasonable possibility, of an offspring is the fundamental reason of the unity and indissolubility of marriage. It is clear that unity and indissolubility are indispensable for a proper education of the children of the married couple and that, generally, divorce and remarriage of the parents are disastrous for the children, who suffer cruelly in consequence. It is right to insist upon these harmful effects of divorce in order to oppose its admission to civil codes or in order to bring about the abrogation of laws that are supposed to authorize it; but divorce with liberty to remarry is at once in contradiction with the gift of self that is completed in the conjugal act.

It is incontestable that the sexual act is directed by nature to the production of a new human body; the child therefore is its end. It is the end in which primarily—for very different motives and because of considerations that may be basely utilitarian and materialistic, or on the contrary nobly human and even supernaturally elevated—an interest is taken by the biologist and the physiologist, the statistician, the politician, the sociologist, the jurist, the philosopher of social life, the theologian, the saint solicitous of the destined to the Kingdom of God and the multiplication of the members of the body of Christ (for every new human being can and should become a servant and friend of God in time and for eternity).

From the point of view of the spouses we see the child rather as a fruit in which their union culminates, as a blessing with which God crowns the union. For them paternity and maternity are an enrichment, a perfection, the absence of which does not take from their marriage all its reason for existence, nor all its fruitfulness; but it is felt as a defect, a grievous deprivation by spouses who being morally sound have long hoped for the common blessing and who see that it will not be given to them. The actual presence of children at the conjugal hearth increases its importance immensely. The blessing of fruitfulness can never be rejected when God offers it. To attempt to put it away

artificially by using contraceptive means is to make an attempt on the rights of God, and to refuse to cooperate with the creator. Normally it is only when a father and mother have had several children that they reach their full stature. Each child touches their heart by its own radiance, each child is their living image, their *common*, infinitely precious good, for it is *their* child; and at the same time it is an *autonomous person*, soon conscious of itself, of its dignity as an end in itself, of its immediate relation to God, the final end—for the same reason—of all human persons, both parents and children.

That it may be lawful, honorable and good, free from all irregularity, even venial, that it may be meritorious for spouses living the life of grace and charity and eager to make spiritual progress, the conjugal act need not be performed with the express intention of begetting a child (how could that intention be sincere when the spouses know that, for one reason or another, their act, although perfectly normal and right, cannot result in a conception?), nor through solicitude to render justice to a fellow-spouse demanding the marriage right, the “debt.” When there is nothing of a nature to dissuade from it or to indicate the contrary, the act by which spouses are united in flesh is good in itself, inasmuch as it is the act of their common life.

We have said that spouses whose love is true and sound naturally desire the perfection of paternity and maternity. They know that they would be seriously unfaithful to nature and to God, the infinitely wise author of nature, if they attempted by artifice or ruse to separate their love from its providential ends, that they would betray and pillage their love itself by debarring the divinely prepared blessing from its act.

But when in good faith they feel that they already have all the children they are capable of nourishing, and that another birth would add a truly excessive burden, they can, without sinning, wish that this new blessing may be deferred, provided that in yielding to the impulse of their love they do nothing to prevent its natural effects. It is then lawful for them to choose the agennetic days for the “use of their rights”; they

do not have to seek an "excuse" in the fact that the conjugal act would be for both, or for one of them, the necessary means of escaping from temptation to incontinence or infidelity. If they truly love one another, if each thinks first of the other, they will never look for a selfish pleasure, but will find in the actualization of their God-made union the nobly human gratification which brings in addition the appeasement and relaxation that the old moralists tersely call *sedationem concupiscentiae*.

And the same love that tends to its act when and as it is proper, also abstains from it when and as it is proper. Nature not being capable of this restraint, the grace of the sacrament of matrimony supplies for its weakness by strengthening the will, and in case of need by enabling spouses to make heroic renunciations.

Since the authors of whom we write have been imperfectly understood by some, partly however through their fault, but partly also, we believe, because many critics have read them rather hurriedly, I will reproduce here a resumé, already published elsewhere, of pages in which Dr. Doms presents systematically his interpretation of the meaning and the end of marriage; then I will summarize and translate an unpublished text in which N. Rocholl in his turn gives his explanation of the problem.

The *meaning*, or signification (*Sinn*), of the conjugal act consists quite simply in the actual realization of the unity of two persons. Let this be considered as its immediate, inner end. Provided that it is normal and that spouses are not bound to abstain from it for any particular reason, it has no need of its being justified, much less "excused" by an end that is extrinsic to it; for it is the proper, lawful, and honorable act of conjugal life of a human couple. But in realizing its meaning it is quite naturally directed in itself towards its goal (*Best*), or, to be more exact, towards two sorts of ends. One of these, which may be called personal, consists in the perfection, the completion of the partners on all the planes of their being; the other, which, since it concerns the species and its perpetuation, may be called biological or specific, consists in the procreation of new human beings. The inner meaning (the immediate and intrinsic end) is always realized by the normal act of two spouses whose love for one another is true and worthy. The ends

(ulterior, or extrinsic: the personal and the biological) are not always realized. Of itself, the act tends to them and, when circumstances are favorable, it attains them; but hindrances may occur unexpectedly and, as regards conception, it is not necessary that an obstacle should be placed from without or that there should be an accidental failure on the part of nature, for all the conditions that are simultaneously required for a proximate possibility of fecundation are not always, or even most frequently, realized, even in the young and fruitful woman or in a man who is at the height of his virility. It can be seen from this resumé, which we believe to be faithful, that the opposition between *Sinn* (meaning) and *Змеч* (end) does not imply that *Sinn* is never itself an end; rather the opposition lies between the object of an act or its immediately proximate end (expressed by *Sinn*) and an end that is not immediately proximate, but more or less removed from the first and extrinsic to it (expressed by *Змеч*). One might say that with that meaning and those ends—those mediate and immediate objective ends (*fines operis*)—the subjective ends of spouses (*fines operantis*) should normally be in agreement.

If it is a question, not precisely of the marriage act, but of marriage itself, the inner meaning of it will not be love precisely, which is a purely psychological reality, but the whole life as shared in common, that is to say, the spiritual, sensible and physical taken as a whole, a community of life whose joy and peace are caused by love. In realizing their meaning, marriages, in their entirety, attain the providential ends of the conjugal union, which however is not primarily and immediately constituted by its ordination to the procreative end—the child. In a strict sense the child is distinguished from the conjugal community, which is not yet a family, and is not recognized as such until after the birth of a child.

It is true that from biological, sociological, demographic, juridical and other such points of view one is warranted in considering the child as the primary and principal end of the union of spouses: society is very particularly interested in the multiplication of its members, in its own duration and prosperity, and laws are enacted for the common good of human societies. The Code of Canon Law declares justly that the child is the “primary end” of marriage (Can. 1013, 2). But in an essay of philosophic synthesis there is no reason why one should restrict oneself to this terminology and oppose the child to the other ends as being secondary. Through institutions so profoundly natural as marriage, nature, or better God, the author of nature, can, and actually does, aim at several

ends at the same time, the subordination or superiority of which one would not know how to determine clearly.

Let us consider first the meaning and then the ends. In doing this we will distinguish the personal ends, which concern the spouses themselves, and the specific end, the child. However closely united it is to its parents, however dear it is to their hearts (normally it is dearer than their own life), and however precious it is to the civil community and to the Church, the child is not included in the unity of two persons of which it is the living common good.

The author illustrates this relation of meaning and ends by dogmatic analogies of which the following is the first: The death out of love and obedience of the God-Man on the cross has for its inner meaning the reparation of the injury done to the divine honor by sin. It has ulterior ends: for Christ Himself, the exaltation of His Name, the glory of His risen body, His eternal throne at the right hand of the Father; for men, their reconciliation with God, their redemption, their salvation.

Analogically it is the same for marriage and its act. They have in themselves a meaning and a very high value. Moreover they produce effects, they tend to ends that are the perfection of spouses or the benefit of the child. However great may be the human value of the unity of two persons and of its characteristic act, even abstracting from the procreative consequences, it is absolutely unquestionable that the conjugal act receives an immense increase of value when it is actually followed by the blossoming of a new life. Moreover, when betrothed persons on marrying, on giving to one another the rights of spouses, take, even in a spirit of most perfect harmony, the resolution to observe perpetual continence and guard it faithfully, their union is ontologically incomplete; and this for a twofold reason: it is not consummated, and it is biologically unfruitful. Yet for all that, from a moral, religious, supernatural point of view the union can be better, spiritually richer than a consummated and fruitful marriage. That depends upon the persons and the quality of their motives in acting. With whatever insistence one should emphasize the irreplaceable value of marriage for the continuance and propagation of the human species, for which it is the peculiar and divinely instituted means, one should previously declare the value (personal and also social) of marriage as a community of a man and a woman. This should be declared not only because Catholics and the Church are too often accused of overlooking it, but also because it is the truth and is demanded by the objective order of things.

One may not admit this viewpoint and its expression that we have summarized. It cannot be justly insinuated that those who think and speak thus consider the child to be only a blessing or a fruit of the conjugal union, for they expressly declare it to be the end of that union (although they do not like to call it the primary end without an explanation); that they separate the personal ends from the procreative end, when they do no more than apply themselves to distinguishing the *ends* from the *meaning*, and the ends from one another; that they separate the paternal or maternal love from the conjugal, for they repeat that there is but one love rather than two, the paternal love or the maternal love being the organic expansion of the reciprocal love of spouses who by their mutual act have become father and mother. It would be altogether unjust to maintain that the new theory makes the child to be an "*accident*" (*sic*) in marriage. We would not insist so strongly upon this matter, if certain critics of the recent essays had not been too harsh—to the point, indeed of rendering evidently unacceptable a thought that has a greater shading of meaning than they would have one believe. It would indeed be an exaggeration and a manifest error to say that the child is *only a fruit* or blessing, and not at all an end of the conjugal union. But is it not on the contrary also an exaggeration to write: "The hearts (of spouses) are never close except when anxious about a new-born life or beat over the cradle of a little one"? One could not overstate how much spouses are developed and bound more closely together by a child, and how this is the ultimate revelation of the meaning of their love, as the Abbé Zundel has admirably shown.⁸ But in the phrase just quoted the words "never . . . except" are evidently too strong. One should be careful not to exaggerate, whether in defending a cherished thesis or in presenting for discussion an opinion regarding which one believes reservations should be made.

As to N. Rocholl, we have an unpublished paper of his in

⁸ *L'Amour Sacrement* published first in *Problèmes de la sexualité*, then in *Recherche de la personne*.

which by a general exposition of principles he replies to the objection made against him (and which if it holds at all, would hold not only against him), that he substitutes for a morality of ends a morality of essences, and thus endangers all morality. What is essential in his paper is given in the following paragraphs.

By *meaning* one should understand *being* (*esse*) and *existence* (*existere*), keeping in mind that being, which is likewise truth and goodness, is not proposed merely to the coldly objective intellect; it is presented with all the force of its charm and obligation. In this there is what may be called a philosophy of totality. *Meaning* and *end* are not opposed to each other in the way that one might think, they are not mutually exclusive, at least when there is question of inner finality (and not merely of goals more or less imposed from without). The essence and the order or rank of ends have their root in being and are revealed in it. A reality is not exhausted by *being-for-something*. The created being has not only an *end*, it has also a *meaning*. To consider things ontologically is in the first place to view the being and in it to seek its meaning, and then to determine the intrinsic and extrinsic ends, the intrinsic end being no more than the perfect realization of the being, while the extrinsic is the extension of the intrinsic, a rendering of service to superior realities. Applying these principles to marriage we will say: As a community of a man and a woman, instituted by God and restored by Christ, marriage has a *meaning*; it is a reflection of the Divine Being and of the marriage of Christ and the Church. Its finality, or inner tendency, is the unfolding and fruitful perfection of that community. It is thereby that it serves the earthly commonwealth and the Kingdom of God; the Church itself, in a certain sense, results from the expansion of married couples into families. The conjugal act belongs to the man and woman's community of life; it has no need of being justified by an end towards which the spouses would consciously and explicitly aim—to beget a child, to render a service of justice and love to a fellow-spouse, or to escape from the danger of incontinence or of unfaithfulness. All of this is contained in the inner orientation of the act, in which is expressed and realized the complete surrender of the love that belongs to marriage alone.

Fecundity is, in principle, included in the inner orientation of marriage, but not always in fact, as shown by the sad experiences of many sterile married couples. To put an obstacle in the way of

fecundity is to make a criminal attack on the intrinsic finality of marriage. It is immoral to contract marriage for an inferior end—as to enrich oneself, to have offspring to whom one could bequeath one's name and goods, without consenting to the being or even the meaning of marriage. We dare to say that for one to marry and to perform the conjugal act even in order to give a citizen to the kingdom of God while refusing to belong interiorly to one's fellow-spouse, would be an unjustified attack upon the inner orientation of marriage. Being and inner finality do not admit of a separation. I cannot wish for the being without wishing for its natural development.

The theory of ends attempts to determine the being by the end, by saying something like this: God wishes the propagation of the human race and He so instituted marriage that it could attain that end in a suitable way. . . . The theory cannot decide whether marriage is something else and more than the necessary condition for an honest and correct propagation of the human race.

The ontological view would say preferably: God knew how glorious His image would be in a human creature if He made man and woman for one another, how fitting to reflect His creative power would be their lives in marriage, to be and to perpetuate from generation to generation the image of the life of love of the Trinity. He therefore made man in accordance with that idea and instituted the being of marriage. Man should consent to it. God founded marriage so marvellously upon the unity of the man and the woman that it is easy for the human will, provided that the image of God has not been effaced from it, to consent to that unity; the consent is so much the more easy as the will follows the movement of sound nature and, in the sacramental marriage, the movement of grace. Thus conceived, marriage requires of spouses the highest moral behavior; they should be continually on their guard not to allow self-love or a false love of the creature to prevail; but that will be in the freedom of children of God, *qui non solum uti debent, ut genus humanum propagetur, seu libido deprimatur, sed etiam frui marito possunt, gratias agentes Domino.*

The ontological construction of marriage does not therefore in any way represent the destruction of morality, but a certain broadening of views, in this sense that the institution of marriage created by God and elevated by grace is not merely determined in its relation to ends but in its entire reality. This is obtained by true conjugal love which is at the same time love of God. Spouses who appreciate the being of marriage have no reason to worry explicitly concerning

those ends, which are bound by God Himself so closely to the being of marriage that they issue from it naturally and cannot be dissociated from it without an offence to morality.

If it is morally good for spouses to devote themselves to an *end* why should it not be just as good to devote themselves to a *being*? The end of the thing (*finis operis*) and the end of the agent (*finis operantis*) are not eliminated but are brought into closer cohesion. It is feared that on our part there is a slipping towards secondary ethical views. I cannot subscribe to this appreciation, for the whole is greater than one of its parts and superior even to all of the parts. The full expansion of the being of marriage is therefore both the end of the union (*finis operis*) and the end of the partners (*finis operantis*), for the being of marriage is not shut up in the nuptial celebration nor does it consist in putting the spouses at the service of exterior ends. The being of marriage is rather a possibility and a need of inner development. Indeed it is a permanent sacrament of which the effects of grace increase through the righteous behavior of the partners. The end of the being (*finis operis*) of marriage is not something extrinsic to the being, but consists in the deepening, the growth and the achievement of it. This is to be understood even of the birth of children, which is not first a service of larger communities, but represents before all else an expansion and a perfecting of the inner being of marriage. The stalk is not merely for the fruit, but the stalk and the fruit together form the undivided plant which has its place in creation.

To subordinate marriage first to the life of the state and even to that of the Church would be to subordinate the interior end to the exterior. I see so much less reason for doing this as with the interior end the exterior end itself is obtained, and more advantageously.

The end of the thing (*finis operis*) in marriage is the conservation, the deepening, the expansion and the perfection of the community of life of the spouses, in the sense we have explained, which includes in a superior unity all that one may consider as a true end of marriage.

The end of the agent (*finis operantis*) is reduced to the end of the thing, since it consists in establishing and realizing the whole being of marriage, which is also the rule of its morality. Thus there reigns a perfect harmony between the being and the will.

In the measure that spouses devote themselves, surrender themselves to one another, according as God made them for one another, with all their being and powers, to form a superior unity they realize the being, and by that very fact, the possible ends of marriage.

This being of marriage is imposed upon them as an obligatory norm of morality, as something that must be observed. In taking this view of things I believe that I am on the very ground of the New Testament which is satisfied to direct spouses regarding the being of marriage itself, and to exhort them to true conjugal love.

Whatever one may think of these explanations and notably of the general mode of their conception to which M. Rocholl adheres, one fact is certain; it is that the essays to which we are giving our special attention have been favorably received by married people, indeed by fervent Christian spouses, and that the authors flatter themselves that they find a confirmation of their views in the testimony of betrothed and married persons whose morality and Christian nobility could not be called into question. They see a confirmation, above all, in the agreement, which for them is evident, between their essays and the practices of the Church. They consider their view to be more benign than that which was the rigidly logical result of older conceptions maintained without any correction or modification, and which as a matter of fact was followed here and there in the Middle Ages.⁹

With regard to this I have proposed certain questions and I have examined some particular considerations developed by authors whether in their published books or in papers of which many have not yet been given to the public. That I may not repeat what I have said elsewhere I will content myself with some brief observations. Whatever may be the presentations or systematic conceptions of theologians, the Church admits without hesitation the lawfulness of marriage between persons of whom it is well known that they neither shall have nor can have children even though they are able to

⁹ The Church has never varied her moral teaching. She does not declare something to be lawful or honest today which in older times she would have considered as dishonest, illicit, or perverse. But one can and one ought to recognize that in the Middle Ages there were some rather excessive severities due to a certain disfavor associated with the conjugal act and to an anxiety to find an "excuse" for it. On this point it will be profitable to consult Rev. Peter Browe, S. J., *Beiträge zur Sexualethik des Mittelalters*. Breslau: 1932, and Dominikus Lindner, *der Usus Matrimonii*, Munich: Kösel and Pustet, 1929.

consummate the act of union. It is also incontestable that today Catholic moralists unanimously admit the perfect lawfulness of the conjugal act in periods of sterility, *ad fovendum mutuum amorem*, *ad vitandam incontinentiam*, *ad vincendam tentationem infidelitatis*, etc. They declare also that when there are just and serious reasons for desiring that conjugal intercourse may not result in a new conception (as for example when pregnancy or confinement would endanger the life of the mother, or when the economic conditions of the family are much too critical or straitened), it is permitted to restrict the intercourse, systematically and exclusively to periods of infecundity.¹⁰

The mind of the Church as seen in her practise is a rule of life and thought for Catholics. The solutions in regard to which moralists are in agreement and which they teach under the supervision of the Church cannot be of a nature to mislead souls into a way of laxity. But their logical connection with the principles put forward in current treatises is not evident at first sight. The universally adopted moral conclusions are harmonized with the classic understanding of primary and secondary ends only by grace of a somewhat subtile dialectic. In the recent essays, on the contrary, the coherence, the organic connection with the practise of the Church, the solutions in regard to which there is agreement today among the moralists, on the one hand, and the explanatory synthesis on the other, are at once evident to all. In that, there is an advantage which many earnest spouses, captivated by the clearness and probity of the new view, appre-

¹⁰ In this connection I wrote that for Christian spouses there could be a question only of *resigning themselves* to the use of the Ogino method when imposed by conditions: "After several years of experience it has been ascertained medically and psychologically that the Ogino method, even when followed accurately, is only a last resort, that there is a risk that it will produce a troublesome state of tension, enervation and unbalance, and that it will weaken in the face of cunning solicitations. Even if it were lawful for no particular reason yet it should be advised against unless it is imposed by conditions. Only when there is a real necessity is it prudent to submit to the consequent harm, then, moreover, when this is reduced to a minimum." (*Revue Thomiste*, Oct. 1938, p. 757.) Monsignor Courbe, secretary of the French Catholic Action, said to me spontaneously last January that the idea expressed in that text was in exact accordance with the mind of the French hierarchy just as it had been declared in recent decisions.

ciate particularly. It is this coherence and this frankness that gives them a feeling of relief and deliverance, whereas the usual presentation of the matter suggests to them such reflections as this: "It cannot be denied that there are Christian spouses who feel uneasy when they see that, in a certain way, stress is put upon the primary end of marriage." They feel that their love is not appreciated in its reality and its peculiar dignity when one judges of it only by its relation to the end that consists in procreation, however noble it is, and to the "secondary" ends that consist in mutual aid or the "appeasement of concupisences."¹¹

These recent authors believe that in a passage of the Encyclical *Casti Connubii* they find a justification of their effort to throw light on the personal ends beside, even before, the procreative end, in a conscious reaction against those who hardly think of any but the latter. After having spoken of the reciprocal formation of spouses in accordance with the perfection of divine charity to which all Christians are urged and which married persons should seek in and through marriage, the Holy Father writes: "In a very true sense, as the Roman Catechism teaches (11, cap. VIII, q. 13), one may say that this mutual interior formation of spouses and this assiduous zeal to aid one another in the way of perfection, *are the cause and primary purpose of marriage, if however, marriage is considered not in its stricter meaning, as instituted for the procreation and education of children, but, in its wider sense, as a lifelong communion, intimacy and society.*"¹²

It is not for us to decide whether or not it is right to turn the Encyclical to account in this way.

¹¹ Paul and Marie-Simone Thisse, foreword of the French edition of Doms, pages 7-8, 1938.

¹² "Haec mutua conjugium interior conformatio, hoc assiduum sese invicem perficiendi studium, verissima quadam ratione, ut docet *Catechismus Romanus*, etiam primaria matrimonii causa et ratio dici potest, si tamen matrimonium non pressius ut institutum ad prolem rite procreandum educandamque, sed latius ut totius vitae communio, consuetudo, societas accipiat."

I have underscored that part of the text from which our authors take their argument.

Objections against this presentation of our question have not been wanting. We have personally examined a number of them which have not seemed to us to be decisive.¹³ Since then Father Robilliard, O. P., in general terms,¹⁴ and Father Boigelot, S. J., in a long review already cited,¹⁵ have formulated together with some very frank praises some very severe criticisms. We will not undertake to discuss them here, for we know that the author whom they had principally in mind will very soon take up the discussion himself. It will be time then to see how the question stands.

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NOTE.—Father Boigelot having involved us incidentally in his reply to the inquiry begun by *Orientations* we have replied by restating our view in its true light. While very courteously admitting the justifiableness of our observations he insisted upon the following point. The new theologians undermine the classic thesis which bases the indissolubility of marriage upon the exactions of an education for the child; they claim that the argument has no value when there is not or cannot be a child. But no less valueless is their own argument, which bases the indissolubility upon "ideal, theoretical, total love" in all cases in which love is actually wanting.

With regard to this may we be allowed to say: The "new theologians" do not base the indissolubility of marriage upon "ideal, theoretic, total love," but in the first place upon the nature itself of the conjugal community and upon the gift of self that the conjugal act expresses and realizes, something quite different from the charge against us. The conjugal community, *3mweinigkeit*, considered in its intimate reality and in the act that belongs to it, of itself requires unity and indissolubility. Naturally and even before any consideration of procreative fecundity it involves an exaction and obligation of love, not indeed "ideal" or "theoretical" but specifically conjugal, "total," yes, and lasting. In the opinion of

¹³ Article in *Revue Thomiste*, Oct. 1938, cited above.

¹⁴ *Vie Intellectuelle*, Nov. 25, 1938. See also *Billet de Christianus*.

¹⁵ *Nouvelle Revue Theologique*, January, 1939.

the authors who are criticized it is not therefore, at least it is not primarily, by reason of the character of the conjugal love that the conjugal bond is indissoluble. It is the bond, perpetual by its nature, which demands that the love, like itself, should be lasting. One should not change the argument of the "new theologians," but should take it just as they present it. Otherwise it will be very easy to criticize them, but the criticism will be only imperfectly pertinent.

However, we can admit Father Boigelot's way of understanding the matter. It is true that if, on the one hand, a lasting, indissoluble bond demands a lasting, perpetual love, on the other hand also, the love of betrothed persons, conjugal love worthy of the name demands that it itself be unique and perpetual, and aim at an indissoluble bond. We have here therefore a verification of the well-known metaphysical principle regarding causes: "Causes are reciprocal from different points of view."

Well, even if one considers this view of the matter, which is true and which could not be neglected without prejudice, still one cannot reason about love as one reasons about fecundity and say: if the consideration of infecundity suffices to weaken the classic argument of indissolubility drawn from the necessities of education, the absence of love will destroy the argument of the new theory. The disparity consists in this: fecundity (which one tries to hinder and which one often succeeds in preventing by using artificial means) is not directly dependent upon the united wills of the partners; there are many spouses who would gladly have children and whose relations remain hopelessly unfruitful, whereas the conjugal love dwells in the heart and will of the partners. (On the other hand, even more numerous are the spouses who would prefer that their relations should be sterile, yet children are conceived and are born to them.) Genuine conjugal love, however spontaneous it may be in its blossoming and in passional elements, is voluntarily accepted, preserved, kept alive and cultivated; when it languishes it can be revived, and its flame can be kindled again. Only love which is no more than carnal passion in those who give way to the obscure impulse of sensuality and renounce all control and freedom, depends entirely upon necessity, blossoms and inevitably dies.

Therefore one is not obliged to ask himself: what will become of indissolubility if love fails, as one asks himself: what decisive reason remains in favor of indissolubility when there is not and cannot be a child if *the* first and determining reason for indissolubility is the ordination of marriage to a child to be begotten and humanly educated. However strongly the normal fecundity of conjugal rela-

tions (and especially the actual presence of the child in the home) may militate in favor of the indissolubility of the marriage bond, there must be a reason yet more profound for the unbreakable bond. It is this reason that the new authors believe they find in the very nature of the conjugal community and its act, without however denying, but quite to the contrary while expressly acknowledging with a declaration of its limitation, the strength of the classic argument drawn from the procreative finality and the exigencies of education. Regarding this point such seems to me at any rate to be the exact meaning of their essays.

B. L.

PROBLEMS FOR THOMISTS

I. THE PROBLEM OF SPECIES

(*Third Installment*)

16. *The second position.* As in the case of the first position the texts here also fall into three groups: (1) texts relevant to the order of species generally; (2) texts dealing with the species of living things; (3) texts dealing with the species of non-living things. But here it is better to examine first the texts relevant to the number of species and later the texts on the order of species, because the second position clearly opposes the first on the question of the number, but not so clearly in the matter of the ordering of species. With respect to this matter, we shall have to discern precisely the points on which the two positions disagree, and to this end the examination of texts concerning the number of species will assist. Furthermore, there is reason for examining first the texts about non-living things. According to the principles of the first position, if there are more than two species of non-living things, there must be more than three species of living things. The argument for the second position can, therefore, be best constructed by taking the texts in an order which reverses the way in which they are above enumerated.

(a) *The species of non-living things.* We have already observed that most of the passages in which Aristotle and St. Thomas discuss elements and mixtures can be more readily construed as saying that there are many species of each of these generic types of non-living body, than as holding *element* and *mixture* to be infima species.¹⁰⁸ In the *De Caelo*, Aristotle argues against those who maintain that there are an infinite number of elements and against those who hold there is only one. We are concerned, of course, only with the latter issue. The argument starts from the fact of an observed diversity in the local motions of bodies: they either tend upward or downward *absolutely*, or they tend in these contrary directions *relatively*, i. e. relative to the places of other bodies. Motions are the acts of powers, and diversity of motions seems to require diversity of powers. "It is clear," says Aristotle, "that the difference of the elements does not depend upon their shape. Their most important differences are those of property, function and power; for every

¹⁰⁸ Vd. fn. 75 and 76, *supra*.

natural body has, we maintain, its own functions, properties and powers."¹⁰⁹ Hence, by a difference in functions,—local motions or tendencies to proper place,—a difference in powers can be discerned, and these different powers are the properties by which the elemental distinctions must be made. In terms of the observed facts, and the basic principle of analysis concerning functions and powers, Aristotle concludes that there are four and only four elements.

In accordance with general conviction we may distinguish the absolutely heavy, as that which sinks to the bottom of all things, from the absolutely light, which is that which rises to the surface of all things. I use the term "absolutely," in view of the generic character of "light" and "heavy," in order to confine the application to bodies which do not combine lightness and heaviness. It is apparent, I mean, that fire, in whatever quantity, so long as there is no external obstacle, moves upward, and earth moves downward; and, if the quantity is increased, the movement is the same, though swifter. But the heaviness and lightness of bodies which combine these qualities is different from this, since while they rise to the surface of some bodies, they sink to the bottom of others. Such are air and water. Neither of them is absolutely either light or heavy. Both are lighter than earth—for any portion of either rises to the surface of it—but heavier than fire, since a portion of either, whatever its quantity, sinks to the bottom of fire; compared together, however, the one has absolute weight, the other absolute lightness, since air in any quantity rises to the surface of water, while water in any quantity sinks to the bottom of air (*De Caelo*, IV, 4, 311^a 15-30).

There seems little doubt that Aristotle is here distinguishing the four elements as specifically distinct kinds of matter, as the following capital text makes plain:

A thing which has one kind of matter is light and always moves upward, while a thing which has the opposite matter is heavy and always moves downward. Bodies composed of kinds of matter different from these but having relatively to each other the character which these have absolutely, possess both the upward and the downward motion. . . . The kinds of matter, then, must be as numerous as these bodies, i. e. four, but though they are four there must be a common matter of all—particularly if they pass into one another—which in each is different in being. There is no reason why there should not be one or more intermediates between the contraries, as in the case of colour. . . . It is plain, then, that one must suppose as many distinct species of matter as there are bodies (*De Caelo*, IV, 5, 312^a 22-312^b 20).¹¹⁰

¹⁰⁹ *De Caelo*, III, 8, 307^b 18-21. Cf. IV, 6, 313^a 15: "The shape of bodies will not account for their moving upward or downward in general, though it will account for their moving faster or slower."

¹¹⁰ In the immediately following sentences, Aristotle reiterates his argument, first,

For a further understanding of Aristotle's view of the four species of elemental bodies, it is necessary to turn to his discussion of the constitution of the elements and of the manner in which they are subject to change, for he holds that they are generated from one another.¹¹¹ "The elements," he tells us, "are the primary constituents of bodies." If we ask "what kind of substance an element is?" we are answered that "an element is a body into which other bodies may be analyzed, present in them potentially or actually (which of these, is still disputable), and not divisible into bodies different in form."¹¹² The characteristic of substantial forms which are elemental is they do not in any way involve inferior forms. Hence, elements cannot be corrupted into anything except other elements, by a kind of transmutation; and an elemental substance is, by reason of having an absolutely primitive form, *formally* indivisible and irreducible, though *materially*, i. e. in quantity, an element, unlike an atom, may be divisible.

In the *De Generatione et Corruptione*, Aristotle confirms this view. The elements, which are the primary bodies somehow constituting all physical things, are themselves constituted by things more primary; but these things are not substances or bodies: they are the ultimate principles of substantial constitution, namely, the one substratum and the contraries. The leading fact here is not, as in the previous case, that of diverse local motions, but rather the fact of substantial change or alteration. If, as Aristotle supposes to be the case, the elements change into one another, they must be constituted by a plurality of unchanging principles, for nothing which is simply one can change. The ultimate substratum does not

against those who hold that there is a single kind of matter of all things, "as, for instance, the void or the plenum or extension or the triangles," for then everything would have only one kind of motion; and secondly, against the position that there are only two kinds of matter, for then "it would be difficult for the intermediate bodies to behave as air and water behave." Cf. *ibid.*, III, 5, wherein Aristotle concludes "from the distinction already established of a plurality of natural movements, it is impossible that there should be only one element. But if the elements are not an infinity and not reducible to one, they must be several and finite in number" (304^b 20-23). What Aristotle says about the necessity of there being one common matter, if there is a transmutation of the elements, is not inconsistent with his denial of one *kind* of matter, for the common matter is not a kind of matter, but the primitive substratum of substantial change, the matter which is analytically, but not existentially, separable from all forms. The four elemental kinds of matter exist as the union of that one common matter with each of the four specifically different elemental forms.

¹¹¹ Vd. *De Caelo*, III, 6, 305^a 32.

¹¹² *De Caelo*, III, 3, 302^a 12-18.

change *per se*; nor can one contrary change into another; but one element can change into another according as the substratum passes from one form to its contrary.¹¹³ We need not be concerned here with Aristotle's reasons for choosing *hot* and *cold*, *dry* and *moist*, as the two basic pairs of contrary qualities;¹¹⁴ it suffices for our purposes to note that these are the four elementary qualities. Since contraries cannot be coupled, there can only be four, not six, couplings of these qualities, namely, "hot with dry and moist with hot, and again cold with dry and cold with moist." The four couples belong to the four simple bodies, "for Fire is hot and dry, whereas Air is hot and moist; and Water is cold and moist, while Earth is cold and dry."¹¹⁵ The precise relation between the four elements, as species of substance, and the four couplings of elementary qualities, is not clear, but, as the following text indicates, the four groups of qualities are consonant with the division of the four elements according to the diversity of their natural motions.

The "simple bodies" since they are four, fall into two pairs which belong to the two regions, each to each: for Fire and Air are forms of the body moving towards the "limit," while Earth and Water are forms of the body which moves towards the "center." Fire and Earth, moreover, are extremes and purest: Water and Air, on the contrary, are intermediates and more like blends. And, further, the members of either pair are contrary to those of the other, Water being contrary to Fire and Earth to Air; for the qualities constituting Water and Earth are contrary to those that constitute Fire and Air. Nevertheless, since they are four, each of them is characterized *par excellence* by a single quality: Earth by dry rather than by cold, Water by cold rather than by moist, Air by moist rather than by hot, and Fire by hot rather than by dry (*De Gen. et Cor.*, II, 3, 330^b 31-331^a 6).^{115a}

What remains unclear is the nature of the substantial form of an elemental body. It cannot be identified either with the power of motion to a proper place, or with the qualitative couples just enumerated. These are properties signifying the essence or substantial form: the power of motion to a proper place is a property of an element considered as acting by itself; whereas the qualitative couples, consisting of active and passive qualities, are the properties

¹¹³ Vd. *De Gen. et Cor.*, II, 1.

¹¹⁴ Vd. *De Gen. et Cor.*, II, 2.

¹¹⁵ *De Gen. et Cor.*, II, 3, 330^a 30-330^b 5.

^{115a} Aristotle has previously explained that "fire and air, and each of the bodies we have mentioned, are not simple but blended. The 'simple' bodies are indeed similar in nature to them, but not identical with them. Thus the 'simple' body corresponding to fire is 'such-as-fire' not fire; that which corresponds to air is 'such-as-air'; and so on with the rest of them" (*ibid.*, 330^b 23-30).

of an element considered as acting upon another or as susceptible to being acted upon by another.¹¹⁶ But in view of the fact that the local motions are contrary and the fact that the four elementary qualities are contrary, the elements themselves are spoken of as contrary to one another, and two, Fire and Earth, are spoken of as extremes, whereas the other two, Water and Air, are spoken of as intermediates. This is *apparently* inconsistent with one of the basic principles concerning the nature of substantial species, which we have stated as common to both the first and the second position, namely, that substances are not related as contraries and that there is no mean between them.¹¹⁷ This inconsistency is further evidenced by Aristotle's discussion of the transmutation of the elements *inter se*, wherein he treats the changing of Air into Fire, Water into Earth, etc., as an *alteration*, i. e., a change in which the primitive substratum passes from one group of qualities to another and contrary group, rather than as a *generation* and *corruption* strictly, i. e. a substantial change, in which the substratum passes from one substantial form to another which, as such, cannot be contrary.¹¹⁸ We cannot be concerned here with the problem of substantial change which these texts raise,¹¹⁹ but we must note what they imply about the order and relation of the four "simple" bodies as species of the genus *element*. We shall develop these implications later when we attempt to state the view of the second position about the general ordering of substantial species. Here we need only observe that Aristotle's consideration of generation and alteration leads him to the same

¹¹⁶ Vd. *De Gen. et Cor.*, II, 2.

¹¹⁷ Vd. the third proposition expounded in the section devoted to *Antecedent Principles* (II, 8, *supra*). It is necessary to distinguish the contrariety of habit and privation, which does obtain in the sphere of substances, from the contrariety of forms, which occurs only in the domain of accidents. "Substantial forms cannot be contraries," says St. Thomas, "because contraries are certain extremes, of a certain determined distance, and in a certain continuous mode" (*In Meta.*, Bk. XI, Lect. 12). It is true that substantial forms exclude one another, but this repugnance is privative opposition rather than contrariety in the strict sense. John of St. Thomas speaks of the opposition of substantial forms as impossibility rather than contrariety. Vd. *Phil. Nat.*, P. I, Q. 2, A. 2. Unless otherwise indicated, I have used and shall use the words "contrary" and "contrariety" in the strict sense to mean the sort of opposition which obtains among accidental forms. The inconsistency noted in the text above arises from the fact that Aristotle *seems* to attribute strict contrariety to the four elements. The consequences are serious. Vd. fn. 168, *infra*.

¹¹⁸ Vd. *De Gen. et Cor.*, II, 4-5. Cf. *ibid.*, I, 2-3 for a clear statement of the distinction between generation and alteration. Cf. also *Physics*, V, 1-2.

¹¹⁹ This problem will be discussed in a subsequent article, and special attention will there be paid to the differences between substantial change in the sphere of living and in the sphere of non-living substances.

conclusion which he reached in *De Caelo* from facts about local motion, namely, that there are four elements, each a species of substance, and this conclusion squarely opposes the notion that *element* is itself an infima species, as the first position holds.¹²⁰

There is no definite enumeration of the species of mixtures. Yet it is perfectly clear in certain texts that the word "mixture" names not an infima species, but a genus subsuming many species. The account of the generation of mixed bodies out of elemental ones gives us reason to believe, furthermore, that there must be *at least* four species of mixture, and that there are probably many more. So far as local motion is concerned, a mixed body will tend to move toward the place proper to its predominant element. To understand this we must know that the various simple bodies do not persist as actual substances when they are together in the constitution of a mixture. The following texts make this plain:

All the other bodies will result from the contraries, or rather from the "elements," in so far as these have been combined: while the "elements" will result from the contraries, in so far as these "exist potentially" in a special sense—not as matter "exists potentially," but in the sense explained above. [The sense explained above is that an element, which has one quality actually, has a contrary potentially, and in virtue of this potentiality on the part of its matter, it can be transformed into that other.] And when a thing comes-to-be in this manner, the process is "combination"; whereas what comes-to-be in the other manner is matter. Moreover contraries also "suffer action," in accordance with the disjunctively articulated definition established in the early part of this work. For the actually-hot is potentially-cold, and the actually-cold potentially-hot; so that hot and cold, unless they are equally balanced, are transformed into one another (and all the other contraries behave in a similar manner). It is thus, then, that *in the first place*, the "elements" are transformed; and that (*in the second place*) out of the elements come-to-be flesh and bones and the like—the hot becoming cold and the cold becoming hot when they have been brought to the "mean." For at the "mean" is neither hot nor cold. The "mean," how-

¹²⁰ "Assuming, then, that the contrariety, in respect to which they are transformed, is *one*, the 'elements' will inevitably be two: for it is 'matter' that is the 'mean' between the two contraries, and matter is imperceptible and inseparable from them. Since, however, the elements are seen to be more than two, the contrarieties must at the least be two. But the contrarieties being two, the 'elements' must at least be four (as they evidently are) and cannot be three" (*De Gen. et Cor.*, II, 5, 332^a34-332^b3). And later, distinguishing between what is *numerically* the same and *specifically* the same, in cyclical sequences of transformation, Aristotle says: "When water comes-to-be from Air, and Air from Water, the Air is the same 'specifically,' not 'numerically'" (*ibid.*, II, 11, 338^b12-20). It is clear, therefore, that Aristotle means each of the four elements to be regarded as a substantial species.

ever, is of considerable extent and not indivisible. Similarly, it is *qua* reduced to a mean condition that the dry and the moist, as well as the contraries we have used as examples, produce flesh and bone and the remaining compounds (*De Gen. et Cor.*, II, 7, 334^b 17-30).

All the compound bodies . . . are composed of all the "simple" bodies. [Aristotle at this point adds a qualification to indicate that he is talking only about all terrestrial compound bodies or mixtures.] All compounds presuppose in their coming-to-be constituents which are contrary to one another; and in all compounds there is contained one set of the contrasted extremes. Hence the other set must be contained in them also, so that every compound will include all the "simple" bodies (*De Gen. et Cor.*, II, 8, 334^b 31-335^a 9).

If all the compound bodies, or mixtures, contained all the simple bodies, or elements, in exactly the same way, then there would be only one species of mixture. But observation tells us that compound bodies differ in their motions and in their active and passive qualities; thus, wood and flesh, blood and bone, minerals and liquids of all sorts, are different compounds. The different kinds of food by which things are nourished are specifically different compounds. Each specifically distinct compound is, then, a different *mean* of the contrary elemental qualities, according to the quantitative predominance of one or another kind of element in the constitution of the compound. Although the elements do not persist as such, i. e., *substantially*, in the mixture, their *virtual* presence is manifested by the way in which the qualitative mean between the pairs of contraries is established.¹²¹

There is the same problem about the nature of substantial form

¹²¹ Aristotle does not have the concept of *virtuality* explicitly, but his analysis does suggest the mode of being which St. Thomas later distinguished from mere potentiality and full actuality. Thus, he writes: "Since some things *are-potentially*, while others *are-actually*, the constituents combined in a compound can 'be' in a sense and yet 'not-be.' The compound may be-actually other than the constituents from which it has resulted; nevertheless, each of them may still *be-potentially* what it was before they were combined, and both of them may survive undestroyed. . . . And it is evident that the combining constituents not only coalesce, having formerly existed in separation, but also can again be separated out from the compound. The constituents neither (a) persist *actually*, nor (b) are they *destroyed*, for their 'power of action' is preserved" (*De Gen. et Cor.*, I, 10, 327^b 22-33). Furthermore, if the constituents were preserved as such, we should speak of a composition, and not a combination or blending, for mixture is blending: "every portion of the resultant exhibits the same ratio between its constituents as the whole. If combination has taken place, the compound *must* be uniform in texture throughout—any part of such a compound being the same as the whole, just as any part of water is water; whereas if 'combination' is 'composition of the small particles,' nothing of the kind will happen" (*ibid.*, 328^a 8-12).

in the case of mixtures, as in the case of elements. It would *appear* that the distinctive properties of specifically different mixtures are diverse *means* between the elemental contrary qualities; from which it would follow that mixed substances, like elements, are related as contraries, for, in the sphere of contrariety, intermediates are opposed to one another as the extremes which they approximate. This problem must be postponed until later, as must further questions about the generation and corruption of mixtures and their transformation into one another;¹²² our present interest is merely in the fact that the Aristotelian analysis of combination and the resultant mixtures indicates his holding the position that there are *many* species of mixed body. This is sufficient to set up the opposition between the first and second position.

There are many texts in the writings of St. Thomas which indicate complete agreement with the Aristotelian analysis of elements and mixtures; and concurrence in the result, namely, the affirmation of four species of element and of at least four, probably many more, species of mixture. There is the passage in the Treatise on Man (*Summa Theologica*, I, 76, 4, ad. 4), already quoted, in which St. Thomas argues against Avicenna and Averroes for what he holds to be the position in accord with the Philosopher; namely, "that the forms of the elements remain in the mixed body, not actually but virtually. For the proper qualities of the elements remain, though modified; and in them is the power of the elementary forms. This quality of the mixture is the proper disposition for the substantial form of the mixed body, for instance, the form of a stone." St. Thomas, furthermore, makes explicit a point that is implied in Aristotle; namely, that "a simple quality is not the substantial form of an element, but its proper accident" and that the "quality resulting from simple qualities reduced to a mean, is not the substantial form of the mixed body, but its proper accident."¹²³ And, in another place, he points out that "the proper qualities of the elements are the effects of their substantial form." Here, in discussing the final conflagration, St. Thomas considers the opinion of those who say "that all the elements will remain as to their matter, while all will be changed as regards their imperfection; but that

¹²² Vd. *De Gen. et Cor.*, I, 3, in which Aristotle speaks of "the seed as a whole being converted into blood, or water into air" as instances of the "coming-to-be of one substance and the passing-away of another," distinguishing such change from alteration, or change of quality, in which a perceptible substance persists throughout the change.

¹²³ *Summa Theologica*, III, Sup., 79, 1, ad. 4. Cf. Opusc. 3, *De Mixtione Elementorum ad Magistrum Phillipum de Castrocoeli*.

two of them will retain their respective substantial form, namely, air and earth, while two of them, namely, fire and water, will not retain their substantial form."¹²⁴ Understood in context, this and other passages show clearly that St. Thomas affirmed four species of elements, each constituted by prime matter and its own substantial form, the latter being signified to us by the quality which is the proper accident of the specific element. In consequence, of course, his position is that there are many species of mixture, though the precise number is nowhere definitely given or, for that matter, even suggested.¹²⁵

One final comment must be made on all these texts from Aristotle and St. Thomas. The theory of elements and mixtures which they expound obviously rests both upon fundamental principles of philosophical analysis and also upon the kind of observation of the behavior of bodies, which belongs to empiriological science.¹²⁶ Aristotle did not distinguish between those premises which he could assert *qua* philosopher (ontological knowledge), and those which he could assert only *qua* scientist (empiriological knowledge); in fact, he could not, nor could St. Thomas, for it is only in the modern period that that distinction can be sharply made. In ancient and mediaeval times, natural philosophy and natural science were *confused*, in the sense that there was no line drawn between the different contributions, made by different methods of knowing, to the solution of problems about the nature of physical things. It is not surprising, therefore, that the account of elements and mixtures which Aristotle and St. Thomas give is full of *scientific errors*, i. e.,

¹²⁴ *Summa Theologica*, III, Sup., 74, 5.

¹²⁵ Thus St. Thomas writes in his discussion of the Eucharist: ". . . if any liquor is mixed in such quantity that it is able to be diffused throughout the wine, the whole will be mixed. But what is mixed from two things is neither of the mixed things, but both are transformed into a third composed of them. Whence it follows that the wine existing before would not remain, but the mixed liquor would be of another species, for instance, if water were mixed, the species of wine would disappear and there would be a liquor of another species" (*Summa Theologica*, III, 77, 8). If as mixed bodies, bread has its own substantial form, and wine another, it would seem to follow that the number of substantial species in the genus of mixtures is extremely large.

¹²⁶ We have already noted how Aristotle combined a simple fact of observation about the diverse motions of bodies with a simple ontological principle about functions indicating powers and powers substantial differences, to reach the conclusion that there must be more than one element, in fact, that there must be four. The observation, however acute in Aristotle's day, may now be known to be faulty. Such observational improvements, giving us a better grasp of the phenomenal facts, will alter the conclusion accordingly, but they do not require the least change in the other premise in the argument, namely, the ontological principle.

errors, and also inadequacies, of observation concerning the phenomena of natural motion, etc.; in fact, it would be surprising were it otherwise, since the scientific enterprise progresses from generation to generation by the correction of observational errors and by the addition of new data, new findings, and so forth. These observational errors need not concern us, however, for, if the ontological insight remains constant, the only effect of their correction by modern science is to alter the *number* of the elements, or the designation of their proper accidents, or the description of the way in which mixtures are constituted out of elements, and so forth.¹²⁷ The only point that concerns us is the affirmation of a plurality of species of non-living substances, of both elements and mixtures. That affirmation reflects a certain ontological analysis, which can be applied to different sets of empirical data, resulting for Aristotle and St. Thomas in the view that there are four elements, and for some modern Thomists in the view that the elements comprise all the species enumerated in the atomic table. The ontological principles in terms of which Aristotle and St. Thomas, or modern Aristotelians and Thomists, maintain a plurality of species in the genera of *element* and *mixture*,—on whatever state of observed facts,—have consequences for the conception of substantial species, their order and relation, which bring the second position into clear conflict with the first.

(b) *The species of living things.* If we abide by the principle in terms of which the first position concluded that there were not more than two species of non-living things *because* there were only three species of living things,¹²⁸ and if we simply reverse the argument, it must follow that the plurality of living species is greater than the plurality of inanimate ones, certainly greater than three or some other small number, as the first position contends. This, however, is not the traditional statement of the second position with regard to living species. That there are many species of plants and animals is not argued in this indirect manner. It appears to be simply affirmed as a matter of observed fact. This will be seen in the following exemplary texts.

¹²⁷ As we shall see subsequently, modern writers in the tradition of Aristotle and St. Thomas, take account of precisely such modifications on the side of empirical fact, and therefore give a different enumeration of elements from the traditional four, and a different exposition of mixtures.

¹²⁸ "The soul, since it is the most perfect form among the forms of corporeal things, is the principle of diverse operations . . . (whereas) the forms of inanimate things, because of their imperfection, are principles of few operations" (Aquinas, *In De Anima*, Bk. II, Lect. 1, #230). Cf. fn. 77, *supra*.

There are, of course, many places in the *Organon*, especially in *Posterior Analytics*, II, and *Topics*, VI, where Aristotle, discussing the different ways of defining, obviously regards *plant* and *animal* as genera to be further differentiated many times before infima species are reached. Thus, in treating of the method of division according to differentiae, he writes:

If the primary genus is assumed, and we then take one of the lower divisions, the dividendum will not fall whole into this division: e.g., it is not all animal which is either whole-winged or split-winged, but all winged animal, for it is winged animal to which this differentiation belongs. The primary differentiation of animal is that within which all animal falls. The like is true of every other genus, whether outside animal or a subaltern genus of animal; e.g. the primary differentiation of bird is that within which falls every bird, of fish that within which falls every fish (*Anal. Post.* II, 13, 96^b 35-97^a 4).

And in further treating of the method of selecting properties, he adds:

The method of selection consists in laying down the common genus of all our subjects of investigation—if e.g. they are animals, we lay down what the properties are which inhere in every animal. These established, we next lay down the properties essentially connected with the first of the remaining classes—e.g. if this first subgenus is bird, the essential properties of every bird—and so on, always characterizing the proximate subgenus. This will clearly at once enable us to say in virtue of what character the subgenera—man, e.g. or horse—possess their properties. Let A be animal, B the properties of every animal, C, D, E various species of animal. Then it is clear in virtue of what character B inheres in D,—namely A,—and that inheres in C and E for the same reason. . . . We are now taking our examples from the traditional class-names, but we must not confine ourselves to considering these. We must collect any other common character which we observe, and then consider with what species it is connected and what properties belong to it. For example, as the common properties of horned animals we collect the possession of a third stomach and only one row of teeth (*Anal. Post.*, II, 13, 98^a 2-18).

But these texts, and many others like them,¹²⁹ are taken from the context of a logical discussion. They cannot, therefore, be given an ontological interpretation. Aristotle is attempting to explain the formal properties of definitions and the formal criteria of a sound

¹²⁹ Vd. *Topics*, VI, 6. Thus: "A genus is always divided by differentiae that are coordinate members of a division, as, for instance, 'animal' by the terms 'walking,' 'flying,' 'aquatic' and 'biped'" (143^b). And: "Animal (e.g.) is predicated of 'man' or 'ox' or other walking animals, not of the actual differentia itself which we predicate of the species" (144^a 35).

method for achieving them: he is dealing with the formal relations of genus, difference and species. In the course of doing so, he must use examples, which he always indicates *as such* and even refers to as commonplace classifications. For the sake of illustrating logical points the examples chosen need not be true in fact.^{129a} We are not justified in converting merely illustrative statements into assertions of truth. Yet it is significant that Aristotle nowhere uses *plant* and *animal*, as he uses *man* or *ox*, to exemplify infima species. They are always genera, always subject to many further differentiations. We are entitled to suppose, therefore, that Aristotle thought of a large plurality of species (i. e., infima species) among living things. To check this supposition we must turn to his biological works, in which his use of the word "species" occurs in statements of fact.

The whole of the *Historia Animalium* is evidence on the point. Throughout its nine books, page after page contains passages in which the many species of animal are distinguished. We must be satisfied here with a citation of texts from Book I, and with an exemplary enumeration of the species which are discussed in the following books.

Of animals, some resemble one another in all their parts, while others have parts wherein they differ. Sometimes the parts are identical in form or species, as, for instance, one man's nose or eye resembles another man's nose or eye, flesh flesh, and bone bone; and in like manner with a horse and with all other animals which we reckon to be of one and the same species: for as the whole is to the whole, so each to each are the parts severally. In other cases the parts are identical, save only for a difference in the way of excess or defect, as is the case in such animals as are of one and the same genus. By "genus" I mean, for instance, Bird and Fish, for each of these is subject to difference in respect of its genus, and there are many species of fishes and of birds (486^a 15-25).

Animals differ from one another in their modes of subsistence, in their

^{129a} The logical discussion of genus, difference and species is concerned with problems of predication,—the use and relation of universal terms or concepts as different types of predicates. In such an analysis of the predicables, there need be no concern at all with whether a given universal term *truly* signifies a nature, generic or specific. But in natural philosophy, we deal, not with terms or concepts, but with natures, according as they are specific or generic, or according as a specific nature is constituted by this generic or that differential character. In such discourse, the words "genus," "difference," and "species,"—or any words used to name particular genera, differences, or species,—signify *entia naturae*, not *entia rationis*. These natures do not exist, of course, in the same way as they are understood. "We must not consider the diversity of natural things as proceeding from the various logical notions or intentions, which flow from our manner of understanding, because reason can apprehend one and the same thing in various ways" (*Summa Theologica*, I, 76, 3, ad 4).

actions, in their habits, and in their parts. . . . Differences are manifested in modes of subsistence, in habits, and in actions performed. For instance, some animals live in water and others on land. And of those that live in water some do so in one way and some in another: that is to say, some live and feed in the water, take in and emit water, and cannot live if deprived of water, as is the case with the great majority of fishes; others get their food and spend their days in the water, but do not take in water but air, nor do they bring forth in the water. . . . Of animals that live on dry land some take in air and emit it, which phenomena are termed "inhalation" and "exhalation"; as, for instance, man and all such land animals as are furnished with lungs. Others again do not inhale air, yet live and find their sustenance on dry land; as, for instance, the wasp, the bee, and all other insects. . . . Some animals at first live in water, and by and by change their shape and live out of water, as is the case with river worms, for out of these the gadfly develops. Furthermore, some animals are stationary, and some are erratic. Stationary animals are found in water, but no such creature is found on dry land. . . . Many creatures are unattached but motionless, as is the case with oysters and the so-called holothuria. Some can swim, as, for instance, fishes, molluscs and crustaceans, such as the crawfish. But some of these last move by walking, as the crab, for it is the nature of the creature, though it lives in water, to move by walking. Of land animals some are furnished with wings, such as birds and bees, and these are so furnished in different ways from one another; others are furnished with feet. Of the animals that are furnished with feet, some walk, some crawl, and some wriggle. . . . Furthermore, the following differences are manifest in their modes of living and in their actions. Some are gregarious, some are solitary, whether they be furnished with feet or wings or be fitted for life in the water; and some partake of both characters, the solitary and the gregarious. . . . Also, some are carnivorous, some granivorous, some omnivorous. . . . Again, some creatures catch their food, others treasure it up, whereas others do not do so. Some creatures provide themselves with a dwelling; others go without one. . . . Further, in respect of locality of dwelling place, some creatures dwell under ground, as the lizard and snake; others live on the surface of the ground, as the horse and the dog. . . . Some are nocturnal, as the owl and the bat; others live in the daylight. . . . Animals also differ from one another in regard to character in the following respects. Some are good-tempered, sluggish and little prone to ferocity, as the ox; others are quick-tempered, ferocious and unteachable, as the wild boar; some are intelligent and timid, as the stag and the hare; others are mean and treacherous, as the snake; others are noble and courageous and high-bred, as the lion; others are thorough-bred and wild and treacherous, as the wolf. Further, some are crafty and mischievous, as the fox, some are spirited and affectionate and fawning, as the dog; others are easy-tempered and easily domesticated, as the elephant; others are cautious and watchful, as the goose; others are jealous and self-conceited, as the peacock. But of all animals man alone is capable of deliberation. Many animals have memory and are capable of instruction; but no other creature except man can recall the past at will (487^a11-488^b28).

The enumeration of species proceeds next in terms of the organs which animals possess in common or differently from one another; then, in terms of their manner of procreation and reproduction; then, in even greater detail in terms of their manner of locomotion. I shall conclude by the citation of a summary passage from Ch. 6.

Very extensive genera of animals into which other sub-divisions fall, are the following: one of birds; one of fishes; and another of cetaceans. Now all these creatures are blooded. There is another genus of the hard-shelled kind, which is called oyster; another of the soft-shelled kind, not as yet designated by a single term, such as the spiny crawfish and the various kinds of crabs and lobsters; and another of the molluscs, as the two kinds of calamary and the cuttle-fish; that of insects is different. All of these latter creatures are bloodless, and such of them as have feet have a goodly number of them; and of the insects some have wings as well as feet. Of the other animals the genera are not excessive. For in them one species does not comprehend many species; but in one case, as man, the species is simple, admitting of no differentiation, while other cases admit of differentiation, but the forms lack particular designation. . . . For all these reasons, we must take animals species by species, and discuss their peculiarities severally. These preceding statements, then, have been put forward thus in a general way, as a kind of foretaste of the number of subjects and of the properties that we have to consider in order that we may get a clear notion of distinctive character and common properties (490^b 7-491^a 8).

The *Historia Animalium* appears to leave little doubt about Aristotle's view of the vast number of infima species in the genus *animal*; in fact, Aristotle seems to say, at many places, that we can specifically distinguish more kinds of animals than there are common names available to designate. To the names which have appeared in the texts already quoted, the following can be added to indicate the extent of Aristotle's classifications: hippopotamus, ape, monkey, crocodile, chameleon, dolphin, sea-serpent, swallow, camel, sea-urchin, ascidian, sea-nettle, eel, partridge, starfish, hermit crab, bumble-bee, ant, spider, scorpion, grasshopper, locust, flea, louse, tortoise, pigeon, vulture, crow, sheep, deer, bear, mouse, tunny fish, mackerel, woodpecker, crane, pelican, bison, hedgehog; and so forth and so on. The kinds thus named are not always infima species; they may be more or less extensive genera; in fact, only in the case of man does Aristotle seem to be certain that no further specific differentiation is possible. For our present purposes, this point is unimportant because there are more infima species than there are genera, and the plurality of sub-genera within the genus *animal* is vast. Nor is it important if Aristotle be in error with respect to certain of his classifications. Here, as in the case of ele-

ments and mixtures, the Aristotelian treatment is a composition of philosophical principles and empirical observations. The enumeration of animal species may be somewhat different today, in the light of corrected and additional observations made by modern biological research, but if Aristotle were supplied with "modern observations," he would proceed, as he did in the *Historia Animalium*, with the specification of animals, into sub-genera and their sub-genera and, ultimately, infima species, according to the same principles, namely, that animals are differentiated by their bodily parts, by their locale of operation, by the manner in which they perform such functions as breathing, eating, procreating and reproducing, locomotion, sensing, etc., by their temperaments, as exhibited in their characteristic habits and actions, by their instincts, etc.¹³⁰

There is no need to support, by an elaborate citation of texts, the proposition that Aristotle would specify the genus *plant*, in the same way as the genus *animal*, and with the same result, namely, a large plurality of sub-genera and species. One sentence in the first book of *De Plantis* is sufficient to indicate the parallel to the *Historia Animalium*: "The differences of plants are recognized in their parts, their form and color, and sparseness and density, and roughness and smoothness, and all their incidental differences of taste, their inequality of size, their numerical increase and decrease, their largeness and smallness" (819^a 1-5). And in the ensuing chapters a large variety of genera and species are named, such as: tree, bush,

¹³⁰ We shall subsequently report the views of contemporary Thomists concerning the species of animals, as bearing on the point whether current biological classifications are acceptable in the light of traditional principles. In this connection we shall re-consider the distinction between "natural" and "systematic" species. Vd. fn. 102, *supra*. One point, however, must be mentioned here. We are not concerned with the epistemological distinction between our knowledge of species in terms of proper accidents and our knowledge in terms of contingent accidents. It is clear that Aristotle often uses contingent accidents in place of properties. The author of this distinction could hardly have been neglectful of it in his own work. He obviously used contingent accidents as extrinsic signs of properties with full knowledge of their remoteness from the essence ultimately signified in any judgment of specification. The point to be noted is, therefore, not Aristotle's solution of the epistemological problem about real and nominal definitions, but the fact that he thought the available empirical knowledge sufficient, in the light of ontological principles, for the classification of a large variety of animal species. It is the ontological principles thus employed which make the difference between the first and the second position concerning the number of species, since both positions must acknowledge the same set of observed facts,—whether the ancient or the modern version,—and neither position is justified in concluding about the number of species from one or another solution of the epistemological problem. Vd. Part III, esp. Section 13, *supra*.

herb, vegetable (the large genera); olive-tree, fig-tree, thorn-tree, bramble, rue, cabbage, beet, wheat, myrtle, willow, tamarisk, pine, grape, mulberry, date, plum, almond-tree, walnut-tree, pomegranate, and so forth (sub-genera and, perhaps, infima species).¹⁸¹

That St. Thomas follows Aristotle in his view of the plurality of plant and animal species can be gathered from many sources. There is, of course, no place where St. Thomas undertakes the extensive enumerations which can be found in Aristotle's biological works, but the indications of agreement are none the less clear. I shall cite a number of such textual indications, and first, several which are, perhaps, most impressive because they are from St. Thomas's commentary on those very passages in the *De Anima* which have already been cited for the position that there are only three species of living things: *plant*, *animal*, and *man*. In *De Anima*, II, 3, Aristotle enumerates the powers possessed by living things. All animals differ from plants in having sense, but in addition "certain *kinds* of animals possess in addition the power of locomotion, and still another order of animate being, i. e., man, the power of thinking, i. e. mind" (414^b 20). I have italicized the word "*kinds*," because it raises the question whether the possession of the power of local motion is a specifying property in the genus *animal*. St. Thomas does not speak directly to this point, but he does say that man is an infima species, incapable of further differentiation, because he is distinguished by intellect, and since intellect does not have a corporeal organ, intellective beings cannot be differentiated according to the diverse combinations of organs. But "the species of sensitive beings (i. e. brute animals) are diversified according to the diverse combinations in which in various ways they [the organs] are related to the operations of sense" (*In De Anima*, II, 5, # 294). It would seem to follow that animals having organs of locomotion, functionally related to the operations of sense, must be specifically differentiated from animals not possessing such organs. Further specifications can be made in terms of the various ways such bodily organs are combined and the manner of their functioning. St. Thomas here seems to be following the general principles of classification set forth in the *Historia Animalium*. A little later in the same chapter Aristotle again observes that the several vital powers

¹⁸¹ In the opinion of scholars the text of *De Plantis* is not from the hand of Aristotle, but is to be attributed to Nicolaus Damascenus, or some other minor peripatetic. It can be cited here because, however imperfect the text, it is nevertheless authentic as a peripatetic document and indicates how Aristotle would have proceeded in the writing of a botanical treatise. Cf. Theophrastus, *Enquiry Into Plants*.

are serially ordered: that in plants self-nutrition is found isolated from all other powers; that the power of sense is never found apart from self-nutrition, but that whereas all animals have at least one sense, touch, they may or may not have other senses. Further "among living things that possess sense some have the power of locomotion, some not. Lastly, certain living beings—a small minority—possess calculation and thought in addition to all the other powers" (415^a 1-10). Commenting on this text, St. Thomas reiterates that that which has reason or intellect as its distinctive power differs from all other living things "because it is not divided into diverse kinds according to species" (*Op. cit.*, II, 6, #301). It would seem to follow that there must be more than one "sensitive soul" and more than one "vegetative soul,"—in fact as many as there are animal and plant species,—despite the fact that the enumeration and ordering of vital powers which is made in this part of the *De Anima* also suggests that there are only three species of soul.¹⁸²

And in *De Anima*, II, 4, Aristotle speaks of reproduction as the most natural act of living things,—“the production of another like itself, an animal producing an animal, a plant a plant” (415^a 28). St. Thomas, in his Commentary, makes the point more definite by adding: “Further, according to species, such an animal makes such an animal, as man generates man, and an olive, an olive” (*Op. cit.*, II, 7, #314). This passage not only corroborates the interpretation

¹⁸² Vd. Part IV, Sect. 15, *supra*, for the exposition of the contrary line of argument which St. Thomas develops from this suggestion. But there are clearly conflicting interpretations of the point about the distribution of vital powers; for in his Commentary on *de Sensu et Sensato* (Lect. 1), St. Thomas says: “Thirdly, he makes a consideration by applying all this to single species of animals and plants, by determining what is proper to each species. The first consideration is in the *De Anima*. . . . The second consideration is contained in those books which he writes concerning those things which pertain commonly, either to all animals, or to many genera of them, or even to all living things, which is the present intention of this book” (#2). And he goes on to add: “Concerning the powers themselves of the soul on the part of the soul itself, it has been decided in the *De Anima*; but now what follows is a consideration of animals ‘and all things having life,’ which he adds on account of plants, ‘for determining,’ namely, what are ‘their proper operations,’—namely, for each species of animal and plant” (#7). “He says, therefore, first, that those which are greatest and chief among the things which pertain to animals and plants, whether they are common to all animals or many, or whether they are proper to a single species, seem to be common to the soul and body” (#8). “And he adds that those which have been enumerated are found in almost all genera of animals. He says ‘almost,’ because many of them are found in all animals, perfect and imperfect, namely, sense and desire, and joy and sorrow” (#11). “But certain of them pertain only to certain genera of animals” (#13).

of the preceding ones, but adds another extrinsic sign of specification, namely, uniformity of character throughout a series of generations. This point becomes increasingly important in the modern view of the problem of species.

If further confirmation is required, it can be found in the following passages:

Although a mule is unlike a horse or ass in species, it is like them in the proximate genus; by reason of which likeness one species, a mean species as it were, is engendered from different species (*De Potentia*, 3, 9, ad 16).

Among all the qualities, figure especially follows and shows the species of things. That is particularly evident in plants and animals, for which no better criterion for the diversity of species can be given than diversity of figure (*In Phys.*, VII, 5).

Now things may be distinguished in two ways. First, as those things which are altogether specifically different, e. g., a horse and an ox. Secondly, as perfect and imperfect in the same species, e. g., a boy and a man (*Summa Theologica*, I-II, 91, 5).

Irrational animals differ in species according to the various determined degrees of sensitive nature (*Summa Theologica*, I, 50, 4, ad 1).

The intellectual faculty . . . is common to many degrees of intellectuality, as the sensitive faculty is common to many degrees in the sensitive nature. Hence, as all sensitive things are not of one species, so neither are all intellectual things of one species (*Summa Theologica*, I, 75, 7, ad 3).

These texts are plain enough in their reference to a multiplicity of plant and animal species,—even illustrating the point by instancing horse and ox and ass. They are troublesome, however, on other grounds: the notion of a mean or intermediate species seems to suggest that species can be related as contraries having means, which, as we have noted in an earlier discussion of Aristotle's theory of the elements and mixtures, is apparently inconsistent with the doctrine that there is no contrariety among substances, and no medium between any two of them;¹³³ further, the remark about figure as the best criterion for distinguishing species *seems* inconsistent with Aristotle's proposition that the elements are not specifically distinguished according to their shapes or figure.¹³⁴

¹³³ Vd. fn. 117, *supra*.

¹³⁴ This inconsistency may be resolved by noting that Aristotle's point concerns the intrinsic nature of the elements,—“the difference of the elements does not depend upon their shapes,”—whereas St. Thomas is considering only the extrinsic signs by which we come to specify things. Vd. fn. 109, *supra*.

Reserving these points for fuller discussion later, we can conclude here with one more series of texts, from the Treatise on the Work of the Six Days, especially significant for the evolutionary aspects of the problem.

Concerning the production of plants, Augustine's opinion differs from that of others. For other commentators, in accordance with the surface meaning of the text, consider that the plants were produced in act in their various species, on this third day: whereas Augustine (*Gen. ad lit.*, V, 5; VIII, 3) says that the earth is said to have then produced plants and trees in their causes, that is, it received then the power to produce them. He supports this view by the authority of Scripture, for it is said (*Gen.* II, 4, 5): *These are the generations of the heaven and the earth, when they were created in that day . . . that God made the heaven and the earth, and every plant of the field before it sprung up in the earth, and every herb of the ground before it grew.* Therefore, the production of plants in their causes, within the earth, took place before they sprang up from the earth's surface. And this is confirmed by reason, as follows. In these first days God created all things in their origins or causes, and from this work He subsequently rested. Yet afterwards, by governing His creatures, in the work of propagation, *He worketh until now.* Now the production of plants from out the earth is a work of propagation, and therefore they were not produced in act on the third day, but in their causes only. However, in accordance with other writers, it may be said that the first constitution of species belongs to the work of the six days, but the reproduction among them of like from like, to the government of the universe (*Summa Theologica*, I, 69, 2).

It is clear that a multiplicity of plant species are said to have been produced. Subsequent passages make the same point about the production of animals.¹³⁵ What does require some further clarification

¹³⁵ "It must be observed that Augustine differs from other writers in his opinion about the production of fishes and birds, as he differs about the production of plants. For while others say that fishes and birds were produced on the fifth day actually, he holds that the nature of the waters produced them on that day potentially" (*S. T.*, I, 71, 1). Cf. *ibid.*, 72, 1, where it is said: "The different grades of life which are found in different living creatures can be discovered from the various ways in which Scripture speaks of them. The life of plants, for instance, is very imperfect and difficult to discern. . . . Amongst animals, those that live on land are, generally speaking, more perfect than birds and fishes. . . . Scripture, therefore, does not call fishes *living creatures*, but *creeping creatures*, having life; whereas it does call land animals *living creatures* on account of their more perfect life. . . . But the life of man, as being the most perfect grade, is not said to be produced, like the life of other animals, by the earth or water, but immediately by God." Further: "In other animals, and in plants, mention is made of genus and species, to denote the generation of like from like. But it was unnecessary to do so in the case of man, as what had already been said of other creatures might be understood of him" (*ibid.*, ad 3). Vd. also Reply Obj. 2 for a listing of genera and species of animal mentioned in *Genesis*.

tion, however, is the point on which St. Augustine differs from other commentators: whether all the species of plants and animals were produced actually during the work of creation or whether they were merely produced potentially, in their causes, to be actualized in the subsequent course of earthly time through the work of propagation.¹³⁶ St. Thomas attempts a resolution of the question, in discussing the completion of the universe, so far as production is concerned, by the sixth day; and in doing so seems to take the view that new species of living things have appeared in the course of time.

Nothing entirely new was afterwards made by God, but all things subsequently made had in a sense been made before in the work of the six days. . . . Some existed not only in matter, but also in their causes, as those individual creatures that are now generated existed in the first of their kind. Species, also that are new, if any such appear, existed beforehand in various active powers; so that animals, and perhaps even new species of animals, are produced by putrefaction by the power which the stars and elements received at the beginning. Again, animals of new kinds arise occasionally from the connection of individuals belonging to different species, as the mule is the offspring of an ass and a mare; but even these existed previously in their causes, in the work of the six days. . . . Hence it is written (Eccles. i, 10), *Nothing under the sun is new, for it hath already gone before, in the ages that were before us* (S. T., I, 73, 1, ad 3).

We can ignore here, as we have done before, such scientific errors as the one about "spontaneous generation" through putrefaction; it does not affect the main point, namely, that the multiplicity of plant and animal species were not originally created *except in their causes*, and that from time to time *new species* have appeared and may appear as the result of natural processes of generation. The precise significance of this point, especially in relation to the evidences of modern scientific research and to the whole "theory of evolution," cannot be determined until we have fully examined the issue between the two positions about the nature and number of species.

(c) *The order of species.* In the summary of the first position, it was made clear that the propositions concerning the *constitution and order* of species were independent of the propositions concerning the *number* of species; in other words, that the various species are hierarchically disposed can be true, even if the number of species

¹³⁶ This difference between St. Augustine and St. Basil, and other, involves a number of other points, such as whether the six days are as one or distinct in time. Vd. *Summa Theologica*, I, 74, 2.

is many more than the five enumerated by the first position. From this it necessarily follows that the second position, while disagreeing sharply with the first position on the number of species, *may* nevertheless agree perfectly about the constitution of species and their relation to one another.¹³⁷ But it does not follow that the second position *must* agree with the first position on this latter point. There are, obviously, two possibilities: *either* (1) the first and second position differ only on the number of species, concurring in their conception of the order of species; *or* (2) the second position differs from the first on the order of species as well as the number. We shall examine these two possibilities in the order mentioned.

The first possibility finds support in a number of texts. In the *Historia Animalium*, Aristotle says:

Nature proceeds little by little from things lifeless to animal life in such a way that it is impossible to determine the exact line of demarcation, nor on which side thereof an intermediate form should lie. Thus, next after lifeless things in the upward scale comes the plant, and of plants one will differ from another as to its amount of apparent vitality. . . . Indeed, there is observed in plants a continuous scale of ascent towards the animal. So, in the sea, there are certain objects concerning which one would be at a loss to determine whether they be animal or vegetable. . . . Indeed, broadly speaking, the entire genus of testacians have a resemblance to vegetables, if they be contrasted with such animals as are capable of progression. In regard to sensibility, some animals give no indication whatsoever of it, whilst others indicate it indistinctly. Further, the substance of some of these intermediate creatures is fleshlike, but the sponge is in every respect like a vegetable. And so throughout the entire animal scale there is a graduated differentiation in amount of vitality and in capacity for motion (VIII, 1, 588^b 4-22).

This text has a number of ambiguities in it. It seems clear enough on the point that there is a graduated scale of living things from the lowest to the highest forms of life. But it can read as if that progression from lower to higher were a continuum rather than a hierarchy in the strict sense. The difference between a continuum and a hierarchy can be exemplified for us by contrasting the series

¹³⁷ The word "may" here must not be interpreted to mean that the doctrine of a vast multiplicity of species is in every way as consonant with the conception of the hierarchy of species, as the doctrine of five, or similarly few, species. The "may" indicates a factual, a historical, possibility, and not a logical one. Whether or not any logical advantage accrues to the doctrine of five species, or disadvantage to its opponent, from the way in which species are ordered hierarchically,—if that is the case,—is a question later to be discussed in the dialectic of the issue between the two positions.

of real numbers and the series of positive integers. In both series, the progression is from the quantitatively less to the quantitatively more; but in the case of the real numbers, mean terms are possible between any two numbers chosen, as between any two fractions there are other fractions, whereas integers can be chosen proximate to one another, so that there is no mean (i. e., no other integer) possible between them. Thus, also, the series of plane figures (triangle, quadrangle, pentagon, etc.) is a hierarchy, while the series of sizes, in which any type of figure can be constructed, is a continuum. Now it makes a difference whether the series of species is a continuum or a hierarchy, for the nature of a continuum appears to violate a principal point about the nature of substantial species, namely, that they are discretely related to one another, that they are not susceptible to differences of degree, of more or less. As we have seen, species of quality in a given genus, such as color, are ordered continuously between extreme contraries, in such a way that each intermediate can be said to be more or less, a degree, of one or the other extreme. But if there is no contrariety among substances, it would seem to follow that the various species cannot be ordered continuously from one extreme, that is, the lowest form of material existence, to the other, the highest form of life. It is not sufficient, therefore, to affirm, as Aristotle does, a graduated scale of substances, arranged from lower to higher species. The passage remains ambiguous, moreover, because we cannot be sure that he is denying hierarchy, for he may not be speaking of species at all. It is just possible that the various forms he refers to are what, according to the first position, we have called sub-species (accidental concretions, races, varieties). But in that alternative, his statement may be read as supporting the first position, namely, that there is a strict hierarchy in nature in so far as it is constituted by five species: elements, mixtures, plants, animals and man; and within each of the domains defined by these specific distinctions there may be a continuum of accidentally different forms, a continuously graduated scale from lower to higher plants, from lower to higher animals.

St. Thomas expresses the point of view we are seeking here in a much less ambiguous way. He says, for instance, that "the higher nature in its lowest degree touches the lower nature in its highest degree" (*Summa Contra Gentiles*, II, 91).¹³⁸ If the word "nature" here is interpreted strictly to mean *species*, and the "degree" of a nature is understood to mean a more or less perfect participation

¹³⁸ Cf. *In Lib. Sent.*, III, Dist. 26, Q. 1, A. 2; and *De Veritate*, 15, 1.

in the specific nature, through individual difference or the differences among accidental varieties, then St. Thomas can be understood as making two points: first, that there is a hierarchy of natures (species); and secondly, that within each grade of the hierarchy there is a continuum of degrees of perfection. Yet there is still some ambiguity here, for the point about the lowest degree of the higher nature *touching* the highest degree of the lower may mean that the natures themselves are continuously related rather than hierarchically discrete; and, further, we do not know what St. Thomas means to include under the several *natures* as opposed to their subordinate *degrees*. In other words, this passage may be consistent only with the position that there are five species, five hierarchically graded natures.

The following passage, however, seems to clear up what is doubtful:

Formal distinction always requires inequality, because, as the Philosopher says, the forms of things are like numbers in which species vary by addition or subtraction of unity. Hence in natural things, species seem to be arranged in degrees; as the mixed things are more perfect than the elements, and plants than minerals (i. e. mixed bodies), and animals than plants, and man than other animals; *and in each of these one species is more perfect than others* (*Summa Theologica*, I, 47, 2).

I have italicized the clause which makes the crucial point. The words "in each of these" must be understood as referring to the five grades of perfection among natural things; and in each of these grades, as genera of substance, there are species so ordered that one is more perfect than another. Furthermore, there is no reason to suppose that the principle about the ordering of species by the addition or subtraction of a unit difference,—so that between two *proximate* species there is only one essential difference, possessed by one and lacked by the other,—is not here being applied to absolutely infima species. Although for the most part St. Thomas exemplifies that principle by using the five generic forms, we have no right to conclude that he does not mean to apply it to all the infima species which fall within "each of these," simply because he does not name the unit differences which constitute the steps up and down the hierarchy. His failure to do so may be due to defective knowledge of natural species; but that defect cannot impair his intention, as expressed in this passage, to apply the principle to the entire set of infima species, however many there are.¹³⁹

¹³⁹ Nor may it be supposed that this is an isolated and aberrant passage. There are other confirming texts, as the following: "The species and forms of things

There is a text from the *Disputed Questions on the Soul* which is more concrete in its conception of the natural hierarchy:

In material substances diverse grades of perfection of nature constitute diversity of species; and this indeed is clearly evident if one considers the genera themselves of material substances. For it is manifest that mixed bodies surpass elements in the order of perfection; plants mineral bodies; and animals plants. And a diversity is found in each genus according to the grade of natural perfection. *For among the elements earth is the least, fire the most noble. Similarly in minerals nature is found to advance by grades through the diverse species up to the species of gold. Among plants also up to the species of perfect trees; and in animals up to the species of man.* However, certain animals are very near to plants, as immobile animals which have only touch; and similarly certainly plants are close to inanimate things; as is clear from the Philosopher in the book *De Plantis*; and on account of this the Philosopher says in VIII *Metaph.* that the species of natural things are like the species of number, in which unity added or subtracted varies the species (*QQ. Disp. de Anima*, Q. 1, A. 7).


I have italicized the passage in which St. Thomas names the most perfect species in each of the four main genera. Although he also says that there is a least perfect in each, and between the least and most perfect a series of species each more or less perfect than one another, he does not name them except in one case, i. e. earth, the least element. Nor does he tell us what the unit differences are by which any of these species is higher or lower than its proximate inferior or superior; nor, failing to know true properties, does he state the extrinsic signs by which the specifying properties are signified. The passage in question cannot be taken as expressing clear philosophical truth; it is obviously determined by the state of "scientific observation" in the ancient and mediaeval world, and as such can have no other value than as an illustration, as an attempt to be concrete in terms which had a contemporary significance. It may even be argued against the illustration that St.

differ from one another, as the perfect from the imperfect; as in the order of things, the animate are more perfect than the inanimate, and animals more perfect than plants, and man than brute animals; *and in each of these genera there are various degrees*" (*Summa Theologica*, I, 76, 3). The italics are mine. It should be noted, however, that in the immediately following sentences, St. Thomas follows Aristotle's analogy of the various souls with the species of figure, and adds that "the intellectual soul contains virtually whatever belongs to the sensitive soul of brute animals, and to the nutritive soul of plants." Cf. *ibid.*, 75, 7, ad 2. Vd. also *ibid.*, 71, 1, ad 4: "Nature passes from one extreme to another through the medium; and therefore there are creatures of intermediate type between the animals of the air and those of the water." This last passage sounds very much like the one from the *Historia Animalium* about the graduated scale.

Thomas did not possess scientific evidence adequate for making the point that earth was the most inferior and fire the most perfect element, or that gold was the supreme mixture, or to name the "perfect tree"; for such evidence,—even in terms of extrinsic signs of proper differences,—would have to indicate the property which any superior species possessed and its proximate inferior lacked. In fact, as we shall see, the evidence in terms of which Aristotle classified species, is not only ambiguous but points in an opposite direction.^{139a} We must, therefore, disregard the concrete material as merely illustrative, and interpret this text as expressing St. Thomas's affirmation of the principle of hierarchy as applied to natural species; for, quite apart from the examples, his intention is plain.

Let us carry out St. Thomas's intention by visualizing what it means in formal rather than concrete terms. Let us suppose that the four elements are the infima species of that lowest genus; let us suppose that there are hundreds of mixtures; and that there are even a larger number of infima species in the two genera of life, plant and animal. Let us use the letters A, B, C, and D for the four genera so far named, and the letter E for the highest infima species, *man*; to each letter the addition of a numerical subscript indicates a different infima species, and its hierarchical position in relation to other species of the same genus. Thus, A_1 represents the lowest species of element,—and hence the lowest of all species absolutely,—and A_4 the highest species of element, proximate to B_1 , which is the lowest species of mixture; B_n represents the highest species of mixture; B_{n-1} , its proximate inferior; and so forth. The hierarchy of nature can then be pictured as follows:

^{139a} We shall also see that the way in which one of these four genera surpasses another is not only different from the way in which the subordinate species exceed their proximate inferiors, but that the hierarchical ordering of the genera *as such* interrupts the ordering of the species, for the least plant is not differentiated from the highest mixture by the addition and subtraction of a unit difference peculiar to that one step of gradation: the difference in this case differentiates every plant, the highest as well as the lowest, from every mixture, the lowest as well as the highest. Hence, there must be two hierarchies, one of genera and one of infima species, and if there are sub-genera between the supreme genera and the infima species of substances, these two may also be hierarchically ordered in a third (or fourth and fifth) independent series. Only the hierarchy of the most extensive genera is uninterrupted; all other hierarchies are constituted only within their proximate genus; so that there are as many hierarchies of infima species as there are groupings of species within proximate genera. But this is certainly not the conception intended by the principle that each species, i.e. infima species, is ordered as higher or lower than another by the addition or subtraction of a difference,—a difference peculiar to that one step of gradation in the hierarchy.



Four things should be noted about the significance of this diagram: (1) the ordering of this vast plurality of terms is formally identical with the ordering of the five species, as that is pictured by the first position; (2) that means that each species, except the highest, is the genus for the proximately superior species, for it is the proximately inferior species which, in the ontological constitution of species, serves as the genus, or matter, to which the difference, or form, is added; (3) hence, speaking ontologically rather than logically, there is no genus which is common to two or more species, for in this conception two species are not differentiated by the addition of diverse formal differences to a common genus, but rather by the addition or subtraction, to or from one another, of the same difference; and, finally (4), there may be intermediate species between remote terms in the series, but between proximate terms,—and there are proximate terms which differ by the addition or subtraction of one and the same difference,—there can be no medium whatsoever.^{139b}

^{139b} In this diagram, each of the letters, A, B, C, and D,—considered apart from their numeral subscripts,—do indicate something in common to a number of species, but this common something must be interpreted as a logical genus, and not as an ontologically common generic nature. Otherwise, the diagram would not represent a hierarchy in the precise sense in which that is affirmed by the first position. There

There is nothing logically impossible about this diagram. Its formal structure is just as applicable to an ordering of thousands of species as to the ordering of five. Thousands of species can be related in a unilinear hierarchy of this sort as readily as five. If they are so related, *and only if they are*, the species of natural substance can be spoken of as *perfectly well-ordered*. If they are not so related, then they are not well-ordered in the strict sense of a perfect hierarchy, even though they may be discretely related to one another.¹⁴⁰ If those who hold the second position concerning the number of species take this view of the ordering of species, they agree, without exception or qualification, with the first position in so far forth, disagreeing only on the question of numbers. We have cited the texts from St. Thomas which certainly seem to take this view of the ordering of a vast multiplicity of natural species.^{140a} Unfortunately, we are not thereby relieved from the obligation of investigating the second possibility, namely, that those who maintain a large number of species also differ from the first position with regard to the way in which this multiplicity is ordered. The evidence for this second possibility is contained in texts already quoted, in which the specification of non-living and of living things is discussed. A re-examination of these texts will show the way in which they involve a denial of the principle of perfect hierarchy.

To make the denial plain, let me first summarize the concept of hierarchy by stating its principal notes, for then we shall be able to determine precisely the locus of the negations.^{140b} The hierarchy of

is, of course, a problem about the significance of the letter E. Lacking any numeral subscript, it represents only a single species. But D and E belong to the same *logical* genus, i.e., *animal*. If D were used to represent *animal* rather than *brute*, then D_n would represent *man* and D_{n-1} the highest brute. Vd. fn. 143 and 143a, *infra*.

¹⁴⁰ In other words, a continuum is not the only alternative to a perfect hierarchy. As we have already pointed out, substantial species may be discrete,—i.e. not susceptible of more and less, not related as contraries,—and yet may be arranged in unordered sets, that is, coordinately rather than hierarchically; or they may be arranged in many different series which, taken together, cannot be constructed as a single hierarchy. Vd. the prior discussion of this point in Part II, Section 8, *supra*.

^{140a} As I have already pointed out, these texts are not entirely free from difficulties, so far as interpreting them as favoring hierarchy is concerned. Vd. fn. 139a, *supra*.

^{140b} When I speak of hierarchy without further qualification I mean an *ontological*, and not a *logical*, hierarchy. The second position does not deny that there is a logical hierarchy of species and genera. There are two principal distinctions between the ontological and logical notions of hierarchy: (1) in a logical hierarchy,

species, as that is conceived according to the first position, involves: (1) an absolutely unilinear ordering in which each infima species is higher or lower than another, and no two species are coordinate; (2) a discontinuous ordering in which proximate species are separated by a unit difference, so that there is no medium between them; (3) the distinction of species by the presence or absence of properties (which signify the unit differences), and not by the possession of the same property in different degrees; and (4) the virtual inclusion by any specific nature of *all* lower specific natures, so that a given species will have *all* the properties belonging to inferior species, in addition to which it will have the distinctive property that constitutes its superiority.

This last point is important for the interpretation of the texts which we are reconsidering. It asserts that the properties by which essences (specific natures) are signified must be related in the same way as the essences. Thus, if Species A is proximately superior to Species B by the addition thereto of the unit difference $d(a)$, then the distinctive property $p(a)$, by which that difference is signified to us, can be possessed only as an addition to properties possessed by Species B. In other words, the specific property,—the property convertible with the essence,—must always be accompanied by generic properties,—properties of the generic nature to which the difference is added, each of which is, in turn, the specific property of some inferior species. Hence, as the substantial form of Species A virtually includes the substantial form of Species B and all inferior forms, so the properties of Species A,—both specific and generic,—include the properties possessed by all inferior species. If the species are hierarchically ordered, so are the properties, and conversely.

species participate equally in a proximate, common genus; whereas in an ontological hierarchy, each species is the genus for its proximate superior, and there is no genus proximately common to two species; (2) in a logical hierarchy, each of two species differs positively from its proximate, common genus, so that the diversity of the species is marked by the diversity of their positive differences; whereas in an ontological hierarchy, there is always only one difference between two species, possessed by the superior and lacked by the inferior,—i.e., the *same* difference considered *positively* and *privatively*. These two points have already been indicated in the prior discussion of the Tree of Porphyry as a confusion of logical and ontological orders (vd. Part IV, Section 15, *supra*). It should be noted, furthermore, that the type of hierarchy which is here called “logical,” in the case of substantial species, is the ontological order of accidental species. We are here concerned to show that the second position denies an ontological hierarchy of substances. This must mean, of course, that it disagrees with the way in which the first position distinguishes logical and ontological hierarchies, and the hierarchies of substance and accident.

Now it should make no difference whether the terms used to distinguish species are truly properties (powers, proper accidents) or merely extrinsic signs of properties (contingent accidents, accidents other than power). For if the true properties which signify the real differences in the substantial order must be related in the same way as the natures they signify, it necessarily follows that the contingent accidents, the empirical signs which are taken to represent the properties, are subject to the same condition. Otherwise, they must fail in their representative or signifying function, for to represent properties they must be related as properties are, just as properties signify substantial differences through a similitude between their ordering and the ordering of species. This point is of the utmost importance, because whereas the first position appears to use only properties, in the strict sense, to enumerate the five species, the second position seems to employ accidents of all sorts in its enumeration of a much larger variety of species. We need not decide whether the differentiating terms used by the second position are truly properties or not, *for if they are used as properties, their representative function requires that the way in which they are related signify the way in which the species they differentiate are related.*¹⁴¹

In the light of these principles, there is evidence that the second position denies the hierarchy of species. That evidence is found in the Aristotelian texts which discuss the speciation of non-living and living substances, and which enumerate and name the species. Since the relevant Thomistic texts do no more than accept and confirm the position of the Philosopher in these matters, it will be

¹⁴¹ The epistemological problem is thus avoided. With regard to the point in issue, the first and second position are on an equal footing even though the first position uses only properties, strictly, and even though the second position is limited to the use of the accidents, except in the case of man. The difference between dianoetic and perinoetic intellection, between real and nominal definitions, is irrelevant at this point, because we are not here concerned with the relative adequacy or inadequacy of our knowledge of species. The second position, as well as the first, claims to know something about the number of substantial species. That claim is the same, even though the second position qualifies it by saying that, for the most part, it does not claim to know adequately, by real definitions, the species it enumerates. It must base its primary claim upon its ability to interpret accidents as extrinsic and empirical signs of properties, as these are, in turn, ontological signs of substantial differences. The only difference between the first and second position, then, is this: that the first employs a proximate sign of the essence, whereas the second employs a remote sign, i.e. a sign of the sign. This difference does not affect the argument for, by the nature of signification, if signs must be formally related as the things they signify, so must also the signs of signs, regardless of the degree of remoteness from the ultimate term being signified.

sufficient to interpret the passages quoted from Aristotle, first those concerned with inanimate substances, and then those concerned with living things.

The elements are distinguished by their characteristic local motions and by their qualities, which are their capacities for reciprocal action and passion. These distinctive terms are *used as properties*; in fact, they are said to be the properties of the elements, but we can ignore the question whether they are, or merely signify the properties. These "properties" are related as contraries. Hence it must follow that the four elemental natures they signify are related as contraries,—either absolute extremes of contrariety or intermediate and relative terms. Hence it follows, also, that the four elemental species are not hierarchically ordered. In fact, as contraries within the common genus *element* they are coordinate.^{141a} This can be shown simply by one step of formal analysis. Let us consider two species of element, A and B; and let Qa and Qb be the qualities which signify, whether proximately or remotely, their substantial differences. Now, it is clear from the Aristotelian account that Element A possesses Qa and lacks Qb, whereas Element B possesses Qb and lacks Qa. If this were not the case, the transmutation of the elements would be impossible, for it is in virtue of its privation and consequent potentiality with respect to Qb, that Element A can be transformed into Element B, and conversely. This transformation occurs when the substratum passes from one quality to the other, and this transition is a generation and corruption if the change of qualities signifies a change in substantial forms. The Aristotelian texts support this interpretation.¹⁴² The elements are, therefore, coordinate in the sense that each of the four species is substantially constituted by a *diverse* difference (signified by Qa, Qb, etc.), and not by the addition or subtraction of one and the same difference. That could only be the case if Element A differed from Element B by the possession of Qa in addition to Qb, whereas Element B, its proximate inferior, let us say, possessed only Qb and lacked Qa. The conclusion we have reached does not apply only to the traditional enumeration of four

^{141a} Thus we see that to treat substantial species as contraries is to deny hierarchy, because contrariety involves, first, the coordination of the species, and, second, their equal participation in a common, generic nature.

¹⁴² Thus interpreted, there is no difficulty about the apparent inconsistency between the passages in which Aristotle talks about the transmutation of the elements as if it were an alteration (a qualitative change) and those other places where he talks about it as a generation and corruption (a substantial change). Cf. fn. 118, *supra*.

elements. Whether there be two elements or a hundred, the point remains the same so long as the qualities, or motions, which any enumeration employs as properties, or extrinsic signs thereof, are not related hierarchically; i. e. so long as every element does not have a proximate inferior or superior by reason of the fact that it possesses all the "properties" possessed by that other, either having one additionally, or lacking one.

The same interpretation holds for the Aristotelian account of mixed bodies. Each mixture is constituted by a combination of the elements, in such manner that it manifests a mean of their contraries. And one mixture differs from another by the precise character of the *blend*, signified to us by a characteristic qualitative mean, which we then take as the differentiating property. Since a mean is an intermediate between extremes, mixed bodies must be coordinately related as diverse species in the genus *mixture*. Hence hierarchy is denied here as in the case of elements. The analytical points leading to that conclusion are precisely the same, and need not be repeated. But two further observations must be made. (1) Although in the Aristotelian texts there is no enumeration of the various species of mixture, and no discussion of their relation to one another, what is said makes it at least possible to conclude that the species of mixture vary *continuously* from one extreme to another. The different qualitative means may differ simply as more and less, as qualities do, between contrary extremes. And if the substances are related as their properties are, then the species of mixture are not only coordinate but are terms in a continuum, and thus hierarchy is doubly denied. This interpretation is not *required* by the texts; but it is significant that the texts do not make it *impossible*; in fact, they even suggest it. (2) According to the principle of hierarchy, the order of substances is an absolutely unilinear order of infima species. This means that generic distinctions do not interrupt the series; or, in other words, although Species C_n and Species D_1 can be *logically* classified as belonging to different genera, they are related in the same way, if they are proximate species, as Species D_1 and D_2 , which belong to the same logical genus, if they, too, are proximate.¹⁴³ But, according to the Aristotelian account, the genus *element* differs from the genus *mixture*

¹⁴³ Cf. the diagram, *supra*. This point must be understood in the light of the principle, already discussed, that in an ontological hierarchy there are no common genera, for each species is as the genus to its proximate superior. Logical genera can, of course, be common to two or more species, but by that very fact the ontological meaning of 'genus' is not the same as the logical meaning, that is, in a hierarchical disposition of species.

unlike the way in which one species of element, or of mixture, differs from another. Or, put differently, there is no highest species of element which is proximately related to a lowest species of mixture, by the same kind of unit difference by which that highest element differs from its proximate inferior, or that lowest mixture differs from its proximate superior.^{143a}

This second point involves a negation of strict unilinearity in the ordering of substances. Substances are differently related according as they differ generically or specifically from one another; the order of substances according to their generic natures is not simply an abstraction from the order of substances according to their species. But in a hierarchy the order of genera, constructed logically, is simply that and so perfectly reflects the order of species. The central insight here is that in a hierarchy the order of genera is *only* a logical construction; whereas when hierarchy is denied there are ontologically, as well as logically, common genera, i. e. genera common to two or more species. Common genera are ontologically possible only if species are ontologically coordinate in respect to a genus. Thus we see how coordination and multiplicity of orderings are reciprocally involved in the denial of hierarchy. This insight will become clearer when we discuss the species of living things. Here we must conclude that the Aristotelian account of elements and mixtures is an almost complete negation of hierarchy.¹⁴⁴ The account of animate substances completes the picture.

The way in which Aristotle differentiates species of plants and of animals confirms what we have already found. It will be sufficient to examine the texts taken from the *Historia Animalium*.¹⁴⁵

^{143a} If the diagram be now re-interpreted in the light of the second position's denial of hierarchy, the letters A, B, C, and D, would represent generic natures, ontologically common to many species. Then the problem about E would become peculiarly difficult, because E differs from D as D differs from C, whereas D_n differs otherwise from D_{n-1} . Hence, the step up from D_n to E is not the same as the step from D_{n-1} to D_n . Vd. fn. 139^a, *supra*.

¹⁴⁴ As in the case of elements, the modifications in the theory of mixtures, resulting from modern scientific research, do not alter the analytical point, unless the modifications are radical; i. e., unless vastly improved and augmented observations have discovered empirical signs which show that each mixture is higher or lower than another, that the higher possesses all the traits of its inferiors, and a further, specifically distinctive one, etc. From my knowledge of modern scientific physics and chemistry I am compelled to say that that does not *appear* to be the case. According to the properties by which they are differentiated, mercury and gold, water and table salt, appear to be coordinate species in their respective genera.

¹⁴⁵ Both because the *De Plantis* is spurious and because there is every reason to believe that the speciation of plants must proceed according to the same principles

One kind of animal is distinguished from another by many "properties": by locale, by shape and color and size, by manner of locomotion, nutrition, association, sensation, by organic parts and members, by temperament, instinct or characteristic habits of action, etc. With respect to some of these "properties," one kind of animal differs from another by a degree, by more or less, of the same trait; whereas with respect to other "properties," one kind differs from another by possession or privation of a given trait. Thus, the lion is more *ferocious* than the wolf, the crow more *cunning* than the raven; or the cow has an *organ of digestion* which the spider lacks, the lizard an *organ of locomotion* which the oyster lacks; or the sponge lives in one manner so far as *locale* is concerned, and the viper in another; and so forth. Two things are clear: first, that a kind of animal which possesses traits lacked by another may, in turn, lack traits possessed by that other; second, that several kinds of animals may possess certain traits in common, while differing *inter se* with respect to other traits, lacked or possessed. These two facts,—supported in detail by the Aristotelian account,—are sufficient to deny hierarchy among animal-species, *if the "kinds" being considered can be interpreted as "infima species."* But even if these "kinds" are sub-genera within the comprehensive genus *animal*, the result is approximately the same, because infima species cannot be hierarchically ordered if, as logically constructed, their proximate or remote genera are not. In short, taking the "kinds" of animals, which Aristotle classifies and describes, *as if* they were species, it is clear that the many species of the genus *animal* are not so ordered that each one is proximately superior or inferior to one and only one other, and in such a way that each superior possesses the "properties" of all of its inferiors, and an additional one by which it differs integrally, and not by degree, from its proximate inferior.

Hierarchy is denied in every way. (1) With respect to certain of the "properties" used to specify, species differ *continuously*, that is, by a degree of the same trait. (2) With respect to other "properties," possessed or lacked, species may be *coordinate* in possessing or lacking the same trait. And (3) species which are thus coordinate may differ from each other ambivalently, by which I mean that one may possess a trait lacked by the other, and lack a trait possessed by that other. This last fact completes the picture because it involves multilinearity among the species themselves. If

as in the case of animals, it is well to restrict ourselves in this way. Vd. fn. 131, *supra*.

possession or privation of properties be taken as a sign of higher or lower position, then one species may be "higher" than another in a given respect, and lower than that other in a diverse respect. The coordination of species is sufficient to negate hierarchy; a multilinear ordering of species makes that negation emphatic.¹⁴⁶

Against this interpretation the objection may be urged that Aristotle, and following him St. Thomas, spoke of a graduated scale of living things.¹⁴⁷ But as we have already remarked, these passages are ambiguous: they can, of course, be interpreted to mean a hierarchy of species in the strict sense; but, on the other hand, their very language seems to suggest a continuum of degrees; and when they are read in the light of the detailed description and classification of living species, the non-hierarchical interpretation gains weight. The species of plants and animals are *continuously* graded with respect to certain traits, such as "amount of vitality" or "capacity for motion"; and with respect to other traits, such as organs possessed or lacked, instincts or habits, or even *modes* of power and

¹⁴⁶ The multilinearity here discussed is different from that previously mentioned, namely, that substances are ordered one way according to their generic natures, and another according to their species. If these two types of multilinearity are taken together with coordination, we get a picture of the relation of species that is in every way opposite to the hierarchical scheme. Whereas the latter gives each species an absolutely unique position in a series, the former permits equality and inequality alike; in fact, there is no *one* series, but many in which the same species may occupy different positions.

It may be said that this interpretation of the texts goes too far, that the way in which species are known does not negate hierarchy, but is merely *neutral* on the point. In other words, the extrinsic and empirical traits which the classification of species uses as "properties" do nothing but *distinguish* one species from another, and do not indicate anything about their *ordering*. Cf. fn. 140, *supra*. But if the second position affirms hierarchy, then the "properties" it uses to differentiate species can be so used only if they indicate hierarchy; their failure to do so must mean either a denial of hierarchy or a failure of true specification. Hence, if we hold that the second position affirms hierarchy, then we must deny that it has succeeded in differentiating species; and if we accept its classification of species, then we must deny that it can also maintain the principle of hierarchy. We have chosen the latter alternative, for on the other interpretation, the second position would not differ from the first except, perhaps, by insisting that there are many more species than five, *without supporting evidence*.

¹⁴⁷ "Nature proceeds little by little from things lifeless to animal life. . . . There is observed in plants a continuous scale of ascent toward the animal. . . . Throughout the entire animal scale there is a graduated differentiation in amount of vitality and in capacity for motion" (*Historia Animalium*, VIII, 588^b 4-22). "The higher nature in its lowest degree touches the lower nature in its highest degree" (*Summa Contra Gentiles*, II, 91). Vd. also the passage, already quoted, from *QQ. Disp. de Anima*, 1, 7.

operation, species may either be coordinate relative to one another, or higher *and* lower than one another in different respects.

It may further be objected that although the Aristotelian texts do not reveal an hierarchical ordering of animal species, they do, nevertheless, point to such an order among the extensive sub-genera, such as invertebrate and vertebrate, molluscs, crustaceans, and insects, fish, birds and mammals,—to use modern nomenclature. But this objection fails for several reasons. In the first place, the point in issue is the hierarchy of species, and that point is not met by reference to genera. In the second place, even these large sub-genera are not well-ordered in a strictly hierarchical sense, if *all* the traits by which they are distinguished are consulted. And, in the third place, what the objection contemplates,—namely, that there is some kind of progression from lower to higher forms of life,—can be readily admitted without altering the interpretation of the Aristotelian classification as non-hierarchical. For whereas strict hierarchy is incompatible with *coordination*, *multilinearity*, and *continuity*, the absence of hierarchy is compatible with all of these facts.¹⁴⁸ Hence even though there be no hierarchy of living species, there can be one or more progressions, continuous or discontinuous, from lower to higher forms of life. In the light of the evidence they had, Aristotle and St. Thomas certainly thought there were such progressions; but that fact by itself does not require us to interpret them as affirming a hierarchy of species; and in the fuller context of their discussion of these matters, that fact becomes even less determinative.¹⁴⁹

¹⁴⁸ This statement must be understood, of course, as bearing only on the order of species. A hierarchy of species is compatible with coordination, multilinearity and continuity among sub-specific entities,—races, varieties, etc. We shall return to this point later in a comparison of the two positions, and in the dialectic of the issue between them.

¹⁴⁹ In his discussion of brutality in the *Ethics*, Aristotle says that “foolish people who are naturally irrational, and live a life of mere sensation, as e.g. some races of remote barbarians, are *like* brutes” (VII, 5, 1149^a8-10). I have italicized “like” because Aristotle could not say that men *are* brutes, however brutal, foolish or irrational. At the other extreme, there is the type of man whom Aristotle calls “divine,” again not meaning that any man *is* divine, but that there are a few men so extremely perfect that they are *like* gods. “As it is rare to find a ‘divine man,’ so too the brutal man is rare in the world” (*Ethics*, VII, 1, 1145^a28-30). Now this suggests that there is a progressive gradation of men from the brute-like at one extreme to the god-like at the other. And at the lower extreme, the least perfect men are most like, could be almost said to *touch*, the most perfect brutes, from whom they differ specifically nevertheless. Hence it does not follow from the fact, *viz.*, that a “higher nature in its lowest degree touches a lower nature in its highest degree,” that the degrees, the gradations, within the sphere of the higher

In this connection, it should be observed that modern biological researches, far from altering, have confirmed the general lines of the Aristotelian picture of plant and animal species. We can consider the evidence in terms of which modern botanical and zoological classifications are made, quite apart from the bearing of that evidence on evolutionary questions. Not only has the modern taxonomist found a much larger number of distinct species,—using the same sorts of observable traits as specifying “properties,”—but his classifications are even less compatible with strict hierarchy, so much more plainly do they reveal coordination, multilinearity and continuity in the ordering of living things.¹⁴⁹

One point remains. We have already noted, in the case of *element* and *mixture*, that these genera are ordered in a manner different from the way in which their respective species are related. They are not coordinate; they are absolutely discontinuous. This fact is clearer in the case of living things, because we are able to distinguish higher and lower forms of life among the species of *plant* and *animal*. Thus, let us suppose that we know Species C_n to be the highest form of plant life and Species D_1 to be the lowest form of animal life. Now if there is a perfect hierarchy of species,

and lower natures, is a series of species; for certainly the gradations of men are not specifically distinct. It is, therefore, possible for Aristotle and St. Thomas to say that there are more and less perfect plants, more and less perfect animals, without necessarily meaning a hierarchy of species, just as they can say that there are more and less perfect men, without treating *man* as a genus. And if the facts of their classifications seem to show that there is not one progression from less to more perfect in any sphere of substance, but many series of such gradations, in which a given “kind” may occupy different positions in different respects, then it is even less likely that they are talking about species, i. e., *if species are in a perfect hierarchy*. But if we decide,—as the texts cited seem to require,—*that they are talking about species*, then by the same reasoning, we must conclude that they are denying hierarchy and that that denial is not incompatible with a view of many progressions from less to more perfect grades of substance. The incompatibility which this analysis reveals is between an ontological hierarchy of species, on the one hand, and the classification of species mentioned in these texts, on the other.

¹⁴⁹ Again it is assumed that the things ordered are *species*, and not *rac*es or *varieties*, i. e. accidentally distinguished classes subsumed by infima species. Cf. fn. 148, *supra*. Modern researches estimate the number of plant and animal species at above a million. Vd. fn. 87, *supra*. Furthermore, the modern taxonomist speaks of a “hierarchy” of species in the logical, and not the ontological, sense of that word. For the modern scientist’s conception of the hierarchy and continuity of living things, vd. T. Dobzhansky, *Genetics and the Origin of Species*, New York, 1937: Ch. I, X. Whether the scientific evidences and account of these matters agree with the first or with the second position cannot be decided until we determine whether the “kinds” considered are truly species or only races. We shall return to this point in the dialectic of the issue between the two positions.

Species C_n will differ from Species D_1 , in the *same way* that it differs from C_{n-1} , the proximately inferior plant form, or that Species D_1 differs from D_2 , the proximately superior animal form, namely, by the addition or subtraction of a difference, as the case may be. But that is not the case according to the Aristotelian classifications; on the contrary, every species of the genus C (plant) differs from every species of the genus D (animal) in the same way as the highest species of plant (C_n) differs from the lowest species of animal (D_1). Thus, let us further suppose that "sensitivity" names the difference between the two genera, the higher possessing, the lower lacking, this property. With respect to this "generic difference," all species of plants are coordinately inferior to all species of animals. There is, furthermore, no specific difference, *as such*, between the highest species of plant and the lowest species of animal, but only this generic difference which distinguishes any plant from any animal as well as the highest of the one from the lowest of the other. This is the last evidence of a complete denial of hierarchy, for it means that there can be two species (C_n and D_1) *which do not differ specifically because they differ generically*. In other words, generic differences absolutely interrupt the perfect ordering of species; species, if ordered at all, can only be hierarchically disposed within their genus. This also indicates what is meant by the incompatibility of hierarchy with ontologically common genera. For when all plants have a common generic nature, to which is added their diverse specific differences, and the same is true of all animals, then the species can be ordered only within the genus, if at all, and one genus, as a whole, is ordered to another.

The case of the infima species *man* illustrates the point perfectly. Man is unquestionably regarded as an *infima species* by both the first and second positions. According to the first position, *man* as a species is proximately superior to *animal*, which is also regarded as an *infima species*, the specifying difference being the property "rationality." But according to the second position, *animal* is not an infima species, but a comprehensive genus, having many species, of which *man* is one, in fact the highest. Now if *man* is removed from the genus *animal*, what remains is the genus *brute*, lacking man's distinctive property. The consequences are striking. Let us suppose that *ape* is the highest species in the genus *brute*, and *sponge* the lowest. Then the difference which specifies *man* makes *man* differ in the same way from *sponge* and *ape*. This proves that *man* cannot be regarded as a species of the genus *animal* in the same way as *sponge* and *ape* are; because they differ from each

other specifically, whereas they, and all other brute species, differ from *man* generically, even though *man*, *ape*, and *sponge* are all infima species of *animal*, and *brute* is an extensive genus. We shall reserve until later the dialectical exploration of these consequences as they bear on the main issue.¹⁵⁰ Here we are concerned only to show how the second position's classification of animals denies hierarchy through affirming a multiplicity of species sharing equally in a common generic nature.

That St. Thomas appears to take the second position, as thus construed, can be inferred from texts in which he affirms a common genus for diverse substantial species. The following citations will suffice:

Although man is of the same *genus* as other animals, he is of a different *species*. Specific difference is derived from the difference of form; nor does every difference of form necessarily imply a diversity of *genus* (*Summa Theologica*, I, 75, 3, ad 1).

In material things of the same genus and differing in species, the ratio of the genus is derived from the material principle, and the specific difference from the formal principle (*Summa Contra Gentiles*, II, 95).

Here, it seems, St. Thomas is affirming that two species can participate ontologically in the same proximate generic nature. This is flatly contradicted by the first position.

We must, therefore, conclude this examination of the texts which propose the second position concerning species, by *deciding* that the second position differs from the first, not only with respect to the number of species, but also with respect to their constitution and ordering. Against this decision, there are only a few texts, such as the one in which St. Thomas says that "in each of these" (the five forms from element to man) "one species is more perfect than others" (*Summa Theologica*, I, 47, 2).¹⁵¹ That text, however plain and strong it may seem to some, is insufficient against the weight of the contrary evidence from the actual classification of animate and inanimate species. And it should be emphatically remarked

¹⁵⁰ The conflict between the two positions is clear, for according to the hierarchical principles of the first position, if the addition of *rational* to *animal* constitutes the infima species *man*, the subtraction of *rational* from *man*, which is the same as the addition of *irrational* to *animal*, must constitute the proximately inferior form, *brute*, and this cannot be a genus, but must be an infima species. That the second position denies hierarchy is clear from the fact that *irrational animal* is considered a genus, from which *man* differs specifically, although at the same time differing generically from every species of *irrational animal*. Cf. Maritain, *Degrees of Knowledge*, p. 253, fn. 1.

¹⁵¹ Vd. also *QQ. Disp. de Anima*, 1, 7. Cf. fn. 139, *supra*.

that the point here being decided is *not* that what that text says is *false*, but only that what it says is *inconsistent* with all the evidence which Aristotle uses to specify natural substances, and with the resulting classifications he sets up. A question we shall later face is whether the principles of hierarchy are intrinsically inconsistent with a large plurality of species; but that is not the point here. Here the only point is that the texts enumerating a large plurality of species employ criteria of specification which must be inductively generalized into a view of the order and constitution of species that is opposed to the hierarchical view and all it implies.¹⁵² And I must say again that we are not here deciding as to the truth of hierarchy or its negation, any more than we are deciding between five species and many. We are only defining the issues between two theories about species, and attempting to show that both theories have traditional texts in their support.

We can briefly summarize the second of these theories in the following set of propositions. This is a summary of the doctrine and not a defense of it. Controversial points will be reserved for the dialectical section to follow.

(1) There is a large number of species of inanimate substances. The point is not whether there are four or a hundred elements, a hundred or a thousand mixtures. The point is simply that *element* and *mixture* are regarded by the second position as extensive genera, and *not as infima species*. This conclusion is reached from observation of the behavior of inanimate bodies. They manifest certain *constant* motions or tendencies to motion, and to action and reaction upon one another. There is an apparent *constancy* in certain groupings of traits, such as weight, shape, color, odor, with their potentialities for action or being acted upon, and these potentialities are determinate with respect to the type of other body acted upon or re-

¹⁵² The exceptional texts from St. Thomas may, of course, be only *apparently* inconsistent. Read in the light of the first position, they can be interpreted to mean that there is a strict hierarchy of the five forms, and that within each of these as *infima species*, there are various progressions from lower to higher among sub-species, races, varieties, etc. This would require us to say that St. Thomas used the word "species" equivocally in the same passage, meaning "*infima species*" in one case, and "sub-species,"—which is not a species at all,—in the other. Vd. fn. 148a, *supra*. Read in the light of the second position, as that is derived from all other texts, there is also equivocation, for in one usage the word "species" means "genera," and in the other it means "species." Thus read, these texts can be similarly interpreted to speak of a hierarchy of genera, and of various progressions, but no hierarchy, among species. In either case their import is not unequivocal, and this fact makes them as readily available in support of the first position as of the second, though they must be differently construed for each.

acted to. It is not a single trait, but a constant aggregation of observable traits, manifested by one sort of body and not by another, which as an aggregate *specifies* one sort of body from another. The specifying aggregate can be regarded as the property of the substance,—its proper accident,—although each term in the aggregate is also called a “property.” It is acknowledged that these constant accidents may not be properties in the strict sense,—in fact, usually are not,—but by virtue of their constancy, their inseparability from the substance, they can be taken to signify the property, itself not directly known, just as properties, in other cases, signify substantial differences which are not known. The second position, in short, neither denies nor neglects the distinction between proper and contingent accidents.

(2) There is an even larger number of species of animate substances. Again the point is not the precise number. It may be a thousand or tens of thousands. Whatever the number, the point is that *plant* and *animal* are not infima species, but extensive genera. This conclusion is also reached from observation. Here as before there is a manifest *constancy* in the traits of one sort of plant or animal, possessed by that sort and not by any other, which is the basis for specification, the reason for regarding the sort in question as a distinct species. Here as before, it is never a single trait, but an aggregation of traits, inseparable from the substance and constant in their togetherness, which as an aggregate constitutes the differentiation, although the several members of the aggregate are also called ‘properties.’ The traits which enter into such differentiations are extremely various in character: some have to do with the mode of behavior of the plant or animal, some with its sensible qualities, such as shape, size, color, etc., some with its terrestrial location, some with its organic parts or members. It is acknowledged that many of these traits are not powers, or even modes of power,—and hence cannot be properties in the strict sense,—but are contingent accidents, as for instance, shape or locale. The differentiation of species is not made, however, by any contingent accident alone, but always by a number of traits which seem to aggregate constantly and the aggregate seems to be inseparable from a particular sort of animal or plant, and from no other. In the case of plants and animals, there is one additional kind of evidence which is thought to signify species, namely, constancy of genetic type, constancy in generation. In biological generation, like normally produces like.^{152a} The fact that these progeny manifest the same

^{152a} Vd. *Summa Theologica*, I 91, 2; 118, 1; 118, 2, ad 4.

constant aggregate of traits as their ancestors signifies their specific identity, and hence their specific difference from all other plants and animals which are entirely excluded from this genetic group.¹⁵³

(3) The species enumerated and classified, in both the spheres of living and non-living substances, may not be *infima* species. The second position does not claim that it has arrived at ultimate differentiae or that it has succeeded in naming the last species under element or mixture, plant or animal. But even if the kinds distinguished are genera with respect to other kinds not yet differentiated, they are nevertheless species of the genera *element*, *mixture*, *plant* and *animal*, and hence they are specifically, that is, essentially and not accidentally, different from one another within their genera. This the second position does claim, and this is sufficient to bring it into absolute conflict with the first position. There are two subordinate points here on which the first and second position agree in principle, though not entirely.

(3a) *Man* is an *infima* species. There is agreement that any further distinction of the kinds of men is a distinction of races or varieties, such accidental concretions (of specific substance and contingent, though perhaps also inseparable, accident) as "white man." But the two positions do not agree about the way in which *man* as an *infima* species is related to the genus *animal*, for according to the first, the genus of *man* is *brute animal*, itself an *infima* species, whereas according to the second, the genus of *man* is *animal*, the same genus of which *oyster* and *cow* are species. The disagreement must not be interpreted logically, for as to the logical relation of genera and species there is no disagreement; rather it is an issue about the ontological status of genera.^{153a} This point will become clearer subsequently.

¹⁵³ In modern times, additional genetic criteria,—inter-fertility, the sterility of hybrids, etc.,—are used in the classification of species; but the essential point is the same. Vd. T. Dobzhansky, *op. cit.*, Ch. VI-IX. It should also be noted, in passing, that modern biological classifications employ *aggregates of traits*. A single mutant characteristic is never sufficient to establish a specific differentiation. Vd. Dobzhansky, *ibid.*, Ch. II-IV.

^{153a} When it is said that the genus of man is brute animal, that cannot be meant logically, for then *brute* would be predicable of *man*, which is impossible. The generic animal nature, which *brute* here signifies, is part of specific human nature, and hence cannot be predicated of that whole. *Animal*, however, as a logical genus,—a generic concept, not a generic nature,—can be predicated of the specific concept *man*, because it is a whole the parts of which are represented by such concepts as *man* or *brute*. This summarizes the distinction between the logical and the ontological genus: the former is always predicable of its species, being a conceptual whole which specific concepts particularize; the latter is not only a nature of its

(3b) Just as there are races and varieties of the infima species *man*, so there are races and varieties of any other infima species of *plant* or *animal*. The first and second position agree on this point and understand the same thing by the notion of race or variety, namely, sub-specific kinds which differ from each other *only accidentally*. But they do not agree in their actual classifications, the first position naming as *sub-species* kinds of plants or animals which the second position thinks to be truly species, whether or not they are infima species. It follows, of course, that any kind of plant or animal which the second position regards as a sub-species would be similarly classified by the first position.

The foregoing three propositions state the doctrine of the second position with respect to the number of species. The propositions to follow expound that part of the doctrine which is concerned with the constitution and order of species. These propositions do not follow *logically* from the first in the sense that the affirmation of a larger number of species than five, or some similar small number, *requires* the negation of hierarchy. But they do follow in another sense. The way in which that affirmation was reached,—the criteria employed in specification,—is incompatible with the principles of hierarchy.

(4) The species of natural substances are not ordered in such a manner that each one is higher or lower than some one other, which is its proximate inferior or superior. The grounds for this conclusion can be briefly summarized. The leading principle is a proposition on which the second position agrees with the first, namely, that species must be related according to the formal relation of their properties. If the properties are hierarchically ordered,—so that property *x* is never present without property *y*, but property *y* can be present without property *x*,—then the species thus distinguished,—Species *X*, having properties *x* (its specific property) and *y* (a generic property), and Species *Y*, having *y* as its specific property,—are also hierarchically ordered, *X* being superior to *Y* by the substantial difference *d(x)*, which is signified by the proper accident *p(x)*. Now it makes no difference whether what is taken

own right (an inferior specific nature), but a part of the superior specific nature. Predication is not a relation between natures. Both theories agree about logical genera: they are common to diverse (logical) species and predicable of them. Both theories agree, furthermore, that ontological genera cannot be predicated, since they are natures, not concepts, and parts rather than wholes. But the first position insists that there is no generic nature proximately common to two specific natures. This is what the second position denies when it regards two species as participating equally in the same proximate generic nature.

as a specifying property is truly one or merely a contingent accident. If the latter, either singly or as an aggregate, is employed as a "property," it must abide by the principle by which the substantial difference is signified, whether proximately or remotely. Hence the relation of whatever the second position calls "properties" signifies the relation of the substances specified. In the light of this principle, the second position is compelled to deny hierarchy because of the way in which the "properties" it uses are related. This denial needs further explication in positive terms.

(4a) In some cases, species are related coordinately in a genus, as contraries are. This results from the fact that their specifying properties are related as contraries.

(4b) In some cases, species are related as higher or lower than one another, but in a scale of continuous degrees of the same difference. This results from the fact that two species may have the same specifying property but in different degrees.

(4c) In some cases, species are ambivalently related as higher and lower than one another in different respects. This results from the fact that each of two species may possess and lack specifying properties, respectively lacked and possessed by the other.

(4d) And ambivalently related species may also be coordinate in other respects without contrariety. This results from the fact that they may also possess certain properties in common, while differing in others.

It should be noted that the cause of these four types of ordering,—*contrariety*, *continuity*, *multilinearity* and *coordination*, all of which are incompatible with hierarchy,—is the same in each case. But that there are *four* types of ordering here,—in contradistinction to the *unity* of hierarchical ordering,—is due to the fact that the specifying "property" is never a unit, but an "aggregate of properties." Though the properties of any one species are a constant aggregate, inseparable from that kind of substance, the members of a given aggregate are not all related to the members of an aggregate specifying another substance *in the same way*. Because of the fourfold diversity of relationships among the members of such aggregates, there is a fourfold ordering of substantial species. These four types of ordering are not exclusive of one another; nor are they necessarily combined. In different respects, two species may be related in all four ways; or only in one, or two, or three.

Furthermore, this fourfold ordering of species does not mean that one *group* of species may not be hierarchically related to another *group*, for it is not inconsistent if their genera constitute a hierarchy.


Thus, for instance, all plants, generically as *plants*, may be hierarchically inferior to all animals, considered generically; and this may be true even for subordinate genera of plants or animals, although as a matter of fact the latter truth may be more difficult to evidence. But that is not the point here being affirmed. *It is rather that, within any proximate genus, the species, considered as species of that genus, are susceptible to a fourfold ordering, and are not hierarchically disposed.*

(5) Finally, the second position affirms that two species may share in a common generic nature, in the sense denied by the first position. Thus we see that a different view of the constitution of species follows necessarily from a different view of their ordering. It must be remembered that we are here talking about genera and species ontologically, and not logically. The ontological affirmation of a genus commonly shared by two species can be understood as follows. Let A represent the proximate genus of which Ax and Ay are species. Then the species Ax differs from the genus A by the difference $d(x)$, which is signified to us by the "property" $p(x)$; and similarly the species Ay differs from the same genus A by the difference $d(y)$. Under these conditions, the two species differ from each other only by the diversity of the differences, $d(x)$ and $d(y)$, by which each differs from their common genus. Hence, it follows that both species share equally in the generic nature A, and will equally possess certain generic properties which are consequent upon that nature. In short, one species does not differ from another by a *difference*, but by the *diversity* of their separate differences, the latter being the terms by which each separately *differs* from their common genus. Because species are thus constituted, they must always be coordinate in their proximate genus, i. e. coordinate with respect to common generic properties at least, however else they may be ordered with respect to their specific properties.¹⁵⁴ The denial by the first position of such coordination, in terms of common genera, has already been amply expounded, and needs no repetition here.¹⁵⁵

One diagram will suffice to make the issue clear. In this diagram, *man* is represented as differing from *brute* hierarchically, whereas *horse* and *ox*,—taken here as if they were proximate and infima species of *brute*,—are represented as differing from *brute* sub-ordinately, and from each other coordinately.

¹⁵⁴ They may also be coordinate with respect to one or another member of the aggregates of traits which specify them.

¹⁵⁵ Vd. Part IV, Section 15, *supra*, especially the last five propositions in the summary of the first position.



According to the first position, *animal* is only a logical genus, and since *brute* subsumes *horse* and *ox* just as *animal* subsumes *brute* and *man*, it must follow that *brute* is either a logical genus or an infima species subsuming races or varieties; whereas the second position regards *animal* as a genus in the same way that *brute* is, having *horse*, *ox*, and *man* all equally as infima species, even though *man* appears to differ from *brute* directly, in a way in which *horse* does not differ from *ox*. Now, according to the first position, *brute* must be an infima species if *man* differs specifically from it by the addition of a difference; but that also means that *brute* (which is equivalent to *animal* lacking *rationality*) is the generic nature of *man*. It is not, however, a common generic nature because it is the generic nature of no other species; as a nature, taken abstractly, it may be common to both *man* and *brute*, but it is the generic nature of the one, and the specific nature of the other. According to the second position, however, *brute* is commonly the generic nature of two species, *horse* and *ox*; and since a species is constituted by the addition of a difference to a genus, from which thereby the species differs, *horse* and *ox* do not differ, strictly, from each other, but from their common genus *brute*; they are distinguished from each other by the diversity of the differences they add to *brute*. If as infima species, *ox* differed from *horse*, in the same manner that according to the first position *man* differs from *brute*, then it would follow necessarily that *brute* be a common genus only in the logical sense in which *animal* is the common logical genus of *brute* and *man* as infima species.¹⁵⁶

The foregoing discussion and diagram make three things clear

¹⁵⁶ This is not the place to discuss the difficulties which accrue to the second position because it regards both *man* and *ox* or *horse* as species of the genus *animal*, even though the way in which they differ from *animal* is radically dissimilar. These difficulties have already been intimated in our discussion of the confusions in the Tree of Porphyry. Vd. fn. 86, *supra*. They have a bearing on the dialectic of the issue between the two positions, to be subsequently elaborated.

about the analysis of genera and species according to the second position: first, that the relation of substantial species to one another and to their genera is like the relation of species of accidents to each other and their genera; second, that there is no radical difference between the logical arrangement of species and genera and their ontological disposition, that, in fact, the former perfectly reflects the latter; and third, consequently, that an ontological reading of the Tree of Porphyry is found acceptable.^{156a}

One matter remains to complete our exposition of this second theory about species. We must examine the modern and contemporary expressions of the doctrine we have found in traditional texts. Since our only purpose is to see whether these later writers merely confirm or also amplify what is said by Aristotle and St. Thomas on the subject, we can, perhaps, be satisfied with an exemplary survey of these materials. I lack the knowledge to make the survey adequate.

There are, first of all, a few typical texts from John of St. Thomas, one about species of inanimate, the other about species of animate, substance. To the question, How a compound is made in liquids of the same as well as different species, he answers:

I say first: Among the liquids of different species which have contrary qualities, there is found a true and proper compound. . . . When liquids are of the same species, but have contrary qualities, there can be found a true compound and corruption of *miscibiles* (*Phil. Nat.*, P. III, Q. VI, A. 2).

Of the division of species within the genera of living things, "which St. Thomas taught as from Aristotle," he says:

There is not only found a distinction of souls within that triple order or genus of vegetative, sensitive and intellective, but also in every genus there must be distinguished grades according to the latitude of participating more or less perfectly in such a genus of life. And indeed in vegetative life there is not found any gradual latitude, because of the fact that, due to the imperfection of that life, the whole is restricted to actions of nourishing and generating; and both of these are found in every vegetable and plant. Thus Genesis, i, 11: "Let the earth bring forth the green herb and such as may seed." And so it pertains to the vegetative principle of plants, not only to nourish, but likewise to generate. Whence there cannot be found a place for diverse grades of this life through participation in more or fewer vegetative operations, since both vegetative operations, in which the total perfection and graduation of that life consists, are not repugnant to all, granted that there are different species of vegetables, connected with differ-

^{156a} Vd. fn. 140^a, *supra*.

ent perfections, which have the same grade of participation in both operations (*Phil. Nat.*, P. IV, Q. 1, A. 4).

Read in its context this passage seems to say that within the genera of vegetative and sensitive life, there are many species, but that in the vegetative sphere the various species do not differ in grade of perfection, through a more or less perfect participation in the operations distinctive of the genus, whereas in the sensitive sphere, there is a gradation among species as less and more perfect animals.

Among more recent authors, we must distinguish between two sorts: those who affirm a large plurality of species in the context of an epistemological discussion, and those who are concerned with the determination of species, and especially with the distinction between what they call "natural" and "systematic" species, in treatises devoted to the philosophy of nature.

In the first group are such writers as Maritain, Garrigou-Lagrange and Rousselot. We have already reported their discussion of our knowledge of species, in the context of which they unmistakably argue that there are many more species than we know adequately.¹⁵⁷ In fact, though they differ on a crucial point,—Maritain, for instance, asserting that we have adequate knowledge only of *man* as an infima species, and Rousselot denying that we possess a real definition of any natural substance,—they agree that we know such things as mercury and gold, potato and rose, horse and lion to be specifically distinct even though our knowledge of these natures is inadequate, perinoetic, or through nominal definitions. We know *that* there are these species, *certainly*, even though we do not know *what* these species are, except remotely, analogically or inadequately. As for our real definitions of such natures as *plant* and *animal*, here our knowledge is adequate, but it reaches only to genera. Thus writes Garrigou-Lagrange:

There is nothing more empirically clear than the difference which separates two species of animals, e.g., the eagle and lion; or two species of plants, e.g., the oak and the fir. But how is one to define these species except in a descriptive, empirical manner? How is one to render them intelligible? Only in their general characteristics,—their substantiality, their corporeality, their vitality, their sentience (if they have this last),—only their generic characteristics attain to intelligibility: the specific difference of the *oak*, the *fir*, the *eagle* or the *lion*, remains hidden from us; we cannot have such knowledge of it that we could deduce the properties of these natures as we would deduce those of the triangle or the circle. Why?

¹⁵⁷ Vd. Part III, Section 12, *supra*.

Because their *specific* or substantial *form* remains as it were *buried* or *immersed in matter*. As a result the human idea of the eagle or the lion is, as it were, a cone whose summit is lighted, and whose base remains in the shadow; the eagle and the lion are clearly intelligible to us as beings, as substances, as corporeal substances, as corporeal substances endowed with life and sensation; but that which formally constitutes the eagle as eagle, or the lion as lion, remains intellectually very obscure. We hardly go beyond the descriptive or empirical definition. Also St. Thomas notes that the *specific differences* of sensible things are often unnamed (vd. *Summa Theologica*, I, 29, 1, ad 3). There is a penury of terms because there is a penury of distinct ideas. Without doubt there is one sensible being whose specific difference we know distinctly. This is man. And we know the specific difference of man for the reason that it is not buried in matter, as in the case of the others, but—dominating matter—raised to a higher point than matter . . . (*Le Sens du Mystère*, Paris, 1934: pp. 12-14).

In another place, Garrigou-Lagrange exemplifies what he means by an empirical or descriptive definition, listing the aggregate of "properties" by which mercury is specifically distinguished.¹⁵⁸ Despite their other disagreements, both Maritain and Rousselot take a similar position with respect to the existence of many species in each of the large genera of natural substances.¹⁵⁹

¹⁵⁸ Vd. fn. 43, *supra*.

¹⁵⁹ Vd. Rousselot, *The Intellectualism of St. Thomas*, New York, 1935: pp. 101-110, in which such things as ox, olive-tree, camel, lion, etc., are acknowledged to be distinct species. "When we mark off a camel by the colour of its skin, we are not going beyond an external accident, and when we describe its outlines, its appearance, its hump, we are suggesting a good basis for zoological classification, but a definition will not be reached until we have discovered that particular temperament to be associated with the camel's characteristic realization of the genus animal which is responsible for its particular form of sensitive reaction" (p. 105). And he quotes in a fn. (54) from St. Thomas's Commentary on *De Anima*, II, 5: *Diversificantur species sensitivorum secundum diversas complexiones, quibus diversimode se habent ad operationes sensus*; adding: "The essence of a lion is said to be that of an animal (*quod habet animam sensitivam*) *talem, scilicet, cum abundantia audaciae*."

Vd. Maritain, *The Degrees of Knowledge*, New York, 1938: pp. 38-40, 48, 215 ff., 249-258. Even if after scientific investigation, "the *quod quid est* is not discovered by us," nevertheless, "the name, stone, indeed, signifies the nature of the stone, as it is in itself . . . it signifies it as a thing to be known, not as a thing known" (p. 252, fn. 1). In the same footnote Maritain cites St. Thomas's description of a stone as an example of empirical definition in terms of "extrinsic properties." Vd. *Summa Theologica*, I, 13, 8, ad 2. And in the text he says: "Whether it be in the mineral, the vegetable or animal worlds, the immense variety of corporeal natures inferior to man refuse to surrender to our discovery their ultimate specific determinations." Vd. p. 253, fn. 1 for other examples of descriptive definitions of such species as *horse, dog, lion*, etc. Cf. *Introduction to Philosophy*, New York, 1930: Ch. V.

In the second group are such writers as Gredt, Monaco and the authors of current, "neo-scholastic" text-books or manuals on cosmology, psychology, etc. They confirm the doctrine of the second position as that can be found in Aristotle and St. Thomas; but, more than that, they add a new distinction,—between "natural" and "systematic" species,—which is responsive to findings of biological research unknown to the ancients. As we have already observed,¹⁶⁰ this distinction, taken by itself, may be favorable either to the first or to the second position: to the first, if there are only five natural species, and the systematic species of scientific classification are merely sub-species (races, varieties, etc.); to the second, if there are many more than five natural species, and the systematic species are sub-species further subsumed. Some writers are ambiguous, or at least uncertain, in the way they apply this distinction, so that it is difficult to tell which position they favor.¹⁶¹ But some are clearly on one side, and their discussion is worth examining in detail because of the characteristic modern flavor which they add to an ancient doctrine. Let us consider, first, Gredt's treatment of the distinction between natural and systematic species:

All natural species can be known with certitude from the strictly essential organization, and by the principle of property strictly (*quod soli et semper et omni convenit*). But this organization is hidden from us; it consists in that micro-organization, which is already present in the germinal cell, from which the evolution of the living thing begins. . . . With the evolution of the living thing, which takes place with cellular division, this strictly essential disposition is communicated to the diverse cells. This micro-organization escapes even microscopic investigation. Hence it is necessary that we learn the essential differences of living bodies from their external types, from their properties, which extrinsically appear in a living individual in the course of its evolution. By the aid of these distinctions, we immediately find that men and brutes and plants are naturally distinct. In the genus of brutes, the different senses likewise give us a clue to specific differences. Animals which are endowed with only taste and touch (and smell) are specifically distinguished, as natural species, from those in which sight and hearing is found. Furthermore, in the genus plant and in the genus animal, we distinguish many natural species according to the stable type of organi-

¹⁶⁰ Vd. Part IV, Section 15, *supra*.

¹⁶¹ Thus, Brennan in his *General Psychology*, New York, 1937: vd. pp. 295-6, 312-4; and Phillips in his *Modern Thomistic Philosophy*, London, 1934: vd. I, p. 340 ff. Phillips increases the ambiguity by talking of "natural species" in a strict and a broad sense. On the other hand, there is some evidence that Phillips adheres to the second position, in the fact that he seems to have no doubt that there are many specifically distinct elements, and an even larger number of specific mixtures. Vd. *op. cit.*, pp. 41 ff. and 141 ff.

zation, not only now, but even through geologic periods. We must necessarily consider brutes and plants as supreme genera, which are further divided into diverse natural genera and species. It belongs to biology and not to philosophy to determine what these genera and species are (*Elementa Philosophiae Aristotelico-Thomisticae*, Fribourg, 1937: *Phil. Nat. B.*, Pt. III, Bk. III, #611).¹⁶²

Secondly, and finally, let us consider Monaco's treatment of the distinction of living species, which occurs in the context of his discussion of the problem of transformism:

That living things which belong to the vegetative and animal kingdoms and to the human species differ specifically among themselves, no one in his right mind would dare to deny. It is also certain that not all living things, which are said by the physiologist, zoologist and botanist, to differ specifically truly constitute diverse species, although some form diverse races, because their diverse properties are accidental. . . . Truly the criterion for the solution of this problem (i.e. the distinction of species) ought to be taken from the proper powers of a thing's nature, and from properties which are intimately connected with the activity of these powers. This activity, to consider only vegetative life, is exercised through nutrition, augmentation and generation. Further, nutrition,—although with reference to living things of the same kingdom or the same family it seems not to differ much,—nevertheless, is distinguished in most things by reason of the diverse powers and organs which they possess. The principle of augmentation is intimately connected with the organism and its properties, since from diverse augmentation, the organism itself is modified by diverse principles and exhibits diverse properties. Finally, generation, which may be chief among these operations, can be taken as a note altogether characteristic of any specific form. If we wish to speak of sensitive life, it is primarily made known to us through the diverse organs by which living organisms are constituted, and through which they exercise their proper activities. Whence also of those living things which enjoy sensitive life, a discrimination of species arises from the diversity of their organs and the powers by which they operate.

¹⁶² For Gredt's discussion of inanimate species, vd. *ibid.*, *Phil. Nat. B.*, Pt. II, Cap. II, Sect. 4. It is also instructive to note Gredt's ontological interpretation of the Tree of Porphyry. Vd. *ibid.*, *Logica*, Pt. II, Cap. II, Sect. 4.

Cf. Coffey, *Ontology*, London, 1929: pp. 291-292: "It is worthy of special note that while extension or volume is indicative of the *material* principle of corporeal substances, the figure or shape naturally assumed by this volume is determined by their *formative* principle, and is thus indicative of their specific nature. This is already noticeable in the inorganic world, where many of the chemically different substances assume each its own distinctive crystalline form. But it is particularly in the domains of botany and zoology that the natural external form of the living individual organism is recognized as one of the most important grounds of its classification, and one of the surest tests of its specific nature." Cf. also McWilliams, *Cosmology*, New York, 1937: pp. 192-193.

And to the question, What a living species is, Monaco answers:

It is a collection of individual living things which preserve the same powers and the same type through the generation of one from the other. Clearly this definition legitimately follows from all those things which we have just stated, and from the properties which we see in living things; thus agreeing with Aristotle and the scholastics. Besides it is to be observed that this is not an abstract definition of species, but an application of it to living things. . . . Therefore, the first words "collection of living things" constitutes, as it were, the genus; and the rest the specific differentia (*Praelectiones Metaphysicæ Specialis*, Pars II: *de viventibus seu psychologia*, Cap. I, A. V, Th. XXIV; Rome, 1929: pp. 174-6).

It should be noted that all of these modern texts emphasize three factors in the specification of substances, the natures of which we cannot adequately grasp: (1) the constancy or stability of an aggregate of observable traits, many of which, if not all, are admittedly contingent accidents; (2) the accident of figure or shape; and (3) genetic constancy, i. e. the generation of like by like, "the preservation of the same powers and the same type" throughout a series of generations. The last, of course, applies only in the case of living things. It should be noted, also, that such writers as Gredt and Monaco are anxious to insist that not all of the "kinds" which physical or biological scientists distinguish are truly species, but that some are merely races or varieties, i. e. accidentally different classes,¹⁶³—even though they can offer no clear criterion for separating nominal (i. e. descriptive) definitions into those which point to species and those which do not. But this last point leads us into controversial matters, and must be postponed for the time.

17. *Comparison of the two positions.* Before we undertake to set forth the dialectic of arguments pro and con, objections and replies, it will be helpful to formulate the issue precisely. In order

¹⁶³ Gredt says "three things ought to be distinguished: (1) varieties (races); (2) types now sharply distinct within the same species, i. e. systematic species; and (3) natural species, founded in the beginning by God. The stability of systematic species is only relative; of natural species, it is absolute. And there can be as much diversity introduced into natural species through systematic species, as does not obliterate their specific type, i. e., their specific organization. But now the difficulty is to distinguish natural species from systematic species . . ." (*op. cit.*, *Phil. Nat.*, B., Pt. III, Bk. II, # 611). But that, unfortunately, is not the only difficulty. The difference between "systematic species" and "races" is, at best, only a matter of degree of relative "stability" or relative "sharpness" of distinction. On strictly metaphysical grounds, what is not a natural species is not a species at all, does not possess a distinctive substantial form. Hence the problem is to distinguish species from races, and Gredt fails to solve this problem concretely; in fact, he says it is not for the philosopher but for the scientist to solve.

to reduce the complex details to a perspicuous form, I shall construct a summary outline of the relevant matters, in which characteristic differences in mode of argument are indicated, as well as the propositional agreements and disagreements of the two positions. I shall use the Roman numerals I and II to signify the two positions.

A. Mode of argument.

(1) Direction of analysis.

I: goes *from* an ontological analysis of the order and constitution of species *to* an enumeration of species, by the application of ontological principles to the observed operations of things.

(a) The ontological principles state the identity of specific natures and substantial forms, and the relation of substantial forms to powers (proper accidents) as their sources.

(b) In the light of these principles, the observed facts about the operations of things become a basis for inferring powers and hence concluding about substantial forms and specific natures.

II: goes *from* an enumeration of species, classified according to the observable traits of things, including more than their operations, *to* an account of the order and constitution of species, in which ontological principles are exemplified.

(a) The constancy (stability), inseparability, and genetic uniformity of aggregates of observed traits is the basis for distinguishing and classifying species; though it is acknowledged that these traits are contingent accidents and that those which are not operations can signify powers (properties) only by virtue of their constancy, inseparability, uniformity, etc.

(b) In the light of this enumeration and classification, and by the application of relevant ontological principles thereto, conclusions are reached concerning the order of species within common genera.

(2) Relation of philosophy to empiriological science.

I: the specification of natural substances is accomplished entirely in terms of ontological principles and the facts of common experience. The findings of empirical science need be consulted *only* for the distinction and ordering of sub-specific varieties (races, accidental concretions, etc.).

II: the specification of natural substances cannot be accomplished by the philosopher without resort to the findings of empirical science. The facts of common experience are

insufficient. Hence, the classifications must be as contingent as are the findings of scientific research.

Note: In both cases, the ontological principles employed are strictly philosophical propositions, axioms or conclusions. But in I, the judgments of specification are also exclusively the work of philosophical knowledge; whereas in II, the judgments of specification are, in part at least, the result of scientific investigation. This means that in I the judgments of specification involve real definitions (dianoetic intellection), whereas in II, they involve nominal and descriptive definitions (perinoetic intellection).

B. Agreements: propositions in which I and II concur.

(1) The five antecedent principles (stated in Section II, *supra*).

Note: There is one exception, already noted (vd. fn. 117, *supra*), which must be mentioned here. The second position, in affirming contrariety among substantial species, not only denies hierarchy thereby, but also appears to deny the third of the five antecedent principles. One of the questions, which the subsequent dialectic must decide, is whether the latter denial is *apparent* or *real* (Vd. fn. 168, *infra*).

(2) The relative inadequacy of our knowledge,—whether by real or by nominal definitions,—is no basis for concluding as to the number of species, or to their determination.

I: admits that it cannot argue from the fact that we have no dianoetic intellection of natures more determinate than the five forms, to the conclusion that these five forms are necessarily infima species.

II: admits that it cannot argue from the fact that we have perinoetic intellection of natures more determinate than the five forms, to the conclusion that some of these more determinate natures are truly species, whereas others are only races and varieties, and that the five forms are genera.

(3) Man is an infima species, and of man as an infima species we do possess a real definition (a dianoetic intellection), whether or not we have similar knowledge of any other infima species.

Note: This statement of agreement between I and II excludes Rousselot's denial of any real definition of natural substances. The double agreement here,—that man is an infima species, and that man is really defined,—has significant consequences for the dialectic of the issue between I and II.

- (4) There are relatively stable organizations of matter, which share the same (infima) specific nature, while differing accidentally from one another.

I: calls these sub-specific natures races, varieties, or accidental concretions.

II: calls these sub-specific natures either races (varieties, etc.) or systematic species. (Strictly, the difference between "race" and "systematic species" is relative, i. e., a matter of degree.)

Note: I and II agree in naming such things as Aryan (white man) and Negro (black man) as races of the human species; but partly agree and disagree in naming the races or varieties in the sphere of any infra-human substance.

C. Disagreements: propositions on which I and II are opposed.

- (1) As to the number of species.

I: there are five species, or some similar small and definitely known number; and of these, three are species of living thing, and two of non-living.

II: there is a large number of species, a number much larger than five, but not definitely known; and there are more species of living than of non-living things.

Note: There is one apparent agreement here on the relative number of living and non-living species. In the case of I, this assertion follows from the application of a basic principle about the natures of living and non-living things,—i. e., the difference between their forms as principles of diverse operations, etc.; so that if the number of living species is known to be three, it can be at once concluded that the number of inanimate species cannot be more than two. But in the case of II, the assertion *seems* to be made in the light of observable facts; although, since II does not deny the principle mentioned, it could also conclude that whatever the number of inanimate species, the species of living things exist in greater number.

- (2) As to the order of species.

I: species are ordered to one another in a single perfect hierarchy, i. e., each species is higher or lower than another by the addition or subtraction of a difference, and the difference which determines any specific nature is always one added to the proximately inferior species, whose nature is the generic matter capable of such further determination.

II: species are not ordered to one another in a perfect hierarchy, i. e. within their proximate genus, two species may be coordinate, and even contrary; or one may be higher than another by a difference in degree of the same property; or each may be higher and lower than the other in respect to different properties possessed and lacked. Species may, however, be hierarchically ordered so far as their generic natures are concerned, and there may be more than one such hierarchy, according to the level of the genera chosen. Even if in a given genus, the infima species happened to be ordered hierarchically, the whole group of such species would be hierarchically ordered, *as such*, to another group having a superior generic nature.

Note: The contradiction here is apparently simple; actually it is complex, because while there is only one way in which a single, perfect hierarchy can be affirmed, there are many separate ways in which it can be denied, *viz.*, by coordination, contrariety, continuity, multilinearity, and by the multiplicity of generic as well as specific orderings.

It should further be noted that there is no disagreement between I and II with regard to the ordering of whatever natures are sub-specific.

(3) As to the constitution of species.

I: ontologically, there are no common genera, for the nature of each infima species, except the highest, is the generic nature of each superior species, and although two proximate species may possess "some nature" in common, that nature will be specific in the inferior and generic in the superior; two proximate species may possess a common generic nature only in the sense of their both sharing in the nature of a species which is inferior to them both, but then that nature will not be equally the proximate genus of both species.

II: ontologically, there are common genera, for a number of species can belong to the same proximate genus, each differing from it by a diverse, further determination; i. e., two species can share equally in the possession of the same generic nature, equally proximate to both of them.

Note: This means that I sharply distinguishes between the ontological account of genera and species and the logical construction of species in genera; whereas according to II the logical construction is a perfect reflection of the ontological situation. Position I must not, therefore, be understood as denying common genera in the logical order. Further, according to I, there is a differ-

ence between the relation of genera and species in the case of substances and accidents, but not so according to II. Finally, there is a difference between I and II with regard to the interpretation of the Tree of Porphyry. Both positions use the word "hierarchy," but not in the same sense. When I uses the word without qualification, an ontological hierarchy of substances is meant,—an order distinctly different from the logical hierarchy of terms or the ontological disposition of accidental species and genera. When II uses the word in the case of substances, what is meant is the same type of order which, according to I, occurs only in the logical arrangement of terms or in the ontological disposition of accidents. The opposition between the two positions is, therefore, clear: II affirms an ordering of substances which is denied by I.

The issue between the two positions is thus drawn in a series of apparent contradictions. It is now necessary to test the issue by seeing whether they are more than *apparent*. For if they are only apparent, a resolution should be readily achieved without recourse to an elaborate dialectic.

In the first place, we must be sure that the contradictions are not due to an equivocal use of words. The possibility of such equivocations can be simply indicated by attempting to translate the basic vocabulary of each position into that of the other. This is summarized in the following, comparable diagrams, in which the italicized word is the verbal equivalent used in the other position.

I	II	II	I
species: <i>genera</i>		species: <i>races</i> (<i>sub-species</i>)	
races: <i>species</i> and, in some cases,		genera: <i>species</i> and, in some cases,	
<i>races</i> (<i>sub-species</i>)		either	
		<i>races</i> or <i>logical genera</i>	

In this scheme of translation there is, in each case, a clear equivalence at one point, and an area of unclarity at another; for although whatever is a species for I is a genus for II, with the exception of *man*, and whatever is a species for II is a sub-species for I, with the same exception, it is not the case that whatever is a race for I is a species for II, because I and II may agree about certain sub-species, as, e. g., Aryan; nor is every genus according to II a species for I, because some of the classes which II regards as genera may be treated by I either as merely logical genera or as sub-species, since I only regards the most extensive genera named by II, as

infima species. Despite these difficulties, a working translation is possible, and this may be thought by some to effect a reconciliation of the two theories. Thus, for instance, the way in which I says that sub-species are ordered is precisely the way that II describes the ordering of species and genera; or, the number of species asserted by II generally fits the number of sub-species recognized by I. *But such a translation is not a reconciliation of the opposing theories*, because if the affirmations are first made in the language of I and then translated into the vocabulary of II, that is tantamount to the denial of II; and conversely. The translation only shows how each position, if acknowledged as true, would undertake to explain the errors of the other position and to account for the latter's positive insights. When we read such words as "genus," "species" and "race" *univocally* in the language of each position, we can then see how their several affirmations and denials create an issue which equivocation cannot avoid. As a matter of fact, the issue appears as soon as either position asserts that its use of such words is the proper use, and that the other position is using them *equivocally*.^{163a}

This scheme of translations has, however, one significance which must not pass unnoticed. Let us suppose that either I or II is ultimately found to be true, and the other false. In either case, there will be important texts in the writings of Aristotle and St. Thomas which are inconsistent with the truth. Then it will be use-

^{163a} I have been assuming throughout the exposition of the two positions that the reader understands the words "genus," "difference," and "species,"—and all other words naming particular genera, differences and species,—in the first intention, as referring to *entia naturae*. We are not here concerned with second intentions, that is, terms or concepts in their modes of predication, but with natures and their formal constituents. Vd. fn. 129a, *supra*. The words "genus," "species," and "difference" are ambiguously used if we fail to distinguish between their second-intentional usage to analyze concepts and their first-intentional usage to analyze things; but neither of the two positions is guilty of that sort of ambiguity. Neither equivocates in that way. Both are theories in the philosophy of nature, and differ *as such*, but not in matters of logic. Vd. fn. 153a, *supra*. Even when the first position charges the second with confusing logic and ontology, it must be interpreted as saying that the second position attributes to natures an order and relation which obtains among concepts, such as common proximate genera or two positive differences between species. *If the second position is true, there is no confusion here*. But if it is true, its truth is about the nature of things, not the relation of concepts.

These matters will be further clarified by the subsequent dialectic, but the reader who supposes that either position is using the words "genus," "difference," and "species" to signify logical intentions,—except when that is explicitly indicated as by the phrase "logical genus,"—has completely misapprehended the discussion so far, and will not understand the issue, its dialectic or resolution.

ful to ask whether Aristotle and St. Thomas do not use such words as "species" and "genus" equivocally. We already know, for example, that the word "species" has a certain kind of equivocation, namely, that it is used both for an infima species and for a genus subordinate to some other genus. Hence it may even be possible that Aristotle and St. Thomas use the word "species" sometimes for infima species and sometimes for sub-species or race. In other words, that fact that I and II contradict each other need not necessarily mean that Aristotle and St. Thomas contradict themselves, even though their writings contain passages which appear favorable to both positions. The appearance of self-contradiction would be removed by showing that they used certain of the crucial words equivocally. Whether or not this can be established depends upon a re-examination of the troublesome texts, but that is worth doing only after the issue has been resolved in favor of I or II.

In the second place, we must ask whether what we have called contradictions are strictly such. The answer is immediately clear: in a strict logical sense, they are not *contradictions*, but a type of *contrariety*. Both positions can be false, but both cannot be true. They can both be false if the basic antecedent principles which generated the issue are themselves false.¹⁶⁴ That is why it was important to note, in our summary outline, that both I and II concurred in the affirmation of these five basic propositions (metaphysical, logical and epistemological). The logical form of this special type of contrariety between I and II can be simply exemplified by the following set of propositions. If it be assumed (A) that every insect has feet, then the proposition (X) that all insects have a definite, small number of feet, attached to the body at one place, and the proposition (Y) that all insects have an indefinite, large number of feet, attached to the body at many places, cannot both be true. Nor can they both be false, so long as (A) is true, on the ground that the number must be either definitely small or indefinitely large, and that the attachment must be at one point or many. But (A) may itself be false; in which case, both (X) and (Y) must be false. Hence, the contrariety of (X) and (Y) depends on the truth of (A), for on that condition one must be true and the other false; the propositions (X) and (Y) are not contradictory because, as we have seen, their opposition is only conditional,—which is not the case with strict contradictories,—and,

¹⁶⁴ These are the five principles stated and discussed in Part II, *supra*. Of these, the first three are the most important for our present purposes, although the last two are tangentially relevant.

the condition negated, they must both be false.¹⁶⁵ Now, it should be clear that the first and second theory about species are contrary to one another in the same way as the illustrative propositions (X) and (Y), and that their contrariety is conditional upon the truth of the antecedent principles, which operate as (A) does in the case of (X) and (Y).

Two things follow from this analysis. (1) So long as the truth of the antecedent principles is affirmed, the contrariety between I and II is, for all dialectical purposes, as good as a strict contradiction because, the condition being granted, one of the two positions *must be true, and the other false*. (2) But it remains the case that I and II do not *unconditionally* exhaust all the possibilities of truth about the nature of things, for both may be false, and there may be some other accounts of nature, one or more. I can at once suggest two other possibilities, arising from the denial of the antecedent principles which generate the issue between I and II. Those antecedent principles entail the whole doctrine of hylomorphism,—the constitution of composite substances, the unity of substantial form, the pure potentiality of prime matter, the identity of specific nature with substantial form, etc. But this whole doctrine may be false, as in fact is so contended by the neo-Platonists, on the one hand, and the atomistic materialists, on the other.¹⁶⁶ If either neo-Platonism or materialism is true,—and, through being the inverse of each other, they are very much alike, as Karl Marx recognized in the case of modern materialism and idealism prior to Hegel,—then there is no problem about species, of the sort we have discovered. This last point has one further consequence. If we find the issue between I and II ultimately irresolvable, then we must

¹⁶⁵ This last fact indicates that (X) and (Y) are not simple contraries, as are the propositions "All men are mortal" and "No men are mortal," for here the opposition is not conditional upon any other propositions, and hence it cannot be said that either one or the other must be true, granted a condition, or, denying it, both must be false. The type of opposition shown between (X) and (Y) should be called "mediated contrariety" to distinguish it from the simple contrariety which obtains between the universal affirmative and the universal negative in the square of opposition.

¹⁶⁶ There are some who call themselves "hylomorphists" but deny the unicity of substantial form, with the consequence that they usually attribute some actual being to matter totally devoid of form. For example, vd. P. Descoqs, *Essai Critique sur l'Hylémorphisme*, Paris, 1924. But, for reasons which need not be explicated here, such writers are better classified as blends of neo-Platonism and materialism. Vd. my discussion of the point in *What Man Has Made of Man*, New York, 1937: Lect. II, and especially Notes 20b, 21, 23, 28, 35. For Maritain's criticism of Descoqs' *Critique*, vd. his *La Philosophie de la Nature*, Paris, 1935: pp. 136 ff.

conclude *either* that we have come upon an ultimate mystery about the nature of things, *or* that the issue is itself a false one, because generated by false principles. In other words, we cannot take refuge in the attribution of mystery, without defending the issue itself against the attack of those who oppose the very principles on which it is grounded.

This analysis of the issue indicates the procedure we must follow. There is no point in considering such alternatives as materialism or neo-Platonism, until we have made every effort to resolve the issue itself. In fact, for the time being, we shall proceed as if there were no third alternative.¹⁶⁷ Assuming the truth of all the antecedent principles, and assuming also that their generation of the issue is valid, we shall attempt to discover if there are any signs that one of the two positions is true and the other false. Should we fail, it will then be time to ask whether one or more or all of the antecedent principles is false.¹⁶⁸

We shall proceed in two stages: first by weighing the pros and

¹⁶⁷ It may be objected that there is a third alternative, already discovered, namely, a theory which agrees with the first in affirming a single perfect hierarchy of species and which agrees with the second in affirming a plurality of species much in excess of five. It cannot be denied that this third alternative is logically possible, and that it accepts the same set of antecedent conditions as the other two. But since there is no evidence for this position,—either in the observable facts or in the traditional texts,—it must remain a mere possibility. The point of the objection remains, however; namely, that the failure to discover a balance of evidence and argument in favor of either position I or II, need not throw us *at once* into the arms of those who deny the issue itself because they deny the validity of its generation from the set of antecedent principles which express the doctrine of hylomorphism.

¹⁶⁸ It has been already noted that some of the propositions of Position II *appear* to be inconsistent with the third of the basic antecedent principles, namely, that "species are discrete and integral forms, not subject to the qualification of more and less, and not related *inter se* as contraries are in a common genus." Vd. fn. 117, *supra*. Although this principle does not necessarily entail hierarchy, in the sense in which the first theory of species affirms it, yet the assertion of contrariety among substances is incompatible with hierarchy and inconsistent with this basic principle. There can be no question that such inconsistencies do *appear*, in so far as the Aristotelian account of elements and mixtures seems to relate them as contraries; or in so far as there may seem to be a continuum of species, varying from one another by more and less of the same. Now, if these inconsistencies are real, and not merely apparent, then one of two things must result: *either* the antecedent principle is true, and Position II is disfavored accordingly; or Position II, being true, raises suspicions about the truth of the antecedent principle, in which case it becomes necessary to look more searchingly into the relation this principle bears to the others, with which it *seems* to be logically connected. This is one of the things the subsequent dialectical exploration must accomplish.

cons through an exposition of objections and replies; second, by choosing whichever position seems to be *more* favored,—which seems to have *more* signs of truth on its side,—and by attempting a tentative resolution of the issue through a positive formulation of that position. By this constructive effort we can not only test the strength of the resolution by seeing how successfully it accounts for all the facts, including the impeccable insights of its opponent, but we can also discover the further range of its philosophical consequences. These latter may have some retroactive value for testing the truth of the theory. Although in the course of preserving whatever truth there is in whichever theory has been discarded, we may effect reconciliations by noting possible equivocations, the dialectical exploration of the issue must, of course, be governed strictly by the rule that all critical words be used univocally throughout.

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(To be continued)

EDITORS' NOTE: We append Dr. Adler's outline of the complete problem and its investigation. Sub-headings 1-15 were covered in preceding issues. The present (Third) installment covers sub-headings 16 and 17.

THE PROBLEM OF SPECIES

OUTLINE

I. INTRODUCTION

1. The series of articles projected: nature of philosophical *problems*
2. Significance of problems for *Thomists*
3. The limited scope of the first article as dealing with the problem of species: its locus in the philosophy of nature, and its relation to other departments of philosophy
4. Outline of the article in its main divisions.

II. ANTECEDENT PRINCIPLES

5. Preliminary statement: why these principles must be stated to formulate the problem
6. } Three metaphysical principles, *directly* relevant
7. }
8. }
9. Transition to other principles relevant only *tangentially*
10. Logical and epistemological considerations: their discussion
11. Indicates why a separate section must be devoted to the theory of our knowledge of species.

III. EPISTEMOLOGICAL DIMENSION OF THE PROBLEM

12. Exposition of 4 answers to the question: how many substantial species do we know adequately (by real definitions)?
 - a. The position of Rousselot: none
 - b. The position of Maritain and Garrigou-Lagrange: one
 - c. The position of the decadent scholastics: a very large number
 - d. The fourth position: five
13. Dialectical summary of the opposition of these four doctrines, which leads to the discovery that the epistemological issue cannot be resolved at all unless the ontological problem of species can be independently solved.

IV. EXPOSITION OF THE PROBLEM IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE

14. Preliminary statement of the issue as constituted by two positions, i.e., two answers to questions concerning the order and number of substantial species
15. Exposition of the first position
 1. Capital texts from Aristotle and St. Thomas
 - a. Texts in re: the order of species
 - b. Texts in re: the species of living things
 - c. Texts in re: the species of non-living things
 2. Propositional summary and analytical explication of the doctrine contained in these texts
 - a. Five propositions concerning the constitution and order of species
 - b. Two propositions concerning the number of species
 - c. One proposition concerning infra-specific distinctions
 3. Texts from contemporary writers in the tradition of Aristotle and St. Thomas, which *appear* to take this first position

16. Exposition of the second position
 1. Capital texts from Aristotle and St. Thomas
 - a. Texts in re: the species of non-living things
 - b. Texts in re: the species of living things
 - c. Texts in re: the order of species
 2. Propositional summary and analytical explication of the doctrine contained in these texts
 3. Texts from contemporary writers in the tradition of Aristotle and St. Thomas, which *appear* to take this second position
17. Comparison of the two positions
 1. What is common to the two positions
 2. Wherein they differ principally
 3. Why no third position is possible
 4. The dialectical possibilities: either one doctrine is true and the other is false; or some reconciliation of the two is possible by an equivocal use of the word "species."

V. THE DIALECTIC OF THE ISSUE

18. Preliminary statement of the dialectical procedure
19. Objections to the second position, with answers so far as possible
20. Objections to the first position, with answers so far as possible
21. Consequences of this dialectic for the epistemological dimension of the problem
22. Consequences of this dialectic for other problems in the philosophy of nature (e.g., evolution, continuity and hierarchy, etc.)
23. Indication of two possible reconciliations, and why we shall attempt one of these as a tentative resolution of the problem.

VI. HYPOTHETICAL RESOLUTION OF THE ISSUE

24. The principle of the reconciliation: its formulation
25. Consequences of the reconciliation
 - a. For the epistemological aspect of the problem
 - b. For other problems in the philosophy of nature.

VII. CONCLUSION

26. Review of the entire argument with a view to determining whether the problem is genuine or false, if genuine whether a mystery or solvable, etc.
27. Transition to the second article on the problem of substantial change, with a note on how that problem is affected by this first one about species.

BOOK REVIEWS

Why the Cross? By EDWARD LEEN, C. S. Sp. New York: Sheed & Ward, 1938. Pp. 210. \$2.50.

Dr. Leen takes the unrest and despair of our times as a point of departure for his thesis proposing the Christian ideal of life as the only guarantee of happiness and a life worth living. The thesis itself is not new; it remains for us to appraise the contribution which Dr. Leen has made to its defense. Before an evaluation, however, it may be well to set forth the general argument of the entire book.

I

The first section of his book, subtitled "The Tree of Death," deals with the spiritual blindness or loss of a sense of the supernatural, intensified indeed by the sixteenth century revolt but first incurred by our original prevarication. This double defection of mankind, according to Dr. Leen, accounts for the attitude so prevalent amongst modern men, which brands Christianity with failure, makes religion a positive hindrance to progress in this life and of no utility save for another world or, at most, a mere means of removing sin with no positive value for our present existence. Such a pessimistic view, Dr. Leen goes on to show, is at cross-purposes with God Who intended unbroken continuity between the present life of grace and the future life of glory and, consequently, a measure of happiness even in this present stage of our existence. Happiness must consist in a more or less complete centering of one's highest faculties, the intellect and will, upon the most noble object attainable, and, since man's soul and higher faculties are essentially simple, the conditions and ingredients of happiness, here and hereafter, should remain essentially the same.

The Gospel of Christ promises and actually realizes a measure of happiness beyond the wildest dreams of philosophers. But the motives for rejecting this program of life are the same today as for all times: to conceive of Redemption as a mere emancipation from material and economic evils without inner conversion of heart, or to emphasize the Redeemer's mission of mercy and philanthropy to the exclusion of His inflexible demands for flawless conduct has ever been a fatal error. Christ from the first enjoyed the very summit of beatitude, revealed much of its content, bequeathed here and now some of its delights on those who followed Him and promised a fuller measure for the hereafter by making it possible for the everyday actions of men to be of abiding and permanent worth by linking time with eternity. So Dr. Leen finds a gist of Christ's theory of

happiness in the Gospel words, "Blessed are the pure of heart for they shall see God."

But to see God either by faith or vision, Dr. Leen points out, implies assimilation or likeness to God. This likeness, which man possessed to a notable degree in the state of original justice, was disfigured by the sin which our first parents have transmitted to their children. Baptism restores the broken image in its essential features, which are sanctifying grace, the supernatural virtues and the gifts; but the three great wounds, the concupiscence of the flesh, of the eyes, and the pride of life, remaining after baptism as bitter fruits of the Tree of Death, can be healed only by pain, suffering and tribulations borne as tokens of the Cross of Christ.

At this point the author takes up the problem of divine reparation with which the second section of his work, subtitled "The Tree of Life," is pre-occupied. Here we review the divine strategy by which God through the Incarnation, and without disturbing the nicely balanced equilibrium of divine justice and mercy, restores fallen man to a more favored position than he enjoyed in the garden of Paradise, namely, to sonship with the Father and brotherhood with Christ.

Christ the new chieftain, taken from the bosom of our race, by the humble circumstances of His humanity flatly contradicts the pride of Adam our old chieftain, readjusts in the minds of men the true proportion of temporal to eternal values and directs their efforts once more towards the hidden treasures of the supernatural lost on account of our sins. At the same time, as Dr. Leen goes on to show, Christ's human life here on earth, the prototype and model of our own, gives the lie to those who insist upon an incompatibility between suffering and happiness, in so far as His earthly life combines at once the fullest joy, most vigorous happiness with agonizing pain and most intense sorrow.

It is with this sorrowful phase of our Savior's life and death that Dr. Leen closes his book. In the last three chapters it is shown how Christ in perfect conformity with an eternal decree of God at length withdrawing the protective might of divinity from His sacred humanity freely offers Himself a victim for sinful mankind, thereby transforming what for His executioners was homicide into the Redemptive Sacrifice of the New Law which renders condign satisfaction to the offended majesty of God, makes perfect reparation for our sins, merits eternal salvation for all men, and justly wins for His instrument of torture, the Holy Cross, the title, Tree of Life.

II

In the general argument and sequence of Dr. Leen's book there is much reason for praise and little for complaint, since it is constructed, for the most part, along the lines of verified fact and trustworthy investigation.

The profuse chapter and paragraph headings, together with a brief summary following each chapter, manifest a commendable order and make the general trend of thought easily retainable. The foregoing digest alone, independently of a detailed perusal of the book, should at least suggest how apposite and well chosen are the title and subtitles, *Why the Cross?* . . . "The Tree of Death"—"The Tree of Life," for the doctrine which the author has put himself to the task of defending. In this regard, however, it seems that a better disposition of material under the aforesaid subtitles might have been made by arranging the content of Chapters II, III, and IV of Part II somewhere under Part I, which seems to be their logical place. Such an arrangement would make the line of demarcation between the two sections of the book more pronounced and, at the same time, would make for clarity, since the above mentioned chapters are concerned primarily with erroneous attitudes towards Christ which seem to be nothing more than fruits of the Tree of Death. Moreover, this would leave room under Part II for a more ample treatment of the Tree of Life or the Cross of Christ as efficient cause of supernatural life and redemption. Whether such an arrangement would have obviated the necessity of a second, companion volume, *The True Vine and Its Branches*,¹ which gives a further development of the doctrine of the Tree of Life, remains problematical. At any rate the reader gets the impression that only one volume was originally intended by the author.

It seems just to remark also that Dr. Leen could have given more unity and coherence to the second section of *Why the Cross?* by insisting more emphatically upon the pivotal position which the passion and death of Our Lord hold in His, as well as in our, life. Of course this point was not entirely neglected, but it cannot be overemphasized that all of Christ's teaching, all His activity, His mission, have their virtuality, their crown and consummation in the Passion and Death.

There remain certain aspects of doctrine touched upon by Dr. Leen which, from a theological viewpoint, merit a more detailed examination. The analysis, for instance, of modern man's characteristic ill, described in Chapter I as a restless, aimless expenditure of energy and despondent groping after a life worth living, rings entirely true and reveals a keen insight into the trends of our age. Also the distinction so nicely made there between mere mechanical motion and human activity rightly directed shows a thorough grasp of fundamentals. However, the point may be debated whether long, close contact with the sea engenders melancholy temperaments as is suggested on page 15, or whether, on the contrary, children of the sea are more apt to be bouyant and carefree as some authorities contend. At any rate, the analogy drawn here between the ocean's fretful

¹ New York: Kenedy & Sons, 1938.

booming and the futilities of the modern philosophies of life seems rather awkward and out of place in view of the fact that the theologian or the "thoughtful" must discover purpose and divine providence even in the surging tides of the sea.

The common teaching of Aristotle and St. Thomas on the essence or nature of human happiness is made to sparkle with vibrant life and convincing force throughout the entire book (Cf. pp. 29, 78-81, 247). Dr. Leen is perfectly justified in his persistent emphasis upon the possibility of a measure of happiness for the wayfarer of this world and offers a fairly good defense for the contention that happiness here and hereafter, the life of grace and glory were intended to be and are essentially the same. Some perhaps will quibble about an overstress of this latter point, arguing that since happiness ultimately rests upon a knowledge of God and since there are two different kinds of knowledge of God, and only two, according to the two ways or media, the divine and created, of knowing God, therefore there should also be two species of happiness, namely, that of heaven and that of earth differing essentially. Dr. Leen should have forestalled this plausible objection by explaining that happiness, both here and hereafter, if subjectively considered, is something created and that divinely infused faith, the basis of true human happiness (that is, more basic than love), has the very Divinity itself as a medium of attaining God as He is in Himself.

It is in analyses, such as are found on pp. 38, 41 and 104, of the underlying causes of unhappiness in this life that the author's creative ability and definite contribution to his task are best brought to light. Here he insists with masterful elegance that it is not so much the fear of death as the fear of "moral annihilation or nothingness" that makes men unhappy; not the dread of pain or suffering but "the sense of life slipping away, like water through a man's fingers." This gnawing consciousness of the ephemeral, half-measured worth of our deeds fills our existence with despair.

But here again Dr. Leen should be warned about minimizing too far the fears of death, because the Saviour Himself feared death with a reasonable fear, thereby showing us how to conquer its fearful and bewildering circumstances by turning its inevitableness into one of the highest forms of mortification. And certainly the religion of Christ, as the author points out, can remedy these sources of unhappiness by investing our simplest, most insignificant actions with an abiding worth. Nevertheless, a fuller, more detailed account of this unity and quality of everlasting continuity which the Cross of Christ enables us to induce into our temporal, transient activity would have been heartily welcomed here at this point. Dr. Leen touches upon this matter in Chapter I; he should have laid more stress on

the preponderant influence for unity and perpetuity which the principle of finality exerts upon human activity: how every human act must be shaped, measured and formed in view of the ultimate end so that one, right intention of the end may pervade a disparate variety of life's activities, gathering them up under one unifying form which by analogical communication gives to each its own peculiar value for leading to and holding in possession the ultimate end, just as each footstep furthers the same journey towards, and counts in the possession of, a goal; he should have shown how the religion of Christ engrafts upon our nature a new supernatural equipment whereby the intellect illuminated by faith clings to its object, the eternal supernatural God, not as He is reflected in creatures, but as He is in Himself and the intention, rectified by charity, centers its own energies and those of all the other virtues upon the same eternal God as an end whose image, communicated to them, deifies and gives to each a more than passing worth.

In connection with this same point, one might be permitted to remind the author that although human reason is the proximate efficient cause of the moral order, and human activity the material cause, nevertheless, God is the first cause. Therefore, instead of writing "The just man . . . is the result of his own effort and God's co-operation," as is found on page 125, it would be more theological to say that he is the result of God's work and his own co-operation, because the human soul even under the influence of co-operating grace (*gratia co-operans*) remains a mover moved.

Moreover, to say simply that man operates and God co-operates in good, seems to amount to nothing less than a very definite concession to that tendency of modern men justly deplored but not sufficiently refuted by Dr. Leen on pp. 18-21, 181, and 213-215, which may aptly be described as cosmo-centric or ego-centric in contradistinction to theocentric.

Such an error should be exposed and refuted at its grass-roots. The cosmo-centric mind judges all things according to human standards, i. e., as they are immersed in, and drawn from, sensible material reality, with no sense for their relation or order to God, the first cause of things. A mental synthesis built upon such principles and methods anchors itself to the world of inferior being rather than to God the Supreme Being, is cosmo-centric rather than theo-centric, and must necessarily be in error or ignorant of many natural truths about the scheme, order, and destiny of man in this universe, to say nothing of those higher natural truths about God. Whereas the theo-centric mind anchored to God by divine faith sees and judges all things from the viewpoint of God. From the cosmo-centric mind there follows an ego-centric will which loves the creature rather than the Creator, embraces worldly, sordid goods and pleasures which set it at variance with the exigencies of its own higher good and degrade it to their level. But the

theo-centric man whose will is healed by the virtue of charity and guided by the light of faith courts only the divine good, loved by God Himself and develops within himself a new supernatural psychological personality patterned after the divine. And unless these high and mighty principles are clearly explained it is useless to decry the evils of our age, or hope to correct them.

Occasion may be taken here to note with regard to the statement, page 115: "... it is only of the rational being that it can be said that it holds or possesses God. The rest are upheld by, but do not lay hold of, God. If the soul were without grace it would be similarly circumstanced," that an overstatement of doctrine is as bad as an understatement. It should be borne in mind that the soul even without grace always in this life retains the natural obediencial capacity for grace which the irrational creature never possesses. The sentence on page 354: "The Sacraments are symbols ordained by God to reveal to men in a sensible manner the divine operations He accomplishes in their souls" might be regarded as a misleading understatement of the efficacy of the Sacraments of the New Law, which are more than mere symbols of grace.

Dr. Leen seems hesitant about the question as to whether our first parents were created in grace. On page 113 he writes: "God breathed on the already living soul a breath of His own living being; ..." again on page 125 there may be found the same insinuation that the first man was created, then later constituted in grace. It may be remarked that this opinion is not the common one. On the other hand, there are statements in other places which seem to indicate that the author wishes to defend the far more common view amongst theologians that man from the very first without any intervening time was created in the state of original justice. A more decisive stand in this matter would be desirable.

The view expressed on page 147: "In the state of innocence Adam enjoyed immense knowledge. . . . He added, day by day, to this initial stock of knowledge" is not entirely accurate. Adam had from the first a divinely infused knowledge of all the naturally knowable truths contained in first evident principles, and of supernatural truths he had that knowledge sufficient to guide the human race to its eternal supernatural destiny. The only sense, therefore, in which Adam could be said to add to his initial stock of knowledge would be in the passive sense of receiving new revelations from God. It is true that Adam had experimental knowledge, just as Christ had, that is to say: he exercised his cognoscitive faculties upon the objects of science or experienced the human modes of acquiring knowledge, but did not thereby add to the content of his original fund of knowledge. At least this seems to be the mind of St. Thomas expressed in I, q. 94, a. 3 of the *Summa Theologica*.

The explanation of the apparently insoluble problem, mentioned on page 191, of reconciling God's justice and mercy in restoring mankind to divine favor seems to falter in clarity on these points: (1) The original offense of our first parents to God was of infinite proportions; (2) God de facto exacted condign satisfaction for this offense; (3) Only a God-man, whose actions in virtue of a divine modality springing from His divine Personality would be of infinite value, could meet and square this debt to God incurred by sin.

In conclusion it is only just to remark that the above issues taken with Dr. Leen should not be considered to be of a nature harmful to the book's wholehearted welcome. The defects of this book, apparent or real, which have been pointed out are more than compensated for by its many thoroughly good points. For instance: the masterful description found on pages 45 ff., 105-109, of the kind of faith required by the Christian ideal; the just and eloquent plea made by Dr. Leen in Chapters II and III of Part I for an acceptance of the Gospel in its integrity; his perfectly sober, theological exposition of the nature and transmission of original sin contained in Chapters VIII and IX of Part I; the beautiful and scholarly presentation of Our Savior's perfections and prerogatives contained in Chapters V and VI of Part II; especially the keen unerring analysis of present-day human problems found throughout the entire book and many other features of excellence make it a substantial contribution to the science of theology and right living.

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St. Augustine's Philosophy of Beauty. By EMMANUEL CHAPMAN, Ph. D.
(St. Michael's Mediaeval Studies). New York: Sheed and Ward, 1939.
Pp. xiii + 114. \$3.50.

Although Mr. Chapman states his intention in this monograph clearly enough and at the very outset, the reviewer is quite unable to understand it. Consequently the structure of the book itself appears obscure. Mr. Chapman says in the foreword: "I have tried to let St. Augustine answer, in his own words as far as possible, the question he asked so directly in the *Confessions*: 'What, then, is the beautiful, and what is beauty?' by putting into order the responses so frequently articulated by him throughout his entire works." The trouble is with the word, "order." What does the author mean by "putting into order"? What is the principle of this order? Is it St. Augustine's order? Apparently not, for that order rests, presumably, in the works as he wrote them. Certainly it is not the order of St. Thomas, and besides Mr. Chapman makes no claim that it is. This difficulty makes

it impossible to present the order and substance of the present book, except by servile paraphrase, at least for this reviewer. For he has been unable to grasp that unity of purpose which would illuminate the parts.

The monograph as a whole is divided into two parts: an account of St. Augustine's theory of the beautiful and an "afterword" on modern painting in the light of Augustinian aesthetic.

The first chapter examines the "experience of the beautiful" which is analyzed into four components: (1) *enjoyment*, (2) *intelligibility*, (3) *agreement of object and subject*, (4) *confluence of intellect and will*. Synthesizing these elements the experience of the beautiful may be defined as a joyful resting of the will in the contemplation of an object, arising from a certain connaturality of object and subject.

The second chapter is devoted to an analysis of the aesthetic object. Here again four components are discovered: (1) *number*. Number is arranged in an ascending dialectical order from the numbers of sounding bodies, to the numbers of memory, to the numbers of the ear confronting the corporeal numbers, to the numbers advancing from judgment to the ear, to the numbers of judgment, and finally to the numbers of reason. Unlike the numbers of judgment, the numbers of reason are not limited by any sensible conditions; for although we cannot judge corporeal numbers when their magnitudes are too great, for example a rhythm of ten hours to five hours, reason nevertheless is able to apprehend this ratio. Finally, and outside all of these numbers, the eternal numbers of reason bring us to God, the source of all numbers but most immediately of the eternal numbers of reason. (2) *form*, which is the principle of unity. Just as the numbers of things and of the mind proceed from the eternal numbers of the Divine Mind, so with the forms of created things. For God is the source of the forms in things, and the procession of the form into the work of art from the mind of the artist imitates the Divine creation. (3) *unity*. Unity is likeness, and likeness is itself a likeness to the absolute identity of Nature in the Persons of the Holy Trinity. For in the created thing there is no absolute identity but only a similitude, as the similitude of one physical part to another, the similitude of individuals in the same species, the similitude of friends, the similitude in harmony and proportion. In general there is this dialectical order: the likeness of creatures to each other, the likeness of the creature to God, the "likeness" of the Persons in the Trinity. And as with number and form, it is the likeness or unity in God which explains the likeness in things, and the desire for unity in things is the desire for the perfect Unity of God. (4) *order*. "Order is the distribution which allots things equal and unequal, each to its own place, and integrates an ensemble of parts in accord with an end." Again the order of created things is a participation in the perfect order of the Trinity, and in a special way is attributed to the Person of the Holy Ghost. It is order which holds together the unequal

things of the universe. Defects are defects only when considered apart from the whole; and as the beauty of a painting as a whole requires privation in the parts, for otherwise the painting could not be a whole, so there is ugliness and death in created nature to show forth as an imitation the invisible Beauty of the Creator. The artist must employ shadows to express his idea; in this he imitates the created hierarchy of being and the Divine exploitation of evil.

The third chapter treats of the nature of beauty. It seems to be divided into three parts: (1) *the definition of corporeal beauty*, (2) *the ascending stages of beauty*, (3) *the conception of beauty in general*. A distinction between the beautiful and the useful leads to the conception of a thing loved for itself and thence to a definition of corporeal beauty: "A congruence of parts with a certain delightfulness of color," or more familiarly: "The splendor of form shining over the harmonious and proportioned parts of matter." From the beauty of bodies whose illumination is only through color, we proceed to the beauty of living things where the life which animates even a miserable worm, giving its movements measure, illuminates its whole being, as color illuminates the being of mere bodies. Rising to the beauty of the soul, three stages are discernible: In the first the soul "takes successively higher attitudes towards matter," in the second "it deals with itself before approaching God," in the third "it approaches God, and then abides in Him." The first stage includes the passage from animation to sensation to art, the second stage from virtue to tranquility, the third stage begins with the approach to God and ends in contemplation. Thus the progression of illumination which is the "color" or "splendor" in the definition of corporeal beauty, is ordered from mere color to God Himself. But this illumination is not the unity, form and order of things, but the *showing forth* of these. Unity and form belong with truth; order, which is the love of parts for each other, belongs with the good. Thus beauty in general is seen to be "the delightful illumination of goodness and truth simultaneously enlightening and gladdening." For illumination is the principle by which something is shown forth in all beautiful things, and it is the goodness and truth which are shown forth.

The fourth chapter is concerned with the *judgment of beauty*. The first and much the larger part expounds the principle of judgment, Divine illumination; the second part treats of the act of judgment. From natural experience we can learn the nature of things as they are but not what they should be. The perfect idea by which anything is judged to be beautiful or ugly is not to be found in any created thing. Hence the necessity of Divine Illumination as the first principle of the act of judgment. It is from this Divine Illumination that we receive the ideas of number, likeness, unity and harmony, and that is why we are pleased by things in so far as these attributes are in things. We cannot say why the attributes themselves

please us. It is sufficient that the mind is illuminated from the same source as the things which please it. *The act of judgment* requires a careful bringing to bear of the uncreated idea on the thing judged, not any uncreated idea, but just that idea which the thing judged is striving to realize, "an oughtness which is in direct relation to the *isness* of the particular work."

In the fifth and last chapter in the first part of his work, Mr. Chapman investigates the meaning of art according to St. Augustine. It is divided into three parts: (1) *what art is*, (2) *Christian art*, (3) *art and morality*. Concerning the nature of art he makes three points: (1) that art is not imitation but primarily of reason. (2) That art is unchangeable. (3) That art is discovered through illumination, not made. Concerning Christian art he proposes and explains the analogy that the artist is to the work of art as the Father is to the Son, for man being made in God's image, what man does is similar to the Divinity. Then he concludes that art proceeds from a love of God and its end is to praise God. The relation of art and morality is set forth in three parts. *First*, the cardinal virtues are explained as modes of love: Temperance is love which gives itself entirely to the Beloved. Fortitude is love which bears all things easily for the Beloved. Justice is love which serves the Beloved only. Prudence is love which discovers the path to the Beloved. *Second*, a formal distinction is drawn between art and morality according to judgment and use. *Third*, the ultimate unity of art and morality is shown in the perfection of both, in contemplation.

With the section on the *Meaning of Art* the first part of the work is completed. Or perhaps it would be better to say that the treatise proper is completed, for the author calls the section in which he examines modern painting an "Afterword." It is Mr. Chapman's intention here, apparently, to prove that contemporary art, having learned St. Augustine's lesson through long experience, is in accordance with the Saint's aesthetic. He first proves this by an analysis of three types of art. Then he presents a short history of modern art regulated by these types. The three types of art are naturalistic, romantic and architectural. By "naturalistic art" he means art which seeks to reproduce what is given by sensation, "copying the appearances of nature." By "romantic art" he means art which strives to convey the emotional significance of what is given, by a dissociation from phenomena. Finally "architectural art" makes no dissociation from sensible reality, but corrects and supplements "this mechanical vision." "In romantic art there is the preponderance of the subject or self. Naturalistic art emphasizes the material object. Architectural art seeks a synthesis of the two." Architectural art is Augustinian in its conception of the continuity of nature and man. This constitutes the major premiss. The minor states that contemporary art is architectural. In his historical sketch of modern art Mr. Chapman shows how, beginning with Cezanne and the break from Impressionism, the tendency to architectural art was gradually

realized. After Cezanne's liberation "from the nineteenth-century bondage of error," three phases are discoverable: The Fauves, the Cubists and a synthesis of the two. "The Fauves cultivated their individual temperaments" and "instead of grasping a form in the real, they started with arbitrary forms subjectively conceived and they often remained in the subjective realm." The Cubists "dissected objects with a scientific cruelty, and coldly replaced the parts on their canvases as their intelligence and will dictated." They "carried their abnegation so far as to renounce the body of the object for the sake of geometrical form." The third phase, represented by Matisse and Picasso, "is a synthesis of the Fauves and the Cubists." "A careful construction is enclosed within the finished composition." "The real is followed humbly and reveals the precious forms to artists of profound humility and chaste love."

Third, and finally, the author concludes from this history, as a minor, that the new art is a realization of St. Augustine's principles.

It is not pleasant to criticize radically a work which is the culmination of so much painstaking scholarship and reflection, so manifestly genuine and noble in its motives and unpretentious in its claims. It is, further, difficult to grasp what is valuable in a conception of St. Augustine so radically different from one's own, and difficult to be confident in disagreeing with a work developed under the auspicious guidance graciously acknowledged by Mr. Chapman. But on the other hand there is good tradition for placing doctrine before persons in the matter of criticism.

As I have already indicated, my disagreement comes at the very beginning of this work. What does it mean to say that one has attempted to put in order St. Augustine's responses to the question: "What is the beautiful, and what is beauty?" What kind of order? Did not the "responses" have an order as they appeared in the original writings? In that case it would seem that they are disordered when taken out of their original order. The context of Augustine's question: "What is the beautiful, and what is beauty?" is ironical. He asks the question, writes a book, *De Pulchro et Apto*, dedicating it to Hierius, a Roman orator, and the book is lost. Why did he dedicate the book to Hierius? Because his friends thought that he was a great and wise man. He dedicated it through the contagion of love. But not the love of God, but by the love and judgment of men. "For then I was accustomed to love men by the judgment of men; not from Thee, my God, in Whom no man is deceived." The book was conceived in sin and it was lost, even as the Augustine who wrote it was, by the grace of God, lost. For to understand what the beautiful is, is to be beautiful, to be lost. To find, for St. Augustine, was to lose himself. It was not for him to articulate with meticulous precision the determinate natures of created things. Rather he was a wounded child, a prodigious mind but still a child, running for refuge in his Father's arms. His dialectic is the trans-

formation of sin to holiness, and therefore, like the mystery which is its source, it is mysterious. To understand the beautiful for him, which means in the supernatural mode, is to flee sin, to become quiet, to approach the Father through the Son, to be moved by the Holy Ghost. It is to diffuse what has been given. If this intention were not immediately recognizable as St. Augustine's, one could document the proposition that it is almost endlessly. For example his reason for entering minutely into the problems of prosody in the *De Musica* was to bring rhetoricians, in the latter books, to a full realization of the beauty they were vainly seeking in human words. His written works as his spoken words were the diffusion of Charity, to lead men even as he had been led, to the one Good they are seeking. Dialectic is, on the face of it, a misleading word for this. It suggests too much a type of philosophic discipline, something too human. As though one were to remark Augustine's dialectical ingenuity. As well speak of the ingenuity of a rushing torrent. The beauty which we see in him is the beauty of a supernatural motion, the motion by which we are moved when our will is to be still. His dialectic is the recollection of that motion still in that motion. It is dialectic if we interpret dialectic as through the Word, not through the human word apart from the Word, but through the Word made flesh.

The *Confessions* is an incomplete treatise on beauty as every treatise on beauty in this mode must be incomplete—or idolatrous. It is fantastic to set up an historical pseudo-philosophic term for what men like Augustine, Bonaventure, and perhaps, shocking as it may strike some scholastic ears, even Plato, were trying to communicate. As well suggest that the difference between St. Thomas and St. John of the Cross is nothing but the difference between the Aristotelian and the Platonic method. But there are things that men do which do not fit into the classifications that men make.

What, then, does it mean to put fragments from the *Confessions*, from the *De Musica*, from the *Commentaries on the Gospels*, the *De Trinitate*, into order? Each one is an incomplete treatise on beauty. "Tu excitas, ut laudare te delectet, quia fecisti nos ad te et inquietum est cor nostrum, donec requiescat in te."

What order is there for charity except Charity? Surely not the order of abstraction, of human knowing. For St. Augustine there is no separation of love from a disquisition on love. And beauty is love. To be a true treatise it must be a loving treatise, measured by what it loves and immeasurably measured. This would seem to be the providence of his lost treatise on beauty: because it was inspired by false love. What was false was lost, what was true remains, because it always is, and Augustine was chosen.

Shall we say, then, that the abstract formulations of St. Thomas were without love? Heaven forbid. But the love of St. Thomas is not the love of St. Augustine. Is and is not. "In the Crucifixion of Angelico, two persons especially draw the attention of the Dominican soul. . . . In the first

row is Saint Dominic kneeling with arms extended in a gesture of grief and compassion. . . . In the rear row, standing, his arms folded on his breast, with head thrust forward to see the better, is Saint Thomas Aquinas. His face betrays a poignant and concentrated expression. Still he does not weep, he gazes: he gazes fixedly at the Crucified Christ and the mute emotion which envelopes him, far from averting his gaze seems but to deepen it and to draw from his eyes an intense flame, just as in the black depths of a volcano one sees the bubbling of fiery lava rise, powerful and restrained. . . . Saint Thomas looks the fearful sacrifice in the face and, despite the horror of the torture, masters its characteristics so as to let nothing escape him, so as to enter more deeply into the mystery, and thus he is here the Doctor.”¹

The writing of each saint proceeded from love, was guided and perfected by love. But they were different ways of love. St. Augustine knew that individual works should be understood in the light of those eternal ideas which they strove to embody. St. Thomas knew that it is better in this life to love God than to know Him, because we cannot know Him as He is. They are different ways of love, but not as not containing each other. For St. Augustine is in St. Thomas and St. Thomas is in St. Augustine, somewhat as the Divine Persons are in each other. Perhaps St. Thomas is more like the Son, St. Augustine more like the Holy Ghost. For they are both saints and therefore both divine. Yet there is distinction analogous to the distinction between the Persons of the Holy Trinity. Perhaps, like that distinction, it is mysterious. In any case, like that distinction, it cannot be ignored.

I think the weakness of Mr. Chapman's book is in his misunderstanding of the distinction. Certainly he grasps that the two are different, but he fails to understand what the difference is—in so far as it can be understood. This would account for the sense of artificial ordering one experiences in reading his work. The sharp divisions of the different chapters are like dams in a flood. He himself is aware of this difficulty. He says in the introduction: “These terms never hardened into meanings which remained fixed throughout his writings, but were more like seminal ideas unfolding into greater amplitude and pushing forward to further consequences.” A treatise on St. Augustine should, if this is true, expound the dialectic, the exciting sensitivity to context, to the work of love in which the ordering love is altogether sensitive to the needs of each idea, its fulfillment in the neighboring ideas. It should show forth the charity of St. Augustine, the charity which caused him to dwell so long on prosody in the *De Musica*, in order to save the souls of rhetoricians. It should do this by expounding the

¹ Gardeil. *The Gifts of the Holy Ghost in the Dominican Saints*. Chap. viii. Translated by Anselm M. Townsend, O.P. The passage is quoted from *Dominican Spirituality*, p. 120.

dialectic which is St. Augustine's charity in act. It is something more than the facile reduction of all beauty to Divine illumination. It is St. Augustine's imitation of Christ, the apostolate which grew out of his crucifixion in self-knowledge.

Concretely this failure is revealed almost dramatically when Mr. Chapman says: "An analysis of *Deus Creator omnium* has led from sensible number to intelligible number and thence to God. *Any other subject* could have yielded the same results . . ." (italics mine). Emphatically no other subject could have yielded the same results. For starting with the verse which praises God as the Creator of all things, the analysis of the music reveals what the words say. As though the words proceeded from the Word, the music from the Holy Ghost, and therefore both lead to God. Just as it is no accident that in the very beginning of the *De Musica* the Master asks: "What foot is 'Modus'?" Then, "What foot is 'bonus'?" Then suggesting: "So what is *bonus* is also *modus*." For later it develops that music is the "scientia bene modulandi," and ultimately "bonus" is "modus." In this kind of thing lies, if you please, the genius of St. Augustine, in his power to make you realize the mystery of one in many in the concrete things of ordinary experience. And with a fecundity that is breath-taking. It is this lesson that Augustine has still to teach Thomists as he taught St. Thomas; to put it very sharply, and I think it deserves to be put sharply, the mystery in knowledge as well as the mystery in God. For knowledge is from God, not from St. Thomas. It is a lesson that will have to be learned before Thomists do for their contemporaries what St. Thomas did for his, what Augustine did for his. There is only one name for it: Intellectual Charity.

The "afterword" on contemporary art is distressingly insensitive, both to the spiritual problems of contemporary artists and to the dialectical medium in which philosophers must clarify and resolve them.

First, if the contemporary artists have achieved the "architectural" ideal which Mr. Chapman says they have, they have realized the Thomistic conception of art, not St. Augustine's. Or, if you please, they have realized the idea of art *simpliciter*. I do not think that Mr. Chapman would want to identify the photographic ideal of "naturalism" with the Aristotelian and Thomistic meaning of imitation. Imitation, for Aristotle, strives to realize a "certain universal," and for St. Thomas art is at once imitation and "primarily in the intellect."

In the second place St. Augustine's concept of art is definitely not "architectural" as Mr. Chapman defines the term: "Realizing that architecture is the mother of the arts, the architectural artist's purpose is to achieve integrated forms into significant wholes. He will have failed in achieving his end if he does not realize a self-contained structure." The contrary of this is very close to Augustine's doctrine. Any "self-contained structure"

would be an idol tempting men to fornication of the spirit, an abhorrence in the eyes of God. To be beautiful the visible work of art must show forth the beauty of things that cannot be seen, a work of grace and an instrument of salvation. To be significant is to fail to be a whole, to signify what is beyond that which signifies, as the numbers of poetry signify the eternal numbers of the Divine Mind, and the Divine Mind itself, as the parts of a rhythm signify the self-sacrifice of the parts which permits them to live again in that which comprehends them.

Finally, Mr. Chapman appears to be singularly unaware of the contemporary artist's terrible spiritual struggle, and not knowing the *terminus ad quem*, his history is confused and misleading. This is not the place for an exposition of contemporary art, but it would seem evident even on the surface that the art of today is in anything but the happy state Mr. Chapman describes. The restless experimenting of Picasso, the linguistically Heraclitean universe of James Joyce, Paul Valéry's "intellect devouring itself," Stravinsky's nostalgia for classic and religious expression, are typical enough to make such a formulation absurd. The relevance of St. Augustine's doctrine is indeed tremendous in the interpretation of contemporary art, but not in the complacent way that Mr. Chapman suggests. It is true that the Thomistic doctrine of art will not answer the contemporary artist's questions. It is too perfectly natural for that, and the contemporary artist is grappling with supernatural problems which he suspects but cannot formulate, no less solve. What they need is the Thomistic doctrine of grace and the Augustinian preparation for the reception of that doctrine. Because contemporary artists are not interested in *recta ratio factibilium* but in *recta ratio agibilium*. They have not, as Mr. Chapman says they have, broken with romanticism, but with a certain sham of romanticism, the sham of fornication, the sham which identifies self-expression with the glory of God. Stravinsky dedicating his *Symphonie des Psaumes* to the Glory of God and the Boston Symphony Orchestra, expresses his hatred of the romantic sham in himself. It is this in romanticism that the contemporary artist hates. But at the same time he realizes that he cannot escape from it by his own artistic means. And so he hates it as only a man can hate a thing which he knows is destroying him. But he hates because he still loves, because there is something authentic in romanticism, something which makes the most lurid romantic very close and dear to St. Augustine particularly, who knew the unspeakable pain of loving sinfully and the glory of love through Christ and with Him and in Him. But how shall they love if they do not know? And how shall they know without a preacher?

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